


Demography

(The Study of Human Population)



Nu Brannon

First Edition, 2012

ISBN 978-81-323-2736-3

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Published by:
Orange Apple
4735/22 Prakashdeep Bldg,
Ansari Road, Darya Ganj,
Delhi - 110002
Email: info@wtbooks.com

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
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Chapter- 1

Introduction to Demography




Map of countries by population

Demography is the statistical study of human populations. It can be a very general science that can be applied to any kind of dynamic human population, that is, one that changes over time or space. It encompasses the study of the size, structure and distribution of these populations, and spatial and/or temporal changes in them in response to birth, migration, aging and death.

Demographic analysis can be applied to whole societies or to groups defined by criteria such as education, nationality, religion and ethnicity. Institutionally, demography is usually considered a field of sociology, though there are a number of independent demography departments. **Formal demography** limits its object of study to the measurement of populations processes, while the more broad field of social demography population studies also analyze the relationships between economic, social, cultural and biological processes influencing a population.

The term demographics is often used erroneously for demography, but refers rather to selected population characteristics as used in government, marketing or opinion research, or the demographic profiles used in such research.

Data and methods



Human population growth showing projections for later this century

There are two methods of data collection: direct and indirect. Direct data come from vital statistics registries that track all births and deaths as well as certain changes in legal status such as marriage, divorce, and migration (registration of place of residence). In developed countries with good registration systems (such as the United States and much of Europe), registry statistics are the best method for estimating the number of births and deaths.

A census is the other common direct method of collecting demographic data. A census is usually conducted by a national government and attempts to enumerate every person in a country. However, in contrast to vital statistics data, which are typically collected continuously and summarized on an annual basis, censuses typically occur only every 10 years or so, and thus are not usually the best source of data on births and deaths. Analyses are conducted after a census to estimate how much over or undercounting took place.

Censuses do more than just count people. They typically collect information about families or households, as well as about such individual characteristics as age, sex, marital status, literacy/education, employment status and occupation, and geographical location. They may also collect data on migration (or place of birth or of previous residence), language, religion, nationality (or ethnicity or race), and citizenship. In countries in which the vital registration system may be incomplete, the censuses are also used as a direct source of information about fertility and mortality; for example the censuses of the People's Republic of China gather information on births and deaths that occurred in the 18 months immediately preceding the census.

Indirect methods of collecting data are required in countries where full data are not available, such as is the case in much of the developing world. One of these techniques is the sister method, where survey researchers ask women how many of their sisters have died or had children and at what age. With these surveys, researchers can then indirectly

estimate birth or death rates for the entire population. Other indirect methods include asking people about siblings, parents, and children.

There are a variety of demographic methods for modeling population processes. They include models of mortality (including the life table, Gompertz models, hazards models, Cox proportional hazards models, multiple decrement life tables, Brass relational logits), fertility (Hernes model, Coale-Trussell models, parity progression ratios), marriage (Singulate Mean at Marriage, Page model), disability (Sullivan's method, multistate life tables), population projections (Lee Carter, the Leslie Matrix), and population momentum (Keyfitz).

- The **crude birth rate**, the annual number of live births per 1,000 people.
- The **general fertility rate**, the annual number of live births per 1,000 women of childbearing age (often taken to be from 15 to 49 years old, but sometimes from 15 to 44).
- **age-specific fertility** rates, the annual number of live births per 1,000 women in particular age groups (usually age 15-19, 20-24 etc.)
- The **crude death rate**, the annual number of deaths per 1,000 people.
- The **infant mortality rate**, the annual number of deaths of children less than 1 year old per 1,000 live births.
- The **expectation of life** (or life expectancy), the number of years which an individual at a given age could expect to live at present mortality levels.
- The **total fertility rate**, the number of live births per woman completing her reproductive life, if her childbearing at each age reflected current age-specific fertility rates.
- The **replacement level fertility**, the average number of children a woman must have in order to replace herself with a daughter in the next generation. For example the replacement level fertility in the US is 2.11. This means that 100 women will bear 211 children, 103 of which will be females. About 3% of the alive female infants are expected to decrease before they bear children, thus producing 100 women in the next generation.
- The **gross reproduction rate**, the number of daughters who would be born to a woman completing her reproductive life at current age-specific fertility rates.
- The **net reproduction ratio** is the expected number of daughters, per newborn prospective mother, who may or may not survive to and through the ages of childbearing.
- A **stable population**, one that has had constant crude birth and death rates for such long time that the percentage of people in every age class remains constant, or equivalently, the population pyramid has an unchanging structure.
- A **stationary population**, one that is both stable and unchanging in size (the difference between crude birth rate and crude death rate is zero).

A stable population does not necessarily remain fixed in size, it can be expanding or shrinking.

Note that the crude death rate as defined above and applied to a whole population can give a misleading impression. For example, the number of deaths per 1,000 people can be higher for developed nations than in less-developed countries, despite standards of health being better in developed countries. This is because developed countries have proportionally more older people, who are more likely to die in a given year, so that the overall mortality rate can be higher even if the mortality rate at any given age is lower. A more complete picture of mortality is given by a life table which summarises mortality separately at each age. A life table is necessary to give a good estimate of life expectancy.

The fertility rates can also give a misleading impression that a population is growing faster than it in fact is, because measurement of fertility rates only involves the reproductive rate of women, and does not adjust for the sex ratio. For example, if a population has a total fertility rate of 4.0 but the sex ratio is 66/34 (twice as many men as women), this population is actually growing at a slower natural increase rate than would a population having a fertility rate of 3.0 and a sex ratio of 50/50. This distortion is greatest in India and Myanmar, and is present in China as well.

Basic equation

Suppose that a country (or other entity) contains $Population_t$ persons at time t . What is the size of the population at time $t + 1$?

$$Population_{t+1} = Population_t + Naturalincrease_t + Netmigration_t$$

Natural increase from time t to $t + 1$:

$$Naturalincrease_t = Births_t - Deaths_t$$

Net migration from time t to $t + 1$:

$$Netmigration_t = Immigration_t - Emigration_t$$

This basic equation can also be applied to subpopulations. For example, the population size of ethnic groups or nationalities within a given society or country is subject to the same sources of change. However, when dealing with ethnic groups, "net migration" might have to be subdivided into physical migration and ethnic reidentification (assimilation). Individuals who change their ethnic self-labels or whose ethnic classification in government statistics changes over time may be thought of as migrating or moving from one population subcategory to another.

More generally, while the basic demographic equation holds true by definition, in practice the recording and counting of events (births, deaths, immigration, emigration) and the enumeration of the total population size are subject to error. So allowance needs to be made for error in the underlying statistics when any accounting of population size or change is made.

History

Demographic thoughts can be traced back to antiquity, and are present in many civilisations and cultures, like Ancient Greece, Rome, India and China. In ancient Greece, this can be found in the writings of Herodotus, Thucydides, Hippocrates, Epicurus, Protagoras, Polus, Plato and Aristotle. In Rome, writers and philosophers like Cicero, Seneca, Pliny the elder, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, Cato and Collumella also expressed important ideas on this ground.


In the Middle ages, Christian thinkers devoted much time in refuting the Classical ideas on demography. Important contributors to the field were William of Conches, Bartholomew of Lucca, William of Auvergne, William of Pagula, and Ibn Khaldun.

The *Natural and Political Observations ... upon the Bills of Mortality* (1662) of John Graunt contains a primitive form of life table. Mathematicians, such as Edmond Halley, developed the life table as the basis for life insurance mathematics. Richard Price was credited with the first textbook on life contingencies published in 1771, followed later by Augustus de Morgan, 'On the Application of Probabilities to Life Contingencies' (1838).

At the end of the 18th century, Thomas Malthus concluded that, if unchecked, populations would be subject to exponential growth. He feared that population growth would tend to outstrip growth in food production, leading to ever-increasing famine and poverty. He is seen as the intellectual father of ideas of overpopulation and the limits to growth. Later, more sophisticated and realistic models were presented by Benjamin Gompertz and Verhulst.

The period 1860-1910 can be characterized as a period of transition wherein demography emerged from statistics as a separate field of interest. This period included a panoply of international 'great demographers' like Adolphe Quételet (1796–1874), William Farr (1807–1883), Louis-Adolphe Bertillon (1821–1883) and his son Jacques (1851–1922), Joseph Körösi (1844–1906), Anders Nicolas Kaier (1838–1919), Richard Böckh (1824–1907), Wilhelm Lexis (1837–1914) and Luigi Bodio (1840–1920) contributed to the development of demography and to the toolkit of methods and techniques of demographic analysis.

Transition



World population from 500CE to 2150, based on UN 2004 projections (red, orange, green) and US Census Bureau historical estimates (black). Only the section in blue is from reliable counts, not estimates or projections.

Contrary to Malthus' predictions and in line with his thoughts on moral restraint, natural population growth in most developed countries has diminished to close to zero, without being held in check by famine or lack of resources, as people in developed nations have shown a tendency to have fewer children. The fall in population growth has occurred despite large rises in life expectancy in these countries. This pattern of population growth, with slow (or no) growth in pre-industrial societies, followed by fast growth as the society develops and industrializes, followed by slow growth again as it becomes more affluent, is known as the demographic transition.

Similar trends are now becoming visible in ever more developing countries, so that far from spiraling out of control, world population growth is expected to slow markedly in this century, coming to an eventual standstill or even declining. The change is likely to be accompanied by major shifts in the proportion of world population in particular regions. The United Nations Population Division expects the absolute number of infants and toddlers in the world to begin to fall by 2015, and the number of children under 15 by 2025.

The figure in this section shows the latest (2004) UN projections of world population out to the year 2150 (red = high, orange = medium, green = low). The UN "medium" projection shows world population reaching an approximate equilibrium at 9 billion by 2075. Working independently, demographers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria expect world population to peak at 9 billion by 2070. Throughout the 21st century, the average age of the population is likely to continue to rise.

Science of population


Populations can change through three processes: fertility, mortality, and migration. Fertility involves the number of children that women have and is to be contrasted with fecundity (a woman's childbearing potential). Mortality is the study of the causes, consequences, and measurement of processes affecting death to members of the population. Demographers most commonly study mortality using the Life Table, a statistical device which provides information about the mortality conditions (most notably the life expectancy) in the population.

Migration refers to the movement of persons from an origin place to a destination place across some pre-defined, political boundary. Migration researchers do not designate movements 'migrations' unless they are somewhat permanent. Thus demographers do not consider tourists and travelers to be migrating. While demographers who study migration typically do so through census data on place of residence, indirect sources of data including tax forms and labor force surveys are also important.

Demography is today widely taught in many universities across the world, attracting students with initial training in social sciences, statistics or health studies. Being at the crossroads of several disciplines such as sociology, economics, epidemiology, geography, anthropology and history, demography offers tools to approach a large range of population issues by combining a more technical quantitative approach that represents the core of the discipline with many other methods borrowed from social or other sciences. Demographic research is conducted in universities, in research institutes as well as in statistical departments and in several international agencies. Population institutions are part of the Cicred (International Committee for Coordination of Demographic Research) network while most individual scientists engaged in demographic research are members of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population or, in the United States, the Population Association of America.

Chapter- 2

Demographic Transition



A diagram of the demographic transition model, including stage 5


The **demographic transition (DT)** is a model used to represent the transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates as a country develops from a pre-industrial to an industrialized economic system. The theory is based on an interpretation of demographic history developed in 1929 by the American demographer Warren Thompson (1887–1973). Thompson observed changes, or transitions, in birth and death rates in industrialized societies over the previous 200 years. Most developed countries are in stage 3 or 4 of the model; the majority of developing countries have reached stage 2 or stage 3. The major (relative) exceptions are some poor countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and some Middle Eastern countries, which are poor or affected by government policy or civil strife, notably Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Yemen and Afghanistan.

Although this model predicts ever decreasing fertility rates, recent data show that beyond a certain level of development fertility rates increase again.


It is important to note the key differences between developed and less developed countries in understanding the dynamics of demographic transition. The traditional demographic transition began in developed countries in the eighteenth century and

continues in our current era. In less developed countries, this demographic transition started later and is still at an earlier stage in the transition.

Summary of the theory



Population pyramids for 4 stages of the model



Demographic change in Sweden from 1735 to 2000.
 Red line: crude death rate (CDR), blue line: (crude) birth rate (CBR)

The transition involves four stages, or possibly five

- In stage one, pre-industrial society, death rates and birth rates are high and roughly in balance.
- In stage two, that of a developing country, the death rates drop rapidly due to improvements in food supply and sanitation, which increase life spans and reduce disease. These changes usually come about due to improvements in farming

- techniques, access to technology, basic healthcare, and education. Without a corresponding fall in birth rates this produces an imbalance, and the countries in this stage experience a large increase in population.
- In stage three, birth rates fall due to access to contraception, increases in wages, urbanization, a reduction in subsistence agriculture, an increase in the status and education of women, a reduction in the value of children's work, an increase in parental investment in the education of children and other social changes. Population growth begins to level off.
 - During stage four there are both low birth rates and low death rates. Birth rates may drop to well below replacement level as has happened in countries like Germany, Italy, and Japan, leading to a shrinking population, a threat to many industries that rely on population growth. As the large group born during stage two ages, it creates an economic burden on the shrinking working population. Death rates may remain consistently low or increase slightly due to increases in lifestyle diseases due to low exercise levels and high obesity and an aging population in developed countries.


As with all models, this is an idealized picture of population change in these countries. The model is a generalization that applies to these countries as a group and may not accurately describe all individual cases. The extent to which it applies to less-developed societies today remains to be seen. Many countries such as China, Brazil and Thailand have passed through the DTM very quickly due to fast social and economic change. Some countries, particularly African countries, appear to be stalled in the second stage due to stagnant development and the effect of AIDS.

Stage One

In pre-industrial society, death rates and birth rates were both high and fluctuated rapidly according to natural events, such as drought and disease, to produce a relatively constant and young population. Family planning and contraception were virtually nonexistent; therefore, birth rates were essentially only limited by the ability of women to bear children. Emigration depressed death rates in some special cases (for example, Europe and particularly the Eastern United States during the 19th century), but, overall, death rates tended to match birth rates, often exceeding 40 per 1000 per year. Children contributed to the economy of the household from an early age by carrying water, firewood, and messages, caring for younger siblings, sweeping, washing dishes, preparing food, and working in the fields. Raising a child cost little more than feeding him; there were no education or entertainment expenses and, in equatorial Africa, there were no clothing expenses either. Thus, the total cost of raising children barely exceeded their contribution to the household. In addition, as they became adults they become a major input to the family business, mainly farming, and were the primary form of insurance for adults in old age. In India, an adult son was all that prevented a widow from falling into destitution. While death rates remained high there was no question as to the need for children, even if the means to prevent them had existed.

During this stage, the society evolves in accordance with Malthusian paradigm, with population essentially determined by the food supply. Any fluctuations in food supply (either positive, for example, due to technology improvements, or negative, due to droughts and pest invasions) tend to translate directly into population fluctuations. Famines resulting in significant mortality are frequent. Overall, the population dynamics during stage one is highly reminiscent of that commonly observed in animals.

Stage Two



World population 10,000 BC - 2000 AD


This stage leads to a fall in death rates and an increase in population. The changes leading to this stage in Europe were initiated in the Agricultural Revolution of the 18th century and were initially quite slow. In the 20th century, the falls in death rates in developing countries tended to be substantially faster. Countries in this stage include Yemen, Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories, Bhutan and Laos and much of Sub-Saharan Africa (but do not include South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia, Kenya and Ghana, which have begun to move into stage 3).

The decline in the death rate is due initially to two factors:

- First, improvements in the food supply brought about by higher yields in agricultural practices and better transportation prevent death due to starvation and lack of water. Agricultural improvements included crop rotation, selective breeding, and seed drill technology.
- Second, significant improvements in public health reduce mortality, particularly in childhood. These are not so much medical breakthroughs (Europe passed through stage two before the advances of the mid-20th century, although there was significant medical progress in the 19th century, such as the development of vaccination) as they are improvements in water supply, sewerage, food handling,

and general personal hygiene following from growing scientific knowledge of the causes of disease and the improved education and social status of mothers.

A consequence of the decline in mortality in Stage Two is an increasingly rapid rise in population growth (a "population explosion") as the gap between deaths and births grows wider. Note that this growth is not due to an increase in fertility (or birth rates) but to a decline in deaths. This change in population occurred in northwestern Europe during the 19th century due to the Industrial Revolution. During the second half of the 20th century less-developed countries entered Stage Two, creating the worldwide population explosion that has demographers concerned today.



Angola 2005

Another characteristic of Stage Two of the demographic transition is a change in the age structure of the population. In Stage One, the majority of deaths are concentrated in the first 5–10 years of life. Therefore, more than anything else, the decline in death rates in Stage Two entails the increasing survival of children and a growing population. Hence, the age structure of the population becomes increasingly youthful and more of these children enter the reproductive cycle of their lives while maintaining the high fertility rates of their parents. The bottom of the "age pyramid" widens first, accelerating population growth. The age structure of such a population is illustrated by using an example from the Third World today.

Stage Three

Stage Three moves the population towards stability through a decline in the birth rate. Several factors contribute to this eventual decline, although some of them remain speculative:

- In rural areas continued decline in childhood death means that at some point parents realize they need not require so many children to be born to ensure a comfortable old age. As childhood death continues to fall and incomes increase parents can become increasingly confident that fewer children will suffice to help in family business and care for them in old age.

- Increasing urbanization changes the traditional values placed upon fertility and the value of children in rural society. Urban living also raises the cost of dependent children to a family. A recent theory suggests that urbanization also contributes to reducing the birth rate because it disrupts optimal mating patterns. A 2008 study in Iceland found that the most fecund marriages are between distant cousins. Genetic incompatibilities inherent in more distant outbreeding makes reproduction harder.
- In both rural and urban areas, the cost of children to parents is exacerbated by the introduction of compulsory education acts and the increased need to educate children so they can take up a respected position in society. Children are increasingly prohibited under law from working outside the household and make an increasingly limited contribution to the household, as school children are increasingly exempted from the expectation of making a significant contribution to domestic work. Even in equatorial Africa, children now need to be clothed, and may even require school uniforms. Parents begin to consider it a duty to buy children books and toys. Partly due to education and access to family planning, people begin to reassess their need for children and their ability to raise them.



A major factor in reducing birth rates in stage 3 countries such as Malaysia is the availability of family planning facilities, like this one in Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu, Malaysia.

- Increasing female literacy and employment lower the uncritical acceptance of childbearing and motherhood as measures of the status of women. Working women have less time to raise children; this is particularly an issue where fathers traditionally make little or no contribution to child-raising, such as southern Europe or Japan. Valuation of women beyond childbearing and motherhood becomes important.
- Improvements in contraceptive technology are now a major factor. Fertility decline is caused as much by changes in values about children and sex as by the availability of contraceptives and knowledge of how to use them.

The resulting changes in the age structure of the population include a reduction in the youth dependency ratio and eventually population aging. The population structure becomes less triangular and more like an elongated balloon. During the period between the decline in youth dependency and rise in old age dependency there is a demographic window of opportunity that can potentially produce economic growth through an increase in the ratio of working age to dependent population; the demographic dividend.

However, unless factors such as those listed above are allowed to work, a society's birth rates may not drop to a low level in due time, which means that the society cannot proceed to Stage Four and is locked in what is called a demographic trap.

Countries that have experienced a fertility decline of over 40% from their pre-transition levels include: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Jamaica, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Surinam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, South Africa, India, Saudi Arabia, and many Pacific islands.

Countries that have experienced a fertility decline of 25-40% include: Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Bolivia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Jordan, Qatar, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe, and Botswana.


Countries that have experienced a fertility decline of 10-25% include: Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Kenya, Ghana and Senegal.

Stage Four

This occurs where birth and death rates are both low. Therefore the total population is high and stable. Some theorists consider there are only 4 stages and that the population of a country will remain at this level. The DTM is only a suggestion about the future population levels of a country. It is not a prediction.

Countries that are at this stage (Total Fertility Rate of less than 2.5 in 1997) include: United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, most of Europe, Bahamas, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Singapore, Iran, China, Turkey, Thailand and Mauritius.

Stage Five



United Nation's population projections by location.
Note the vertical axis is logarithmic and represents millions of people.

The original Demographic Transition model has just four stages; however, some theorists consider that a fifth stage is needed to represent countries that have sub-replacement fertility (that is, below 2.1 children per woman). Most European and many East Asian countries now have higher death rates than birth rates. In this stage, population aging and population decline will eventually occur to some extent, presuming that sustained mass immigration does not occur.

Possible Stage Six

There may even be a further stage of demographic development. In an article in the August 2009 issue of *Nature*, Myrskylä, Kohler and Billari show that previously negative relationship between national wealth (as measured by the human development index (HDI) and birth rates has become J-shaped. Development promotes fertility decline at low and medium HDI levels, but advanced HDI promotes a rebound in fertility. In many countries with very high levels of development (around 0.95) fertility rates are now approaching two children per woman - although there are exceptions, notably Canada and Japan.

Effects on age structure

The decline in death rate and birth rate that occurs during the demographic transition leads to a radical transformation of the age structure. When the death rate declines during the second stage of the transition, the result is primarily an increase in the child population. The reason is that when the death rate is high (stage one), the infant mortality rate is very high, often above 200 deaths per 1000 children born. When the death rate falls or improves, this, in general, results in a significantly lower infant mortality rate and, hence, increased child survival. Over time, as cohorts increased by higher survival rates get older, there will also be an increase in the number of older children, teenagers, and young adults. This implies that there is an increase in the fertile population which, with constant fertility rates, will lead to an increase in the number of children born. This will further increase the growth of the child population. The second stage of the demographic transition, therefore, implies a rise in child dependency.

Historical studies

Britain

Between 1750 and 1975 England experienced the transition from high levels of both mortality and fertility, to low levels. A major factor was the sharp decline in the death rate for infectious diseases, which has fallen from about 11 per 1,000 to less than 1 per 1,000. By contrast, the death rate from other causes was 12 per 1,000 in 1850 and has not declined markedly. The agricultural revolution and the development of transport, initiated by the construction of canals, led to greater availability of food and coal, and enabled the Industrial Revolution to improve the standard of living. Scientific discoveries and medical breakthroughs did not, in general, contribute importantly to the early major decline in infectious disease mortality, and the decline in fertility occurred before efficient contraception became available.

Ireland

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Irish demographic status converged to the European norm. Mortality rose above the European Community average, and in 1991 Irish fertility

fell to replacement level. The peculiarities of Ireland's past demography and its recent rapid changes challenge established theory. The recent changes have mirrored inward changes in Irish society, with respect to family planning, women in the work force, the sharply declining power of the Catholic Church, and the emigration factor.

France

France displays real divergences from the standard model of Western demographic evolution. The uniqueness of the French case arises from its specific demographic history, its historic cultural values, and its internal regional dynamics. France's demographic profile is similar to its European neighbors and to developed countries in general, yet it seems to be staving off the population decline of Western countries. With 62.9 million inhabitants in 2006, it is the second most populous country in the European Union, and it displays a certain demographic dynamism, with a growth rate of 2.4% between 2000 and 2005, above the European average. More than two-thirds of that growth can be ascribed to a natural increase resulting from high fertility and birthrates. In contrast, France is one of the developed nations whose migratory balance is rather weak, which is an original feature at the European level. Several interrelated reasons account for such singularities, in particular the impact of pro-family policies accompanied by greater unmarried households and out-of-wedlock births. These general demographic trends parallel equally important changes in regional demographics. Since 1982 the same significant tendencies have occurred throughout mainland France: demographic stagnation in the least-populated rural regions and industrial regions in the northwest, with strong growth in the southwest and along the Atlantic coast, plus dynamism in metropolitan areas. Shifts in population between regions account for most of the differences in growth. The varying demographic evolution regions can be analyzed through the filter of several parameters, including residential facilities, economic growth, and urban dynamism, which yield several distinct regional profiles. The distribution of the French population therefore seems increasingly defined not only by interregional mobility but also by the residential preferences of individual households. These challenges, linked to configurations of population and the dynamics of distribution, inevitably raise the issue of town and country planning. The most recent census figures show that an outpouring of the urban population means that fewer rural areas are continuing to register a negative migratory flow - two-thirds of rural communities have shown some since 2000. The spatial demographic expansion of large cities amplifies the process of peri-urbanization yet is also accompanied by movement of selective residential flow, social selection, and sociospatial segregation based on income.

Asia

McNicoll (2006) examines the common features behind the striking changes in health and fertility in East and Southeast Asia in the 1960s-1990s, focusing on seven countries: Taiwan and South Korea ("tiger" economies), Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia ("second wave" countries), and China and Vietnam ("market-Leninist" economies). Demographic change can be seen as a byproduct of social and economic development together with, in some cases, strong governmental pressures. The transition sequence

entailed the establishment of an effective, typically authoritarian, system of local administration, providing a framework for promotion and service delivery in health, education, and family planning. Subsequent economic liberalization offered new opportunities for upward mobility - and greater risks of backsliding - but these opportunities were accompanied by the erosion of social capital and the breakdown or privatization of service programs.

Korea

Cha (2007) analyzes a panel dataset to explore how industrial revolution, demographic transition, and human capital accumulation interacted in Korea from 1916-38. Income growth and public investment in health caused mortality to fall, which suppressed fertility and promoted education. Industrialization, skill premium, and closing gender wage gap further induced parents to opt for child quality. Expanding demand for education was accommodated by an active public school building program. The interwar agricultural depression aggravated traditional income inequality, raising fertility and impeding the spread of mass schooling. Landlordism collapsed in the wake of de-colonization, and the consequent reduction in inequality accelerated human and physical capital accumulation, hence growth in South Korea.

Africa

Campbell has studied the demography of 19th-century Madagascar in the light of demographic transition theory. Both supporters and critics of the theory hold to an intrinsic opposition between human and "natural" factors, such as climate, famine, and disease, influencing demography. They also suppose a sharp chronological divide between the precolonial and colonial eras, arguing that whereas "natural" demographic influences were of greater importance in the former period, human factors predominated thereafter. Campbell argues that in 19th-century Madagascar the human factor, in the form of the Merina state, was the predominant demographic influence. However, the impact of the state was felt through natural forces, and it varied over time. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries Merina state policies stimulated agricultural production, which helped to create a larger and healthier population and laid the foundation for Merina military and economic expansion within Madagascar. From 1820, the cost of such expansionism led the state to increase its exploitation of forced labor at the expense of agricultural production and thus transformed it into a negative demographic force. Infertility and infant mortality, which were probably more significant influences on overall population levels than the adult mortality rate, increased from 1820 due to disease, malnutrition, and stress, all of which stemmed from state forced labor policies. Available estimates indicate little if any population growth for Madagascar between 1820 and 1895. The demographic "crisis" in Africa, ascribed by critics of the demographic transition theory to the colonial era, stemmed in Madagascar from the policies of the imperial Merina regime, which in this sense formed a link to the French regime of the colonial era. Campbell thus questions the underlying assumptions governing the debate about historical demography in Africa and suggests that the demographic impact of

political forces be reevaluated in terms of their changing interaction with "natural" demographic influences.

Russia

Russia has been undergoing a unique demographic transition since the 1980s; observers call it a "demographic catastrophe": the number of deaths exceeds the number of births, life expectancy is drastically decreasing and the number of suicides has increased.

United States

Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) show that from 1800 to 1940 there was a demographic shift from a mostly rural US population with high fertility, with an average of seven children born per white woman, to a minority (43%) rural population with low fertility, with an average of two births per white woman. This shift resulted from technological progress. A sixfold increase in real wages made children more expensive in terms of forgone opportunities to work and increases in agricultural productivity reduced rural demand for labor, a substantial portion of which traditionally had been performed by children in farm families.

A simplification of the DTM theory proposes an initial decline in mortality followed by a later drop in fertility. The changing demographics of the U.S. in the last two centuries did not parallel this model. Beginning around 1800, there was a sharp fertility decline; at this time, an average woman usually produced seven births per lifetime, but by 1900 this number had dropped to nearly four. A mortality decline was not observed in the U.S. until almost 1900—a hundred years following the drop in fertility.

However, this late decline occurred from a very low initial level. It's been estimated that the crude death rate in 17th century rural New England was already as low as 20 deaths per 1000 residents per year (levels of up to 40 per 1000 being typical during stages one and two). The phenomenon is explained by the pattern of colonization of the United States: high death rates unavoidably had to match high birth rates in densely populated Europe, whereas in the United States, westward expansion of the frontier into sparsely populated interior allowed ample room to absorb all the excess people, resulting in exponential population growth (from less than 4 million people in 1790, to 23 million in 1850, to 76 million in 1900.)

Today, the U.S. is recognized as having both low fertility and mortality rates. Specifically, birth rates stand at 14 per 1000 per year and death rates at 8 per 1000 per year.

Critical evaluation

It has to be remembered that the DTM is only a model and cannot necessarily predict the future. It does however give an indication of what the future birth and death rates may be for an underdeveloped country, together with the total population size. Most particularly,

of course, the DTM makes no comment on change in population due to migration. It is not applicable for high levels of development, as it has been shown that after a HDI of 0.9 the fertility increases again.

Non-applicability to less-developed countries

DTM has a questionable applicability to less economically developed countries (LEDCs), where wealth and information access are limited. For example, the DTM has been validated primarily in Europe, Japan and North America where demographic data exists over centuries, whereas high quality demographic data for most LDCs did not become widely available until the mid 20th century. DTM does not account for recent phenomena such as AIDS; in these areas HIV has become the leading source of mortality. Some trends in waterborne bacterial infant mortality are also disturbing in countries like Malawi, Sudan and Nigeria; for example, progress in the DTM clearly arrested and reversed between 1975 and 2005.

Economic development not sufficient cause to effect demographic change

DTM assumes that population changes are induced by industrial changes and increased wealth, without taking into account the role of social change in determining birth rates, e.g., the education of women. In recent decades more work has been done on developing the social mechanisms behind it.

DTM assumes that the birth rate is independent of the death rate. Nevertheless, demographers maintain that there is no historical evidence for society-wide fertility rates rising significantly after high mortality events. Notably, some historic populations have taken many years to replace lives after events such as the Black Death.

Some have claimed that DTM does not explain the early fertility declines in much of Asia in the second half of the 20th century or the delays in fertility decline in parts of the Middle East. Nevertheless, the demographer John C Caldwell has suggested that the reason for the rapid decline in fertility in some developing countries compared to Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand is mainly due to government programs and a massive investment in education both by governments and parents.

Chapter- 3

Demography of the United States

The United States has a total estimated resident population of 311,909,000, the third largest in the world. It is a very urbanized population, with 82% residing in cities and suburbs as of 2008 (the worldwide urban rate is 50.5%). California and Texas are the most populous states, as the mean center of United States population has consistently shifted westward and southward.

The total fertility rate in the United States estimated for 2010 is 2.01 children per woman, which is below the sub-replacement fertility threshold of 2.1. However, U.S. population growth is among the highest in industrialized countries, since the vast majority of these have below-replacement fertility rates and the U.S. has higher levels of immigration. The United States Census Bureau shows population increases ranging between 0.85% and 0.89% for the twelve-month periods ending in 2009. Nonetheless, though high by industrialized country standards, this is below the world average annual rate of 1.19%.


There were 155.6 million females in the United States in 2009. The number of males was 151.4 million. At age 85 and older, there were more than twice as many women as men. People under 20 years of age made up over a quarter of the U.S. population (27.3%), and people age 65 and over made up one-eighth (12.8%) in 2009. The national median age was 36.8 years. Racially, the U.S. has a White American majority. Minorities compose just over one-third of the population (102.5 million in 2007), with Hispanic and Latino Americans and Black Americans as the largest minority groups, by ethnicity and race, respectively.

The American population more than tripled during the 20th century—at a growth rate of about 1.3% a year—from about 76 million in 1900 to 281 million in 2000. It reached the 200 million mark in 1967, and the 300 million mark on October 17, 2006. Currently, population growth is fastest among minorities as a whole, and according to the Census Bureau's estimation for 2005, 45% of American children under the age of 5 belonged to minority groups.


Hispanic and Latino Americans accounted for almost half (1.4 million) of the national population growth of 2.9 million between July 1, 2005, and July 1, 2006. Immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants are expected to provide most of the U.S. population gains in the decades ahead.

The Census Bureau projects a U.S. population of 439 million in 2050, which is a 46% increase from 2007 (301.3 million). However, the United Nations projects a U.S. population of 402 million in 2050, an increase of 32% from 2007 (the UN projects a gain of 38% for the world at large). In either case, such growth is unlike most European countries, especially Germany, Russia, Italy, and Greece, or Asian countries such as Japan or South Korea, whose populations are slowly declining, and whose fertility rates are below replacement.

As of January 18, 2011, the United States is estimated to have 4.52% of the world's population.



The first U.S. census, in 1790, recorded four million Americans. By 2000, this number had grown to 281 million. It is expected to reach 310 million by 2010 and 439 million by 2050.



United States population pyramid.

History

Since the liberalization of immigration policy in 1965, the number of first-generation immigrants living in the United States has quadrupled, from 9.6 million in 1970 to about 38 million in 2007. During the 1950s, 250,000 legal immigrants entered the country annually; by the 1990s, the number was almost one million, and the vast majority of new immigrants have come from Latin America and Asia. In 2009, 37% of immigrants originated in Asia, 42% in the Americas, and 11% in Africa. Almost 97% of residents of the 10 largest American cities in 1900 were non-Hispanic whites. In 2006, non-Hispanic whites were the minority in thirty-five of the fifty largest cities. The Census Bureau reported that minorities accounted for 48.6% of the children born in the U.S. between July 2008 and July 2009.

Cities

The United States has dozens of major cities, including 8 of the 60 "global cities" of all types, with three in the "alpha" group of global cities: New York City, Los Angeles and Chicago. As of 2008, the United States had 52 metropolitan areas with a population of over 1,000,000 people each.

The following table shows the populations of the top ten cities and their metropolitan areas, as of July 1, 2008.

Leading U.S. population centers

Rank	Core city	Pop.	Metro rank	Metropolitan Statistical Area	Metro area pop.	Region
1	New York City, New York	8,363,710	1	New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA MSA	19,006,798	Northeast
2	Los Angeles, California	3,833,995	2	Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA	12,872,808	West
3	Chicago, Illinois	2,853,114	3	Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI MSA	9,569,624	Midwest
4	Houston, Texas	2,242,193	6	Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX MSA	5,728,143	South
5	Phoenix, Arizona	1,567,924	12	Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ MSA	4,281,899	West
6	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	1,447,395	5	Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD MSA	5,838,471	Northeast
7	San Antonio, Texas	1,351,305	28	San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX MSA	2,031,445	South
8	Dallas, Texas	1,279,910	4	Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX MSA	6,300,006	South
9	San Diego, California	1,279,329	17	San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA MSA	3,001,072	West
10	San Jose, California	948,279	31	San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA MSA	1,819,198	West
42	Miami, Florida	433,136 (2009)	7	Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL MSA	5,514,772	South
33	Atlanta, Georgia	540,922 (2009)	8	Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA MSA	5,376,285	South
27	Washington, DC	599,657 (2009)	9	Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV MSA	5,358,130	South
20	Boston, Massachusetts	645,169 (2009)	10	Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH MSA	4,522,858	Northeast



New York City




Los Angeles



Chicago

2008 U.S. Census Bureau estimates

Population density



2000 U.S. population density within each county, in persons per sq. mile (lower 48 states only): *Light to dark (yellow to blue):* 1-4 (y), 5-9 (lt. green), 10-24 (teal), 25-49 (dk. teal), 50-99 (blue-green), 100-249 (blue), 250-66,995 (black).

Population density for selected U.S. census-designated places (CDPs) and select cities, towns, villages and city neighborhoods (top 100)

Place	Government type	Density
Friendship Village, Maryland		31,657/km ² 81,992/mi ²
Manhattan, New York	Borough & County	25,850/km ² 66,940/mi ²
Guttenberg, New Jersey	Town	21,961/km ² 56,012/mi ²
Union City, New Jersey	City	20,454/km ² 52,978/mi ²
West New York, New Jersey	Town	17,124/km ² 44,352/mi ²
Edgewater, Illinois		13,800/km ² 35,743/mi ²
Brooklyn, New York	Borough & County	13,481/km ² 34,917/mi ²
The Bronx, New York	Borough & County	12,242/km ² 31,709/mi ²
Hoboken, New Jersey	City	11,675/km ² 30,239/mi ²

Back Bay/Beacon Hill, Massachusetts		11,463/km ²	29,690/mi ²
New York City, New York	City	10,194/km ²	26,403/mi ²
Maywood, California	City	9,189/km ²	23,887/mi ²
Cliffside Park, New Jersey	Borough	9,253/km ²	23,848/mi ²
East Newark, New Jersey	Borough	9,178/km ²	23,330/mi ²
Passaic, New Jersey	City	8,425/km ²	21,805/mi ²
Cudahy, California	City	8,345/km ²	21,628/mi ²
Great Neck Plaza, New York	Village	8,052/km ²	20,853/mi ²
Irvington, New Jersey	City	7,926/km ²	20,528/mi ²
Queens, New York	Borough & County	7,880/km ²	20,409/mi ²
North Bay Village, Florida	City	7,825/km ²	20,267/mi ²
Huntington Park, California	City	7,819.5/km ²	20,254/mi ²
Kaser, New York	Village	7,468/km ²	19,343/mi ²
West Hollywood, California	City	7,335/km ²	18,993/mi ²
Somerville, Massachusetts	City	7,285/km ²	18,868/mi ²
East Orange, New Jersey	City	6,860/km ²	17,777/mi ²
Bell Gardens, California	City	6,842/km ²	17,721/mi ²
Paterson, New Jersey	City	6,826/km ²	17,675/mi ²
Sweetwater, Florida	City	6,774/km ²	17,440/mi ²
San Francisco, California	City & County	6,349/km ²	16,443/mi ²
Long Beach, New York	City	6,398/km ²	16,595/mi ²
Jersey City, New Jersey		6,195/km ²	16,094/mi ²
Chelsea, Massachusetts	City	6,211/km ²	16,086/mi ²
Lawndale, California	City	6,192/km ²	16,037/mi ²
Weehawken, New Jersey	Township	6,136/km ²	15,891/mi ²
South Floral Park, New York	Village	6,091/km ²	15,776/mi ²
Cambridge, Massachusetts	City	6,086/km ²	15,766/mi ²
Mount Vernon, New York	City	6,058/km ²	15,689/mi ²
Central Falls, Rhode Island		6,096/km ²	15,652/mi ²
Fairview, New Jersey	Borough	6,021/km ²	15,586/mi ²
Hawaiian Gardens, California	City	5,942/km ²	15,390/mi ²
Stone Park, Illinois	Village	5,999/km ²	15,378/mi ²
Hempstead, New York	Village	5,547/km ²	15,366/mi ²
Sunny Isles Beach, Florida	City	5,881/km ²	15,231/mi ²
Orange, New Jersey	Township	5,754/km ²	14,904/mi ²
Bell, California	City	5,715/km ²	14,803/mi ²
Cicero, Illinois		5,651/km ²	14,645/mi ²
Lynwood, California	City	5,556/km ²	14,389/mi ²

Palisades Park, New Jersey	Borough	5,449/km ²	14,112/mi ²
Fort Lee, New Jersey	Borough	5,412/km ²	14,002/mi ²
Garfield, New Jersey	City	5,399/km ²	13,976/mi ²
Hawthorne, California	City	5,359/km ²	13,879/mi ²
Berwyn, Illinois	City	5,361/km ²	13,876/mi ²
Bay Harbor Islands, Florida	Town	5,357/km ²	13,875/mi ²
Millbourne, Pennsylvania	Borough	5,309/km ²	13,749/mi ²
Daly City, California	City	5,353/km ²	13,704/mi ²
Elmwood Park, Illinois	Village	5,136/km ²	13,328/mi ²
South Gate, California	City	5,052/km ²	13,084/mi ²
Manorhaven, New York	Village	5,041/km ²	13,056/mi ²
Hudson County, New Jersey	County	5,036/km ²	13,044/mi ²
Mount Rainier, Maryland	City	5,034/km ²	13,039/mi ²
Hermosa Beach, California	City	5,013/km ²	12,982/mi ²
Woodlynne, New Jersey	Borough	4,996/km ²	12,939/mi ²
Island Park, New York	Village	4,938/km ²	12,866/mi ²
New Square, New York	Village	4,947/km ²	12,812/mi ²
Chicago, Illinois		4,866/km ²	12,603/mi ²
Miami Beach, Florida		4,830/km ²	12,502/mi ²
Santa Ana, California		4,751/km ²	12,306/mi ²
Boston, Massachusetts		4,697/km ²	12,166/mi ²
Spring Valley, New York		4,682/km ²	12,123/mi ²
Hialeah, Florida		4,544/km ²	11,768/mi ²
Hamtramck, Michigan		4,537/km ²	11,750/mi ²
Newark, New Jersey		4,459/km ²	11,548/mi ²
Miami, Florida		4,407/km ²	11,534/mi ²
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania		4,190/km ²	10,852/mi ²
Yonkers, New York		4,162/km ²	10,780/mi ²
Lakewood, Ohio		3,895/km ²	10,088/mi ²
Berkeley, California		3,793/km ²	9,823/mi ²
Washington, District of Columbia		3,502/km ²	9,070/mi ²
Staten Island, New York	Borough & County	3,246.3/km ²	8,408/mi ²
Los Angeles, California		3,078/km ²	7,972/mi ²
Baltimore, Maryland		2,970/km ²	7,693/mi ²
Buffalo, New York		2,786/km ²	7,217/mi ²
Oakland, California		2,724/km ²	7,054/mi ²
Minneapolis, Minnesota		2,691/km ²	6,969/mi ²
Seattle, Washington		2,563/km ²	6,639/mi ²

New Haven, Connecticut	2,527/km ²	6,554/mi ²
Detroit, Michigan	2,470/km ²	6,398/mi ²
Milwaukee, Wisconsin	2,399.5/km ²	6,214.7/mi ²
Cleveland, Ohio	2,353/km ²	6,095/mi ²
St. Louis, Missouri	2,199/km ²	5,696/mi ²
University City, Missouri	2,457/km ²	6,363.1/mi ²
Mechanicville, New York	2,091/km ²	5,577/mi ²
San Jose, California	1,953/km ²	5,059/mi ²
Cincinnati, Ohio	1,612/km ²	4,174/mi ²
Portland, Oregon	1,503/km ²	3,894/mi ²
Atlanta, Georgia	1,551.5/km ²	4,018.4/mi ²
Denver, Colorado	1,396.4/km ²	3,642/mi ²
Dallas, Texas	1,348/km ²	3,492/mi ²
Columbus, Ohio	1,307/km ²	3,384/mi ²
Houston, Texas	1,287/km ²	3,333/mi ²
Phoenix, Arizona	1,061/km ²	2,749/mi ²

The most densely populated state is New Jersey (1,121/mi² or 433/km²).

The United States Census Bureau publishes a popular "dot" map showing population distribution at a resolution of 7,500 people, as well as complete listings of population density by place name.

Race and ethnicity

The U.S. population's distribution by race and ethnicity in 2009 was as follows: The total population was 307 million in 2009.

Race	Percentage	Number
White alone (of which 30.4 million are White Hispanic and Latino Americans. Excluding these, this category comprises 65.0% or 199.3 million)	74.8%	229.8 million
Black or African American alone	12.4%	38.1 million
Some other race alone	4.9%	14.9 million
Asian alone	4.5%	13.8 million
Two or more races	2.4%	7.5 million
American Indian or Alaska Native alone	0.8%	2.5 million
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander alone	0.15%	0.454 million

Hispanic and Latino Americans

Each of the racial categories includes people who identify their ethnicity as *Hispanic or Latino*. U.S. federal law defines Hispanic or Latino as "those who classify themselves in one of the specific Hispanic or Latino categories listed on the Census 2000 or ACS questionnaire - "Mexican", "Puerto Rican", or "Cuban" - as well as those who indicate that they are "other Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino."" The total population of Hispanic and Latino Americans comprised 48.4 million or 15.8% of the national total in 2009, with the following racial distribution:

- White alone: 63.0% or 30.4 million
- Some other race alone: 29.5% or 14.3 million
- Two or more races: 4.2% or 2.0 million
- Black or African American alone: 2.0% or 0.949 million
- American Indian or Alaska Native alone: 1.0% or 0.482 million
- Asian alone: 0.30% or 0.147 million
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander alone: 0.06% or 0.027 million

Projections

U.S. Census Population projections

	2010	2050
Whites	79.5%	74.0%
Non-Hispanic Whites	64.7%	46.3%
Hispanics/Latinos (of any race)	16.0%	30.2%
African Americans	12.9%	13.0%
Asian Americans	4.6%	7.8%

A report by the U.S. Census Bureau projects a decrease in the ratio of Whites between 2010 and 2050, from 79.5% to 74.0%. At the same time, Non-Hispanic Whites are projected to no longer make up the majority of the population by 2042, but will remain the largest race. In 2050 they will compose 46.3% of the population. Non-Hispanic whites made up 85% of the population in 1960. The report foresees the Hispanic or Latino population rising from 16% today to 30% by 2050, the African American percentage barely rising from 12.9% to 13.0%, and Asian Americans upping their 4.6% share to 7.8%. The U.S. has 310 million people as of October 2010, and is projected to reach 400 million by 2039 and 439 million in 2050. It is further projected that 82% of the increase in population from 2005 to 2050 will be due to immigration.


Of the nation's children in 2050, 62% are expected to be of a minority ethnicity, up from 44% today. Approximately 39% are projected to be Hispanic or Latino (up from 22% in 2008), and 38% are projected to be single-race, non-Hispanic Whites (down from 56% in 2008).

Other subgroups

There were 22.1 million veterans in 2009.

In 2010, there were an estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country.

There were about 2 million people in prison in 2010.




Density of same-sex households compared to all households by state.

The 2000 U.S. Census counted same-sex couples in an oblique way; asking the sex and the relationship to the "main householder", whose sex was also asked. One organization specializing in analyzing gay demographic data reported, based on this count in the 2000 census and in the 2000 supplementary survey, that same-sex couples comprised between 0.99% and 1.13% of U.S. couples in 2000. A 2006 report issued by The Williams Institute on Sexual Orientation concluded that the number of same-sex couples in the U.S. grew from 2000 to 2005, from nearly 600,000 couples in 2000 to almost 777,000 in 2005. 4.1% of Americans aged 18–45 identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual (Other estimates have varied depending on methodology and timing; see Demographics of sexual orientation for a list of studies.) The American Community Survey from the 2000 U.S. Census estimated 776,943 same-sex couple households in the country as a whole, representing about 0.5% of the population.

Less than 1% of Americans serve in the Armed Forces.

Religion



Major religions by overall percentage

The table below is based mainly on selected data as reported to the United States Census Bureau. It only includes the voluntary self-reported membership of religious bodies with 750,000 or more. The definition of a member is determined by each religious body. As of 2004, the US census bureau reported that about 13% of the population did not identify itself as a member of any religion.

Religious body	Year reported	Places of worship reported	Membership (thousands)	Number of clergy
African Methodist Episcopal Church	1999	-	2500	7741
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church	2002	3226	1431	3252
American Baptist Association	1998	1760	275	1740
Amish, Old Order	1993	898	227	3592
American Baptist Churches USA	1998	3800	1507	4145
Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America	1998	220	65	263
Armenian Apostolic Church	1998	28	200	25
Assemblies of God	1998	11937	2526	18148
Baptist Bible Fellowship International	1997	4500	1200	-
Baptist General Conference	1998	876	141	-
Baptist Missionary Association of America	1999	1334	235	1525
Buddhism	2001	-	1082	-
Christian and Missionary Alliance, The	1998	1964	346	1629
Christian Brethren (Plymouth Brethren)	1997	1150	100	-
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)	1997	3818	879	3419
Independent Christian Churches/Churches of Christ	1998	5579	1072	5525
Christian Congregation, Inc., The	1998	1438	117	1436
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church	1983	2340	719	-
Christian Reformed Church in North	1998	733	199	655

America				
Church of God in Christ	1991	15300	5500	28988
Church of God of Prophecy	1997	1908	77	2000
Church of God (Anderson, IN)	1998	2353	234	3034
Church of God (Cleveland, Tennessee)	1995	6060	753	3121
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints	2005	12753	5691	38259
Church of the Brethren	1997	1095	141	827
Church of the Nazarene	1998	5101	627	4598
Churches of Christ	1999	15000	1500	14500
Conservative Baptist Association of America	1998	1200	200	-
Community of Christ	1998	1236	140	19319
Coptic Orthodox Church	2003	200	1000	200
Cumberland Presbyterian Church	1998	774	87	634
Episcopal Church	1996	7390	2365	8131
Evangelical Covenant Church, The	1998	628	97	607
Evangelical Free Church of America, The	1995	1224	243	1936
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America	1998	10862	5178	9646
Evangelical Presbyterian Church	1998	187	61	262
Free Methodist Church of North America	1998	990	73	-
Full Gospel Fellowship	1999	896	275	2070
General Association of General Baptists	1997	790	72	1085
General Association of Regular Baptist Churches	1998	1415	102	-
U.S. Conference of Mennonite Brethren Churches	1996	368	82	590
Grace Gospel Fellowship	1992	128	60	160
Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America	1998	523	1955	596
Hinduism	2001	-	766	-
Independent Fundamental Churches of America	1999	659	62	-
International Church of the Foursquare Gospel	1998	1851	238	4900
International Council of Community Churches	1998	150	250	182
International Pentecostal Holiness Church	1998	1716	177	1507
Islam	2001	-	1104	-
Jehovah's Witnesses	2007	12494	1040	-
Judaism	2006	3727	6452	-
Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod, The	1998	6218	2594	5227
Mennonite Church USA	2005	943	114	-
National Association of Congregational Christian Churches	1998	416	67	534
National Association of Free Will Baptists	1998	2297	210	2800

National Baptist Convention of America, Inc.	1987	2500	3500	8000
National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc.	1992	33000	8200	32832
National Missionary Baptist Convention of America	1992	-	2500	-
Orthodox Church in America	1998	625	1000	700
Pentecostal Assemblies of the World, Inc.	1998	1750	1500	4500
Pentecostal Church of God	1998	1237	104	-
Pentecostal Church International, United	2008	28351	4037	22881
Presbyterian Church in America	1997	1340	280	1642
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)	1998	11260	3575	9390
Progressive National Baptist Convention, Inc.	1995	2000	2500	-
Reformed Church in America	1998	902	296	915
Religious Society of Friends (Conservative)	1994	1200	104	-
Roman Catholic Church	2002	19484	66404	50,017 (1997)
Romanian Orthodox Episcopate	1996	37	65	37
Salvation Army, The	1998	1388	471	2920
Scientology	2005	1300	55	1
Serbian Orthodox Church	1986	68	67	60
Seventh-day Adventist Church	1998	4405	840	2454
Sikhism	1999	244	80	-
Southern Baptist Convention	1998	40870	16500	71520
Unitarian Universalism	2001	-	629	-
United Church of Christ	1998	6017	1421	4317
United House of Prayer For All People	-	100	2500	-
United Methodist Church, The	1998	36170	8400	-
Wesleyan Church, The	1998	1590	120	1806
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod	1997	1240	411	1222



Religious affiliation within each state that has the largest deviation compared to the national average, 2001.



Percentage of state populations that identify with a religion rather than "no religion", 2001.

Religions of American adults

The United States government does not collect religious data in its census. The survey below, the American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) 2008, was a random digit-dialed telephone survey of 54,461 American residential households in the contiguous United States. The 1990 sample size was 113,723; 2001 sample size was 50,281

Adult respondents were asked the open-ended question, "What is your religion, if any?". Interviewers did not prompt or offer a suggested list of potential answers. The religion of the spouse or partner was also asked. If the initial answer was "Protestant" or "Christian" further questions were asked to probe which particular denomination. About one third of the sample was asked more detailed demographic questions.

Religious Self-Identification of the U.S. Adult Population: 1990, 2001, 2008

Figures are not adjusted for refusals to reply; investigators suspect refusals are possibly more representative of "no religion" than any other group.

Group	1990 adults x 1,000	2001 adults x 1,000	2008 adults x 1,000	Numerical Change 1990- 2008 as % of 1990	1990 % of adults	2001 % of adults	2008 % of adults	change
								in % of total adults 1990- 2008
Adult population, total	175,440	207,983	228,182	30.1%				
Adult population, Responded	171,409	196,683	216,367	26.2%	97.7%	94.6%	94.8%	-2.9%
Total Christian	151,225	159,514	173,402	14.7%	86.2%	76.7%	76.0%	-10.2%
Catholic	46,004	50,873	57,199	24.3%	26.2%	24.5%	25.1%	-1.2%
non-Catholic Christian	105,221	108,641	116,203	10.4%	60.0%	52.2%	50.9%	-9.0%
Baptist	33,964	33,820	36,148	6.4%	19.4%	16.3%	15.8%	-3.5%
Mainline Christian	32,784	35,788	29,375	-10.4%	18.7%	17.2%	12.9%	-5.8%

<i>Methodist</i>	14,174	14,039	11,366	-19.8%	8.1%	6.8%	5.0%	-3.1%
<i>Lutheran</i>	9,110	9,580	8,674	-4.8%	5.2%	4.6%	3.8%	-1.4%
<i>Presbyterian</i>	4,985	5,596	4,723	-5.3%	2.8%	2.7%	2.1%	-0.8%
<i>Episcopalian/Anglican</i>	3,043	3,451	2,405	-21.0%	1.7%	1.7%	1.1%	-0.7%
<i>United Church of Christ</i>	438	1,378	736	68.0%	0.2%	0.7%	0.3%	0.1%
Christian Generic	25,980	22,546	32,441	24.9%	14.8%	10.8%	14.2%	-0.6%
<i>Christian Unspecified</i>	8,073	14,190	16,384	102.9%	4.6%	6.8%	7.2%	2.6%
<i>Non-denominational Christian</i>	194	2,489	8,032	4040.2%	0.1%	1.2%	3.5%	3.4%
<i>Protestant - Unspecified</i>	17,214	4,647	5,187	-69.9%	9.8%	2.2%	2.3%	-7.5%
<i>Evangelical/Born Again</i>	546	1,088	2,154	294.5%	0.3%	0.5%	0.9%	0.6%
Pentecostal/Charismatic	5,647	7,831	7,948	40.7%	3.2%	3.8%	3.5%	0.3%
<i>Pentecostal - Unspecified</i>	3,116	4,407	5,416	73.8%	1.8%	2.1%	2.4%	0.6%
<i>Assemblies of God</i>	617	1,105	810	31.3%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.0%
<i>Church of God</i>	590	943	663	12.4%	0.3%	0.5%	0.3%	0.0%
Other Protestant Denominations	4,630	5,949	7,131	54.0%	2.6%	2.9%	3.1%	0.5%
<i>Churches of Christ</i>	1,769	2,593	1,921	8.6%	1.0%	1.2%	0.8%	-0.2%
<i>Jehovah's Witness</i>	1,381	1,331	1,914	38.6%	0.8%	0.6%	0.8%	0.1%
<i>Seventh-Day Adventist</i>	668	724	938	40.4%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.0%
Mormon/Latter-Day Saints	2,487	2,697	3,158	27.0%	1.4%	1.3%	1.4%	0.0%
Total non-Christian religions	5,853	7,740	8,796	50.3%	3.3%	3.7%	3.9%	0.5%
Jewish	3,137	2,837	2,680	-14.6%	1.8%	1.4%	1.2%	-0.6%
Eastern Religions	687	2,020	1,961	185.4%	0.4%	1.0%	0.9%	0.5%
<i>Buddhist</i>	404	1,082	1,189	194.3%	0.2%	0.5%	0.5%	0.3%
Muslim	527	1,104	1,349	156.0%	0.3%	0.5%	0.6%	0.3%

New Religious Movements & Others	1,296	1,770	2,804	116.4%	0.7%	0.9%	1.2%	0.5%
None/ No religion, total	14,331	29,481	34,169	138.4%	8.2%	14.2%	15.0%	6.8%
<i>Agnostic+Atheist</i>	1,186	1,893	3,606	204.0%	0.7%	0.9%	1.6%	0.9%
Did Not Know/ Refused to reply	4,031	11,300	11,815	193.1%	2.3%	5.4%	5.2%	2.9%

Source:ARIS 2008

Marriage

In 2010, the median age for marriage for men was 27; for women, 26.

Income

In 2006, the median household income in the United States was around \$46,000. Household and personal income depends on variables such as race, number of income earners, educational attainment and marital status.

Median income levels									
Households			Persons, age 25 or older with earnings			Household income by race			
All households	Dual earner households	Per household member	Males	Females	Both sexes	Asian	White, non-hispanic	Hispanic	Black
\$46,326	\$67,348	\$23,535	\$39,403	\$26,507	\$32,140	\$57,518	\$48,977	\$34,241	\$30,134
Median personal income by educational attainment									
Measure	Some High School	High school graduate	Some college	Associate's degree	Bachelor's degree or higher	Bachelor's degree	Master's degree	Professional degree	Doctorate degree
Persons, age 25+ w/ earnings	\$20,321	\$26,505	\$31,054	\$35,009	\$49,303	\$43,143	\$52,390	\$82,473	\$70,853

Male, age 25+ w/ earnings	\$24,192	\$32,085	\$39,150	\$42,382	\$60,493	\$52,265	\$67,123	\$100,000	\$78,324
Female, age 25+ w/ earnings	\$15,073	\$21,117	\$25,185	\$29,510	\$40,483	\$36,532	\$45,730	\$66,055	\$54,666
Persons, age 25+, employed full-time	\$25,039	\$31,539	\$37,135	\$40,588	\$56,078	\$50,944	\$61,273	\$100,000	\$79,401
Household	\$22,718	\$36,835	\$45,854	\$51,970	\$73,446	\$68,728	\$78,541	\$100,000	\$96,830
Household income distribution									
Bottom 10%	Bottom 20%	Bottom 25%	Middle 33%	Middle 20%	Top 25%	Top 20%	Top 5%	Top 1.5%	Top 1%
\$0 to \$10,500	\$0 to \$18,500	\$0 to \$22,500	\$30,000 to \$62,500	\$35,000 to \$55,000	\$77,500 and up	\$92,000 and up	\$167,000 and up	\$250,000 and up	\$350,000 and up

Social class

Social classes in the United States lack distinct boundaries and may overlap. The following table provides a summary of currently prominent academic theories on the stratification of American society:

Academic Class Models					
Dennis Gilbert, 2002		William Thompson & Joseph Hickey, 2005		Leonard Beeghly, 2004	
Class	Typical characteristics	Class	Typical characteristics	Class	Typical characteristics
Capitalist class (1%)	Top-level executives, high-rung politicians, heirs. Ivy League education common.	Upper class (1%)	Top-level executives, celebrities, heirs; income of \$500,000+ common. Ivy league education common.	The super-rich (0.9%)	Multi-millionaires whose incomes commonly exceed \$350,000; includes celebrities and powerful executives/politicians. Ivy League education common.
Upper middle class (15%)	Highly educated (often with graduate degrees), most commonly salaried, professionals and middle management with large work autonomy	Upper middle class (15%)	Highly educated (often with graduate degrees) professionals & managers with household incomes varying from the high 5-figure range to commonly above \$100,000	The Rich (5%)	Households with net worth of \$1 million or more; largely in the form of home equity. Generally have college degrees.
				Middle class (plurality/majority?; ca. 46%)	College educated workers with incomes considerably above-average incomes and compensation; a man making \$57,000 and a woman making \$40,000

Lower middle class (30%)	Semi-professionals and craftsmen with a roughly average standard of living. Most have some college education and are white collar.	Lower middle class (32%)	Semi-professionals and craftsman with some work autonomy; household incomes commonly range from \$35,000 to \$75,000.	may be typical.
Working class (30%)	Clerical and most blue collar workers whose work is highly routinized. Standard of living varies depending on number of income earners, but is commonly just adequate. High school education.	Working class (32%)	Typically, some college education. Clerical, pink and blue collar workers with often low job security; common household incomes range from \$16,000 to \$30,000. High school education.	Blue collar workers and those whose jobs are highly routinized with low economic security; a man making \$40,000 and a woman making \$26,000 may be typical. High school education.
Working poor (13%)	Service, low-rung clerical and some blue collar workers. High economic insecurity and risk of poverty. Some high school education.	Lower class (ca. 14% - 20%)	Those who occupy poorly-paid positions or rely on government transfers. Some high school education.	
Underclass (12%)	Those with limited or no participation in the labor force. Reliant on government transfers. Some high school education.		The poor (ca. 12%)	Those living below the poverty line with limited to no participation in the labor force; a household income of \$18,000 may be typical. Some high school education.

Health

A nationwide study in 2010 indicated that 19.5% of teens, aged 12–19, have developed "slight" hearing loss. "Slight" was defined as an inability to hear at 16 to 24 decibels.


Demographic statistics

The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated.

Median age

36.8 years (male: 35.5 years, female: 38.1 years, 2010 est.)

Age structure



A population pyramid that shows the age of the population by sex from 1950-2010.

(2009 est.)

0-14 years: 20.2% (male 31,639,127/female 30,305,704)

15-64 years: 67% (male 102,665,043/female 103,129,321)

65 years and over: 12.8% (male 16,901,232/female 22,571,696) (2010 est.)

Population growth rate

0.977% (2010 est.)

Birth rate

13.5 births/1,000 population (2010 est.). This is the lowest in a century. There were 4,136,000 births in 2009.

13.9 births/1,000 population/year (Provisional Data for 2008)

14.3 births/1,000 population/year (Provisional Data for 2007)

In 2009, Time magazine reported that 40% of births were to unmarried women. The following is a breakdown by race for unwed births: 17% Asian mothers, 29% white, 53% Hispanics, 66% Native Americans, and 72% black.

The drop in the birth rate from 2007 to 2009 is believed to be associated with the Great Recession

Death rate

8.38 deaths/1,000 population (July 2010 est.)

Immigration

13% of the population was foreign-born in 2009.

Net migration rate

4.32 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2010 est.)

Sex ratios

at birth: 1.048 male(s)/female
under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female
15-64 years: 1 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.75 male(s)/female
total population: 0.97 male(s)/female (2010 est.)

Infant mortality rate

total: 6.22 deaths/1,000 live births
male: 6.9 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 5.51 deaths/1,000 live births (2010 est.)

Life expectancy at birth

total population: 78.11 years
male: 75.65 years
female: 80.69 years (2010 est.)

Total fertility rate

- 2.06 children born/woman (2010 est.)

Unemployment rate

9.6%+ (2010 est.)

Nationality

- *noun*: American(s)
- *adjective*: American


Population projections

In 2008, the US Census Bureau projected future censuses as follows:

- 2010: 310,232,863
- 2020: 341,386,665
- 2030: 373,503,674
- 2040: 405,655,295
- 2050: 439,010,253

Chapter- 4

Demography of the United Kingdom



Population pyramid in 2010

This is about the demographic features of the population of the United Kingdom, including population density, ethnicity, education level, health of the populace, economic status, religious affiliations and other aspects of the population.

According to the 2001 census, the total population of the United Kingdom was 58,789,194—the third-largest in the European Union (behind Germany and metropolitan France) and the 21st-largest in the world. Its overall population density is one of the highest in the world, due to the particularly high population density in England. Almost one-third of the population lives in England's southeast and is predominantly urban and suburban, with about 8.2 million in the capital city of England, London. The United Kingdom's extremely high literacy rate (99%) is attributable to universal public education introduced for the primary level in 1870 (Scotland 1872, free 1890) and secondary level in 1900. Parents are obliged to have their children educated from the ages of 5 to 16 (with legislation passed to raise this to 18), and can continue education free of charge in the form of A-Levels, vocational training or apprenticeship to age 18. About one-fifth of British students go on to post-secondary education (18+). The Church of England and the Church of Scotland function as the national churches in their respective countries, but all the major religions found in the world are represented in the United Kingdom.

The UK's population is predominantly White British. Being located close to continental Europe, the countries that formed the United Kingdom were subject to many invasions and migrations, especially from Scandinavia and the continent, including Roman occupation for several centuries. Historically, British people were thought to be descended mainly from the different ethnic stocks that settled there before the 11th century; pre-Celtic, Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, Viking and Norman. This is under debate with scientists finding evidence of both massive Germanic influence and that the majority of

British ethnicity can be traced back to ancient migrations, so that 75% of the modern British population could (in theory) trace their ancestry back 15,000 years. Although Celtic languages are partially spoken in Scotland, Cornwall, and Northern Ireland, the predominant language overall is English. In North and West Wales, Welsh is widely spoken as a first language, but much less so in the more English dominated South East of the country.

History

Three sets of demographic statistics are useful to governments and others concerned with their nations' political and economic stability. The first is an enumeration of the number of inhabitants distinguished by age, sex, and occupation. The second involves a continuous record of population trends from the registration of births, marriages, and burials. The third is documentation of the extent of internal and external migration.

England and Wales

Before 1800, England had none of these except for the civil registration of births, marriages, and burials briefly attempted under the Commonwealth (1653–1660) and an even more short-lived initiative of the same kind in 1694 in connection with the attempt to raise a tax on the occasion of every birth, marriage, and death—paupers excepted. At that time, the chief source of information on the demography was provided by parish registration of baptisms, marriages, and burials that had occurred in the parish churches, supplemented by information on mortality in the Bills of Mortality that were published for certain large towns and by inferences drawn from various counts of taxpayers. The article focuses on the reliability of the parochial registration system and the way in which it was exploited by the state as measured against the state's objectives for establishing it in 1538. These objectives were rarely achieved. By the end of the 18th century, the parish registers were falling short of providing a national system of registration. Neither had the registers at any time provided the requisite detail to allow the verification of age, lineal descent, or right of inheritance. They had not been used as a way of raising revenue except briefly between 1694 and 1705. Moreover, the Anglican Church was extremely lax about the enforcement of its own regulations regarding the appropriate time for registering baptisms, burials, and marriages.

The ability of the registration system to fulfil these original objectives can be measured in terms of the breadth of its coverage and the quality of the information provided. Each category can be further subdivided. For example, the breadth of coverage can be defined to include the speed with which parishes throughout the country commenced the registration of baptisms, marriages, and burials; the percentage of the population whose vital events went unrecorded even in the parishes that established registers; and the success of the incumbents and churchwardens in preserving the registers completed by their predecessors. The quality of the recording can be assessed based on the amount of information offered about individuals mentioned in the registers, the extent to which that information was provided in a standard form across the country, and the clarity of the presentation (whether separate registers for baptisms, marriages, and burials were

maintained). The accuracy of the work undertaken by the parochial clergy as unpaid servants of the state in providing Rickman with the totals of baptisms, marriages, and burials can also be assessed. Each of these aspects will now be considered in turn before an assessment of the overall effectiveness of the registration system is attempted. Cromwell's brief instructions establishing the registration system did not specify what sort of register book was to be provided. Not unnaturally, most parishes chose to use paper rather than the dearer, but more durable, parchment. In 1597, the Convocation of the clergy, bishops, and archbishop of the province of Canterbury found it necessary to order parchment copies of all entries from old paper registers, instructions that were soon reissued in 1603.

The first census held throughout the UK was organised in 1801. England and Wales started the civil registration of births, marriages, and deaths in 1837. The first attempt by the state to compile statistics on migration was included in the census of 1841.

United Kingdom

During the Industrial Revolution, the life expectancy of children increased dramatically. The percentage of the children born in London who died before the age of five decreased from 74.5% in 1730–1749 to 31.8% in 1810–1829. According to Robert Hughes in *The Fatal Shore*, the population of England and Wales, which had remained steady at 6 million from 1700 to 1740, rose dramatically after 1740.

The first Census in 1801 revealed that the population of England, Scotland and Wales was 10.5 million. In 1800 the population of Ireland was between 4.5 and 5.5 million.

The 1841 UK Census counted the population of England and Wales to be 15.9 million. Ireland's population was 8.2 million in 1841. The population of Scotland was 2.6 million.

The Great Irish Famine, which began in the 1840s, caused the deaths of one million Irish people, and caused over a million to emigrate. Mass emigration became entrenched as a result of the famine and the population continued to decline until late in the 19th century.

The population of England had almost doubled from 16.8 million in 1851 to 30.5 million in 1901. Ireland's population decreased rapidly, from 8.2 million in 1841 to less than 4.5 million in 1901.

Population

The population of the United Kingdom in the 2001 census was 58,789,194. This has since risen to 60,587,300 according to mid-2006 estimates by the Office for National Statistics. Current estimates (mid 2010) put the country's population at closer to 63million.

Part	Population (mid-2006)	% (mid-2006)
England	50,762,900	83.8
Scotland	5,116,900	8.4
Wales	2,965,900	4.9
Northern Ireland	1,741,600	2.9
United Kingdom	60,587,300	100

(1 July 2006 population estimates by UK National Statistics)

There are 11 cities which exceed 300,000 inhabitants, these being London, Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds, Sheffield, Liverpool, Manchester, Edinburgh, Bristol, Cardiff and Coventry. Cities with urban areas in excess of 300,000 inhabitants include Nottingham, Leicester, Bradford, Belfast, Southampton and Newcastle Upon Tyne.

Population levels at census dates and average adjustments annually


(thousands)

United Kingdom	Population at start of period	Overall annual change	Births	Deaths	Natural change	Net migration and other changes
1901 – 1911	38 237	385	1091	624	467	-82
1911 – 1921	42 082	195	975	689	286	-92
1921 – 1931	44 027	201	824	555	268	-67
1931 – 1951	46 038	213	793	603	190	22
1951 – 1961	50 225	258	839	593	246	12
1961 – 1971	52 807	312	962	638	324	-12
1971 – 1981	55 928	42	736	666	69	-27
1981 – 1991	56 357	108	757	655	103	5
1991 – 2001	57 439	161	731	631	100	61
2001 – 2008	59 113	324	722	588	134	191

Age structure

The most numerous five year age groups (at the 2001 census) were the 5-year group born in the years 1946–51 (the post-World War II baby boom); the baby boom born a generation later in 1966–71 (the largest group of all); and a more modest boom a generation after that, born in 1986–91. The 1946–51 group reaches retirement age from 2006 onwards (women from 2006 and men from 2011), and the sudden increase in the number of people claiming the state pension has led politicians and political commentators to fear a "pensions crisis".

The age groups are not evenly distributed around the country, with some areas having many young adults and children and some areas having large numbers of older people.



The pie chart shows the percentages of age structure throughout the United Kingdom.

Age group	Population		%
	Male	Female	
0–14	5,560,489	5,293,871	18.0
15–64	20,193,876	19,736,516	66.3
65+	4,027,721	5,458,235	15.7

Fertility

In 2008 the UK's total fertility rate (TFR) was 1.96 children per woman, below the replacement rate of 2.10. In 2001, the TFR was at a record low of 1.63, but it has increased each year since. The TFR was considerably higher during the 1960s 'baby boom', peaking at 2.95 children per woman in 1964. TFR varies widely across the UK, standing at 2.10 in Northern Ireland, 1.80 in Scotland, 1.94 in England and 1.96 in Wales in 2008.

The TFR for British residents also varies by country of birth. In England and Wales in 1996, people born in the UK had a TFR of 1.67, India 2.21 and Pakistan and Bangladesh 4.90, for example.

A 2010 survey from the Office of National Statistics found that 1.5% of Britons identify as either homosexual or bisexual—far lower than previous estimates of 5–7%.

Ethnicity



Estimated foreign-born population by country of birth, April 2007 – March 2008



Estimated foreign-nationals population by country of nationality, April 2007 – March 2008


From the United Kingdom Census 2001:

Ethnic group	Population	% of total*
White British	50,366,497	85.67%
White (other)	3,096,169	5.27%
Indian	1,053,411	1.8%
Pakistani	977,285	1.6%
White Irish	691,232	1.2%
Mixed race	677,117	1.2%
Black Caribbean	565,876	1.0%
Black African	485,277	0.8%
Bangladeshi	283,063	0.5%
Other Asian (non-Chinese)	247,644	0.4%
Chinese	247,403	0.4%
Other	230,615	0.4%
Black (others)	97,585	0.2%

Religion

The traditional religion in the United Kingdom is Christianity. In England the established church is the Church of England (Anglican). In Scotland, the Church of Scotland (a Presbyterian Church) is regarded as the 'national church' but there is not an established church. In Wales there is no established church, with the Church in Wales having been disestablished in 1920. Likewise, in Northern Ireland the Church of Ireland was disestablished in 1871. In Northern Ireland and similarly in parts of Scotland, there is a sectarian divide between Roman Catholic and Protestant communities.

The table below shows the most recent census data (2001) regarding religious belief:



The pie chart shows the religions of the United Kingdom.

Religion	Number	%
Christian	42,079,000	71.6%
Muslim	1,591,000	2.7%
Hindu	559,000	1.0%
Sikh	336,000	0.6%
Jewish	267,000	0.5%
Buddhist	152,000	0.3%
Other religion	179,000	0.3%
Not stated	4,289,000	7.3%
No religion	9,104,000	15.5%
Total religious	45,163,000	76.8%

Rather than select one of the specified religions offered on the 2001 Census form, many people chose to write in their own religion. Some of these religions were reassigned to one of the main religions offered, predominantly within the Christian group.

In England and Wales, 151,000 people belonged to religious groups which did not fall into any of the main religions. The largest of these were Spiritualists (32,000) and Pagans (31,000), followed by Jain (15,000), Wicca (7,000), Rastafarian (5,000), Bahà'i (5,000) and Zoroastrian (4,000).

Although the Census 2001 also recorded 390,000 Jedi Knights, making Jedi the fourth-largest "religion" in the UK, this does not confer them any official recognition. In fact, all returns with "Jedi Knight" were classified as "No religion", along with Atheist, Agnostic, Heathen and those who ticked "Other" but did not write in any religion.

An Office for National Statistics survey of 450,000 Britons in 2010 confirmed that 71% are Christian, 4% are Muslim and 21% lack a religious affiliation.

Status of religious freedom in the United Kingdom, Islam in the United Kingdom, Hinduism in the United Kingdom, Buddhism in the United Kingdom, Sikhism in the United Kingdom, History of the Jews in England, and Judaism in the United Kingdom

Languages

The United Kingdom has no official language. The dominant language, spoken as a first language by 95% of the population, is English. Scots is spoken by around 500,000 people in Scotland and 30,000 in Northern Ireland, where it is called Ulster Scots. Welsh is spoken by around 600,000 people. Scottish Gaelic is spoken by about 60,000 speakers, mostly in Scotland. Cornish is spoken by around 2,500 people. Irish is spoken by about 106,844 speakers in Northern Ireland. The Polish minority in the United Kingdom estimated over 600,000 people speak mostly Polish at home, Polish Britons are mainly Polish-born immigrants to the UK, although many are those who settled in Britain after the second world war and their descendants. French language is spoken in the Channel Islands. British Sign Language is also common.


Education



King's College, part of the University of Cambridge, England.

Each country of the United Kingdom has a separate education system, with power over education matters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland being devolved.

The Secretary of State for Education and the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills are responsible to the UK Parliament for education in England, though the day to day administration and funding of state schools is the responsibility of Local Education Authorities. Universal state education in England and Wales was introduced for primary level in 1870 and secondary level in 1900. Education is mandatory from ages five to sixteen (15 if born in late July or August). The majority of children are educated in state-sector schools, only a small proportion of which select on the grounds of academic ability. Despite a fall in actual numbers, the proportion of children in England attending private schools has risen to over 7%. Just over half of students at the leading universities of Cambridge and Oxford had attended state schools. State schools which are allowed to select pupils according to intelligence and academic ability can achieve comparable results to the most selective private schools: out of the top ten performing schools in terms of GCSE results in 2006 two were state-run grammar schools. England has some of the top universities in the world with Cambridge, Oxford, and London ranked amongst the top 20 in the 2007 THES - QS World University Rankings.



Marischal College, University of Aberdeen

In Scotland, the Cabinet Secretary for Education and Lifelong Learning is responsible to the Scottish Parliament for education, with day to day administration and funding of state schools being the responsibility of Local Authorities. Scotland first legislated for universal provision of education in 1696. The proportion of children in Scotland attending private schools is just over 4% though it has been rising slowly in recent years. Scottish students who attend Scottish universities pay neither tuition fees nor graduate endowment charges as the fees were abolished in 2001 and the graduate endowment scheme was abolished in 2008.

The National Assembly for Wales has responsibility for education in Wales. A significant number of students in Wales are educated either wholly or largely through the medium of Welsh and lessons in the language are compulsory for all until the age of 16. There are plans to increase the provision of Welsh Medium schools as part of the policy of having a fully bi-lingual Wales.

The Northern Ireland Assembly is responsible for education in Northern Ireland though responsibility at a local level is administered by 5 Education and Library Boards covering different geographical areas.


Chapter- 5

Demography of Scotland

Scotland has a population of 5,194,000 (2009 estimate). Covering an area of 78,782km² (30,341mi²), Scotland has a population density of 65.6 inhabitants per square kilometer (170/sq mi). Around 70% of the country's population live in the Central Lowlands — a broad, fertile valley stretching in a northeast-southwest orientation between the cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow, and including major settlements such as Paisley, Stirling, Falkirk, Perth and Dundee. Other concentrations of population include the northeast coast of Scotland, principally the regions around the cities of Aberdeen and Inverness. The Highlands of Scotland have the lowest population density at 8 inhabitants per square kilometer (21/sq mi). The City of Glasgow has the highest population density at 3,292 inhabitants per square kilometer (8,526/sq mi).

Estimating the population of Scotland, as well as recording births, deaths and marriages in Scotland is overseen by the General Register Office for Scotland (GROS), headed by the Registrar-General for Scotland. Under the terms of the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965, the Registrar-General must present an annual report of demographic trends to Scottish Ministers (previously the Secretary of State for Scotland prior to devolution). In conjunction with the rest of the United Kingdom a decadal census of population is carried out — the last one being 2001, the next taking place in 2011.

Population data



Evolution of the population of Scotland 1981-2005. Data from General Register Office for Scotland 2005.

Total residents:

- 5,194,000 (2009 est)
- 5,168,000 (2008 est)
- 5,144,000 (2007 est)
- 5,116,900 (2006 est)
- 5,094,800 (2005 est)
- 5,078,400 (2004 est)
- 5,057,400 (2003 est)
- 5,054,800 (2002 est)
- 5,062,011 (2001 est)
- 5,083,000 (1991 est)
- 5,180,200 (1981 est)
- 5,234,000 (1971 est)
- 5,201,000 (1961 est)

Figures from the decennial Census are as follows:

- 1801 1,608,420
- 1811 1,805,864

- 1821 2,091,521
- 1831 2,364,386
- 1841 2,620,184
- 1851 2,888,742
- 1861 3,062,294
- 1871 3,360,018
- 1881 3,735,573
- 1891 4,025,647
- 1901 4,472,103
- 1911 4,760,904
- 1921 4,882,497
- 1931 4,842,554
- 1951 5,096,000

According to the annual estimates of the General Register Office of Scotland, in 2006, Scotland had a total resident population of 5,116,900 - an increase of 22,100 on the previous year and an increase of nearly 55,000 since mid-2002. The total population was split between 2,469,407 males and 2,647,693 females.

Birth rate: 11.7 births/1,000 population (2008 est.)

Death rate: 10.8 deaths/1,000 population (2008 est.)

Net migration rate: 4.1 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2005 est.)

Population growth rate: 0.4% (2005 est.)

Sex ratio:

at birth: 1.04 male(s)/female

under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female

15-64 years: 0.94 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.88 male(s)/female

total population: 0.93 male(s)/female (2005 est.)

Infant mortality rate: 4.2 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:

total population: 76.8 years

male: 74.2 years

female: 79.3 years (2005 est.)

Total fertility rate: 1.73 children born/woman (2007 est.)

Religions:

Christianity (74.9%): primarily Church of Scotland (42.4%) and Roman Catholicism (15.9%), non-religious (27.5%), Islam (0.8%), others

Languages: English, Scots (Doric, Central and Border) and Gaelic

Ethnic Groups

- **White:** 4,960,334 - 98.19%
- *Scottish:* 4,459,071 - 88.09%
- *Other White British:* 373,685 - 7.38%
- *Any other White background:* 87,650 - 1.73%
- *White Irish:* 49,428 - 0.98%
- **Mixed:** 12,764 - 0.25%
- **South Asian:** 55,007 - 1.09%
- *Pakistani:* 31,793 - 0.63% (2008 estimates - 40,000 Pakistanis)
- *Indian:* 15,037 - 0.30%
- *Bangladeshi:* 1,981 - 0.04%
- *Other South Asian:* 6,196 - 0.12%
- **Black:** 8,025 - 0.16%
- *African:* 5,118 - 0.10%
- *Caribbean:* 1,778 - 0.04%
- *Other Black:* 1,129 - 0.02%
- **Chinese:** 16,310 - 0.32%

Marriages: 32,154 (2004 est.)

Literacy:

definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: 99%

male: 99%

female: 99% (2005 est)

Nationality noun

- Scot(s)

adjective

- Scottish, Scots

Population projections



People on Buchanan Street in Glasgow. Scotland's population is getting older as many baby boomers approach retirement.

Since the census of 2001, the Scottish Government and leading academics in Scotland have expressed concern over the falling number of births in Scotland and the ageing and decline of the population which has occurred over recent decades. Scotland's population reached its peak in the mid-1970s, and has slowly declined since that time to its current total of 5.1m. The major reason is seen to be emigration from Scotland - particularly to the rest of the United Kingdom - although recent years have seen that trend reversed with significant immigration to Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom. Similarly, since 2004 there has been a large influx of arrivals from the new EU accession states such as Poland, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Latvia, contributing to the recent growth of the population. Since 1997 Scotland has generally experienced a natural decrease in population, with an excess of deaths over births. In 2004, for example, there were 4012 more deaths than births, although for the last five years this process has been reversed with 4342 more births than deaths in 2008.

Compounding the problem of a declining and ageing population, Scotland is experiencing falling fertility and birth rates - a feature common to much of Europe. The ageing population sees the large numbers of people born in the post war period (1950s and 1960s) approach retirement. A common fear amongst commentators is the strain this

could impose on the nation's resources, with a smaller working population being insufficient to support a high number of retirees and dependents.

In 2002, according to GROS, the number of live births in Scotland was the lowest ever recorded, at 51,270. This has however steadily risen, with 53,957 births recorded in 2004 and in 2008 the number of live births was 60,041.

The Scottish Executive has responded to these demographic trends by setting up the Fresh Talent - Working in Scotland Scheme open to foreign (non-EU) graduates from Scotland's universities allowing them a 2 year residency period after graduation.

Within Scotland itself there is significant regional variation in patterns of population growth, with areas such as Aberdeenshire (1.1%), Edinburgh (0.9%), Clackmannanshire (0.8%) Falkirk (1.1%), Perth and Kinross (0.6%) and West Lothian (0.6%) seeing the largest increases in population between 2004 and 2005. Conversely Aberdeen City (-0.5%), West Dunbartonshire (-0.6%) and East Dunbartonshire (-0.6%) have seen the largest falls in population. The Highlands have also seen a significant rise in population over recent years, compared with the last 200 years, in which the area lost large volumes of people, due to persistently high rates of (forced) emigration particularly to places such as Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand.

In December 2005, GROS published a series of population projections which showed that Scotland's population was projected to rise between then and the year 2038, with both the numbers of births and deaths expected to drop. Immigration was projected to remain steady, positive and constant.

In January 2008, the GROS figures predicted that Scotland's population would rise to 5.37 million by 2031. Edinburgh's population could rise by 18%, while most other large Scottish cities would suffer a decline.

Council Area Population Estimates

Area Population Estimates in Scotland (2005)

Local Council Area	Population (2001)	Population Estimates (2005)	% change 2004 – 2005
Aberdeen City	212,125	202,370	-0.5
Aberdeenshire	226,871	235,440	+1.1
Angus	108,400	109,170	+0.6
Argyll and Bute	112,097	90,870	-0.4
Clackmannanshire	48,077	48,630	+0.8
Dumfries and Galloway	147,765	148,340	+0.3
Dundee City	142,170	145,663	+0.2
East Ayrshire	120,235	119,400	-0.3


East Dunbartonshire	108,243	105,960	-0.6
East Lothian	90,088	91,800	+0.2
East Renfrewshire	89,311	89,600	0.0
City of Edinburgh	448,624	457,830	+0.9
Eilean Siar	26,502	26,370	+0.4
Falkirk	145,191	149,150	+1.1
Fife	349,429	356,470	+0.6
Glasgow City	577,869	578,790	+0.2
Highland	208,914	213,590	+1.1
Inverclyde	84,203	82,130	-0.4
Midlothian	80,941	79,190	-0.5
Moray	86,940	88,120	+0.5
North Ayrshire	135,817	135,830	-0.1
North Lanarkshire	321,067	323,420	+0.2
Orkney Islands	19,245	19,590	+0.5
Perth and Kinross	134,949	138,400	+0.6
Renfrewshire	172,867	170,000	-0.4
Scottish Borders	106,764	109,730	+0.4
Shetland Islands	21,988	22,000	+0.3
South Ayrshire	112,097	111,780	-0.1
South Lanarkshire	302,216	306,280	+0.3
Stirling	86,212	86,930	+0.6
West Dunbartonshire	93,378	91,400	-0.6
West Lothian	158,714	163,780	+0.6

Higher education


95% of Scottish higher education students study in universities in Scotland.

Chapter- 6

Demography of Iran



Changes in population of Iran



Population pyramid in 2005

Iran's population increased dramatically during the later half of the 20th century, reaching about 72 million by 2008. In recent years, however, Iran's birth rate has dropped significantly. Studies project that Iran's rate of population growth will continue to slow until it stabilizes above 90 million by 2050. In 2008, the number of households stood at 15.3 million (4.8 person/household).

More than two-thirds of the population is under the age of 30, one quarter being 15 years of age or younger. The literacy rate was 80% in 2007. Iran is ethnically and linguistically diverse, with some cities, such as Tehran, bringing various ethnic groups together.

Languages and ethnic groups



Iran's ethnoreligious distribution

While nearly 100% of Iran's population is fluent in modern Persian, approximately 75-80% of Iran's peoples exclusively speak Iranian languages (the most common language known as Persian - or "farsi" as it is known in the Persian language). The major groups in this category include Persians, Kurds, Gilakis, Mazandarans, Lurs, and Baluchis. Turkic speakers, such as the Azeri, Turkmen, and the Qashqai peoples, comprise a substantial minority. The remainder are primarily Semitics such as Arabs and Assyrians or other Indo-Europeans such as Armenians. There are also small communities of Brahui in southeastern Iran. The Georgian language is spoken only by those Iranian Georgians that live in Fereydan and Fereydunshahr. All other communities of Iranian Georgians in Iran have already lost their language.

Library of Congress like the Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden) states Iran's ethnic group as following: Persians 65%, Azeris 16%, Kurds 10%, Lurs 6%, Arabs 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmens 1%, Turkic tribal groups (e.g. Qashqai) 1%, and non-Persian, non-Turkic groups (e.g. Armenians, Assyrians, and Georgians) 1%.

Another source, CIA World Factbook, which is based on a pre-revolution (1979) statistics gives us the following numbers: Persians 51%, Azeris 24%, Gilakis and Mazandarans 8%, Kurds 7%, Arabs 3%, Lurs 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%.

Urban Population

In addition to its international migration pattern, Iran also exhibits one of the steepest urban growth rates in the world according to the UN humanitarian information unit.

According to 2005 population estimates, approximately 67 percent of Iran's population lives in urban areas, up from 27 percent in 1950. The following is a list of the five most populous cities in the country.

Rank	City (Province)	2007 population
1.	Tehran (Tehran Province)	14,000,000 (conurbation and commuter towns included) (7,705,036 in the city itself)
2.	Mashad (Razavi Khorasan)	2,868,350 (this does include suburban population) (2,410,800 in the city itself)
3.	Isfahan (Isfahan Province)	A population of around 3,430,353 including its metropolitan and the population live within the Isfahan conurbation (1,602,110 in the city itself)
4.	Tabriz (East Azarbaijan)	1,597,319 (city proper and main suburbs) (1,378,935 in the city itself)
5.	Karaj (Tehran Province)	1,377,450
6.	Shiraz (Fars Province)	1,204,882

Religious affiliations



The entrance to Shah Mosque (aka Imam Mosque or *Shah Jame' Mosque*) in Isfahan. This mosque is a fantastic example of Persian architecture during the Safavid dynasty.

Most Iranians are Muslims; 90% belong to the Shi'a branch of Islam, the official state religion, and about 8% belong to the Sunni branch, which predominates in neighboring Muslim countries. 2% Non-Muslim minorities include Zoroastrians, Jews, Bahá'ís, Mandeans, Christians and Yarsan. The Bahá'í Faith, Iran's largest religious minority with a population around 300 000, is not officially recognized, and has been persecuted during its existence in Iran. Since the 1979 revolution the persecution of Bahá'ís has increased

with executions, the denial of civil rights and liberties, and the denial of access to higher education and employment.

Non-Muslim minorities have been shrinking in the past few decades as they have been emigrating and leaving Iran. About 11,000 to 40,000 Jews remain in Iran today, still being the largest Jewish community in the Middle East outside Israel, but it stood at about 100,000 before the Islamic Revolution. Zoroastrian, and Christian communities are seeing similar contraction. Today, there are about 8,000 Assyrian Christians in Iran, who belong to the Chaldean Catholic Church.

Women

Iranian women have played an important role throughout history. Scheherazade, though fictional, is an important figure of female wit and intelligence, while the beauty of Mumtaz Mahal inspired the building of the Taj Mahal itself. While in ancient times, aristocratic females possessed numerous rights sometimes on par with men, generally Iranian women did not attain greater parity until the 20th century. However, Tahiri, the poet, had a great influence on modern women's movements throughout the Middle East. The Tahiri Justice Center is named after her. Females were given such status in ancient Irania that they were the first to ever serve in a national military.

Iranian women today serve an active role in society. Peace activists such as Shirin Ebadi have pushed for greater rights for women, while many Iranian women exiles have set examples of excellence that have no doubt inspired many Iranian women to strive for change in the conservative society prevalent in today's Iran. Even with the current climate of religious conservatism, Iranian women still tend to take a more active role in social, religious and family affairs than their Arab or Turkish counterparts. Despite the barriers imposed by the Revolution, Iranian women can be seen working in a variety of areas such as politics, law enforcement, transportation industries, etc. Universities still tend to be dominated by women in Iran and one may find a large number of female legislators in the Iranian Majlis (parliament), even by western standards. Former Vice President Masoumeh Ebtekar, noted for her eloquence in dealing with western media, set a new standard for aspiring Iranian female politicians while serving under President Khatami. Outstanding Iranian female academics, such as Laleh Bakhtiar have forever left a mark in the fields they contribute to.

Iranian citizens abroad

The term "Iranian citizens abroad" or "Iranian/Persian diaspora" refers to the Iranian people born in Iran and their children but living outside of Iran. Migrant Iranian workers abroad remitted less than two billion dollars home in 2006.

As of 2010, there are about five million Iranians living abroad, mostly in North America, Europe, Persian Gulf States, Turkey, Australia and the broader Middle East. In particular, the Los Angeles area is estimated to be host to approximately 72,000 Iranians, earning

the Westwood area of LA the nickname Tehrangeles. Other metropolises that have large Iranian populations include Dubai with 300,000 Iranians, Vancouver, London, Toronto, San Francisco Bay Area, Washington D.C., Stockholm, Berlin, Hamburg and Frankfurt. Their combined net worth is estimated to be \$1.3 trillion.

Note that this differs from the other Iranian peoples living in other areas of Greater Iran, who are of related ethnolinguistical family, speaking languages belonging to the Iranian languages which is a branch of Indo-European languages.

CIA World Factbook demographic statistics



Net Iranian migration (1979-2008). A positive value represents more people entering Iran than leaving it

The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated.

Nationality

noun: Iranian/Persian(s)

adjective: Iranian

Population

76,923,300 (July 2010 est.) / 70,049,262 according to Iran's 2006 census.

Religions

Shi'a Muslim 90%, Sunni Muslim 8%, Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Bahá'í (largest non-Muslim minority) 2%.

Literacy

definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: above 80%

male: 86%

female: 73.0% (2003 est.)

Age structure

0-14 years: 21.7% (male 7,394,841/female 7,022,076)

15-64 years: 72.9% (male 24,501,544/female 23,914,172)

65 years and over: 5.4% (male 1,725,828/female 1,870,823) (2010 est.)

Median age

total: 26.4 years

male: 26.2 years

female: 26.7 years (2008 est.)

Population growth rate

0.792% (2008 est.)

Birth rate

16.89 births/1,000 population (2008 est.)

Death rate

5.94 deaths/1,000 population (2010 est.)

Net migration rate

-3.28 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2008 est.)

Sex ratio

at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female

under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female

15-64 years: 1.02 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.93 male(s)/female

total population: 1.03 male(s)/female (2008 est.)

Infant mortality rate

36.93 deaths/1,000 live births (2008 est.)

Life expectancy at birth

total population: 70.86 years

male: 69.39 years

female: 72.4 years (2008 est.)

Total fertility rate

1.89 children born/woman (2010 est.)

Refugee population

Iran hosts one of the largest refugee population in the world, with more than one million refugees, mostly from Afghanistan (80%) and Iraq (10%). Since 2006, Iranian officials have been working with the UNHCR and Afghan officials for their repatriation.

Between 1979 and 1997, UNHCR spent more than US\$1 billion on Afghan refugees in Pakistan but only \$150 million on those in Iran. In 1999 alone, the Iranian government estimated the cost of maintaining its refugee population at US\$10 million per day, compared with the US\$18 million UNHCR allocated for all of its operations in Iran in 1999.

People of Iranian Ancestry

There are perhaps some 200 million people around the world who have Persian ancestry.

Parsis

The Parsis are the close-knit Zoroastrian community based primarily in India but also found in Pakistan. Parsis are descended from Persian Zoroastrians who emigrated to the Asian subcontinent over 1,000 years ago. Indian census data (2001) records 69,601 Parsis in India, with a concentration in and around the city of Mumbai (previously known as Bombay). There are approximately 8,000 Parsis elsewhere on the subcontinent, with an estimated 2,500 Parsis in the city of Karachi and approximately 50 Parsi families in Sri Lanka. The number of Parsis worldwide is estimated to be fewer than 100,000 (Eliade, 1991:254).

Iranis

In Pakistan and India, the term "Irani" has come to denote Iranian Zoroastrians who have immigrated to Pakistan and India within the last two centuries, as opposed to most Parsis who arrived in India over 1000 years ago. Many of them immigrated during the Qajar era, when persecution of Iranian Zoroastrians was rampant. They are culturally and linguistically closer to the Zoroastrians of Iran. Unlike the Parsis, they speak a Dari dialect, the language spoken by the Iranian Zoroastrians in Yazd and Kerman. Their last names often resemble modern Iranian names, however Irani is a common surname among them. In India they are mostly located in modern-day Mumbai while in Pakistan they are mostly located in modern-day Karachi. In both Pakistan and India, they are famous for their restaurants and tea-houses. Some, such as Ardeshir Irani, have also become very famous in cinema.

Ajam (Bahrain)

The "Ajam" are an ethnic community of Bahrain, of Iranian origin. They have traditionally been merchants living in specific quarters of Manama and Muharraq. The Iranians who adhere to both the Sunni or Shiite sect of Islam are Ajam, and they are different from the Huwala, who have Arab origins.

In addition to this, many names of ancient villages in Bahrain are of Persian origin. It is believed that these names were given during the Safavid rule of Bahrain (1501–1722). i.e. Karbabad, Salmabad, Karzakan, Duraz, Barbar, which indicates that the history of Ajams is much older.

Huwala

Huwala are the descendants of Sunni Arabs, and the word is also mistakenly used to call Sunni Persians, who migrated from Iran to the Arabian peninsula. The Huwala are much different from the Sunni Persians who also have migrated from their original homeland "Iran" to Arabia, except that the two ethnicities share the same Islamic Sunni faith.

Genetics

Y-chromosome DNA

Y-Chromosome DNA Y-DNA represents the male lineage, The Iranian Y-chromosome pool may be summarized as follows where haplogroups R1, J, G, I, and NOP* comprise generally more than 90% of the total chromosomes.

- R1 ~ 30%
- J2 ~ 30%
- I ~ 10%
- G ~ 10%
- NOP* ~ 10%
- Other Haplogroups 10%

Mitochondrial DNA


Mitochondrial DNA mtDNA represents the female lineage The Iranian mitochondrial DNA shows more European lineages than the Y-DNA lineages.

- Haplogroup UK ~ 30%
- Haplogroup JT ~ 25%
- Other Haplogroups ~20%

Chapter- 7

Demography of South Africa

Demographics of South Africa



Population of South Africa, 1961-2003

Population:	49,109,107 (July 2009 est.)
Growth rate:	-0.051%
Birth rate:	19.61 births/1,000 population (2010 est.)
Death rate:	16.99 deaths/1,000 population (2010 est.)
Life expectancy:	49.2 years (2010 est.)
–male:	50.08 years (2010 est.)
–female:	48.29 years (2010 est.)
Fertility rate:	2.33 children born/woman (2010 est.)
Infant mortality rate:	43.78 deaths/1,000

Age structure:

0-14 years:	28.9% (male 7,093,328/female 7,061,579)
15-64 years:	65.8% (male 16,275,424/female 15,984,181)
65-over:	5.4% (male 1,075,117/female 1,562,860) (2010 est.)


Sex ratio:

Total:	0.99 male(s)/female (2010 est.)
At birth:	1.02 male(s)/female
Under 15:	1 male(s)/female
15-64 years:	1.02 male(s)/female
65-over:	0.68 male(s)/female


The **demographics of South Africa** encompasses about 50 million people of diverse origins, cultures, languages, and religions. The last census was held in 2001 and the next will be in 2011.

Even though the population of South Africa has increased in the past decade (primarily due to immigration), the country had an annual population growth rate of -0.051% in 2010 (CIA est.), where the birth rate is higher than the death rate but there is a net emigration rate. South Africa is home to an estimated 5 million illegal immigrants, including some 3 million Zimbabweans. A series of anti-immigrant riots occurred in South Africa beginning on 11 May 2008.

Ethnic groups



Population density in South Africa



Dominant population groups in South Africa.

- Black African
- Coloured
- Indian or Asian
- White
- None dominant

Statistics South Africa provided five racial categories by which people could classify themselves, the last of which, "unspecified/other" drew negligible responses, and these results were omitted. The 2010 midyear estimated figures for the other categories were Black African at 79.4%, White at 9.2%, Coloured at 8.8%, and Indian or Asian at 2.6%. The first census in South Africa in 1911 showed that whites made up 22% of the population; it declined to 16% in 1980.

Blacks

By far the major part of the population classified itself as African or black, but it is not culturally or linguistically homogeneous. Major ethnic groups include the Zulu, Xhosa, Basotho (South Sotho), Bapedi (North Sotho), Venda, Tswana, Tsonga, Swazi and Ndebele, all of which speak Bantu languages.

Some, such as the Zulu, Xhosa, Bapedi and Venda groups, are unique to South Africa. Other groups are distributed across the borders with neighbours of South Africa: The Basotho group is also the major ethnic group in Lesotho. The Tswana ethnic group constitute the majority of the population of Botswana. The Swazi ethnic group is the major ethnic group in Swaziland. The Ndebele ethnic group is also found in Matabeleland in Zimbabwe, where they are known as the Matabele. These Ndebele people are the descendants of a Zulu faction under the warrior Mzilikazi that escaped persecution from Shaka by migrating to their current territory. The Tsonga ethnic group is also found in southern Mozambique, where they are known as the Shangaan.

Demographics

As of the census of 2001, there are 35,416,164 Black Africans and 8,625,050 Black African households residing in South Africa. The Black South African population density is 29/km². The density of Black households is 7/km². Black South Africans make up 79.0% of the total population. The percentage of all Black South African households that are made up of individuals is 19.9%. The average Black household size is 4.11 members.

In South Africa, the Black population is spread out with 34.0% under the age of 15, 21.6% from 15 to 24, 28.3% from 25 to 44, 11.8% from 45 to 64, and 4.3% who are 65 years of age or older. The median age of a Black African is 21 years. For every 100 Black females there are 91.1 Black males. For every 100 Black females age 18 and over, there are 86.2 Black males.

With regard to education, 22.3% of Black aged 20 and over have received no schooling, 18.5% have had some primary school, 6.9% have completed only primary school, 30.4% have had some high school education, 16.8% have finished only high school, and 5.2% have an education higher than the high school level. Overall, 22.0% of Black Africans have completed high school.

The percentage of Black South African housing units having a telephone and/or mobile phone in the dwelling is 31.1%. The percentage having access to a nearby phone is 57.2%, and 11.7% do not have nearby access or any access. The percentage of Black African households that have a flush or chemical toilet is 41.9%. Refuse is removed from 45.3% of Black African households by the municipality at least once a week, and 11.0% have no rubbish disposal. Some 17.9% of Black Africans have running water inside their dwelling, 51.7% have running water on their property, and 80.2% have access to running water. The percentage of Black African households using electricity for cooking is 39.3%, for heating, 37.2%, and for lighting, 62.0%. Radios are owned by 68.7% of Black

African households while 44.2% have a television, 1.8% own a computer, 40.0% have a refrigerator, and 24.6% have a mobile phone.

The unemployment rate of the Black population aged 15–65 is 28.1%. The median annual income of Black working adults aged 15–65 is ZAR 12,073. Black African males have a median annual income of ZAR 14,162 versus ZAR 8,903 for Black African females.

Whites

The white population is not ethnically homogeneous and descends from many ethnic groups: Dutch, Flemish, Portuguese, Norwegian, German, Greek, French Huguenot, English, Polish, Irish, Italian, Scottish and Welsh. Culturally and linguistically, they are divided into the Afrikaners, who speak Afrikaans, and English-speaking groups, many of whom are descended from British and Irish immigrants. Many small communities that have immigrated over the last century retain the use of other languages. There is also a substantial (though decreased) Jewish population, the majority of whom came from Lithuania at the turn of the 20th century; though others came then and later from Great Britain, the former Soviet Union and Israel. The white population has until recently been on the decrease due to a low birth rate and emigration; as a factor in their decision to emigrate, many cite the high crime rate and the affirmative action policies of the government. Since 1994, approximately 440,000 white South Africans have permanently emigrated. However, between 2009 and 2010 the number of white South Africans grew by 108,000. Their growth rate of 2.5% was the highest of any other population group.

Despite high emigration levels, a high level of non-South African white immigrants have settled in the country, in particular from countries such as Britain and Zimbabwe. For example, by 2005, an estimated 212,000 British citizens were residing in South Africa. Since 2003, the numbers of British migrants coming to South Africa has risen by 50%. An estimated 20,000 British migrants moved to South Africa in 2007. There have also been a significant number of white Zimbabwean arrivals, fleeing their home country in light of the economic and political problems currently facing the country. As well as recent arrivals, a significant number of white Zimbabweans emigrated to South Africa in the wake of independence in Zimbabwe in 1980. Some of the more nostalgic members of the community are known in popular culture as "Whenwes", because of their nostalgia for their lives in Rhodesia "when we were in Rhodesia".

There have been other white immigration waves to South Africa in recent decades. In the 1970s, many Portuguese residents of African colonies such as Angola and Mozambique, came to live in South Africa after the independence of those nations. In addition, the apartheid government encouraged Eastern European immigration in the 1980s and early 1990s, particularly from Poland and Hungary.

Demographics

As of the census of 2001, there are 4,923,638 Whites and 1,409,690 White households residing in South Africa. The White population density is 4/km². The density of White households is 1.16/km². Whites make up 9.6% of the total population.

The percentage of all White households that are made up of individuals is 19.1%. The average White household size is 3.05 members. In South Africa, the White population is spread out with 19.0% under the age of 15, 15.1% from 15 to 24, 31.0% from 25 to 44, 23.8% from 45 to 64, and 11.1% who are 65 years of age or older. The median age of a White is 35 years. For every 100 White females there are 94.0 White males. For every 100 White females age 18 and over, there are 91.1 White males.

With regard to education, 1.4% of Whites aged 20 and over have received no schooling, 1.2% have had no more than some primary schooling, 0.8% have completed only primary school, 25.9% have had no more than some high school education, 40.9% have finished only high school, and 29.8% have an education higher than the high-school level. Overall, 70.7% of Whites have completed high school.

The percentage of White housing units having a telephone and/or mobile phone in the dwelling is 95.4%. The percentage having access to a nearby phone is 4.4%, and 0.2% do not have nearby access or any access. The percentage of White households that have a flush or chemical toilet is 98.7%. Refuse is removed from 90.8% of White households by the municipality at least once a week, and 0.5% have no rubbish disposal. Some 87.2% of White have running water inside their dwelling, 95.6% have running water on their property, and 99.4% have access to running water. The percentage of White households using electricity for cooking is 96.6%, for heating, 93.2%, and for lighting, 99.2%. Radios are owned by 94.7% of White households while 92.6% have a television, 46.0% own a computer, 97.6% have a refrigerator, and 74.6% have a mobile phone.

The unemployment rate of the White population aged 15–65 is 4.1%. The median annual income of White working adults aged 15–65 is ZAR 65,405. White males have a median annual income of ZAR 81,701 versus ZAR 52,392 for White females.

Coloureds

The term "coloured" is still used for the people of mixed race descended from slaves brought in from East and Central Africa, the indigenous Khoisan who lived in the Cape at the time, Bantus, Whites (mostly the Dutch/Afrikaner and British settlers) as well as an admixture of Javanese, Malay, Indian, Malagasy and Asian blood (such as Burmese). The majority speak Afrikaans. Khoisan is a term used to describe two separate groups, physically similar: light-skinned and small in stature. The Khoikhoi, who were called *Hottentots* by the Europeans, were pastoralists and extensively integrated into the colonial economy, many converting early on to Christianity; the San, called Bushmen by the Europeans, were hunter-gatherers. Within the Coloured community, more recent immigrants will also be found: Coloureds from the former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe);

Namibia and immigrants of mixed descent from India and Burma (Anglo-Indians/Anglo-Burmese) who were welcomed to the Cape when India and Burma received their Independence.

Asians/Indians

The major part of the South African Asian population is Indian in origin; many of them descended from indentured workers brought in the nineteenth century to work on the sugar plantations of the eastern coastal area then known as Natal. Serious riots in Durban between Indians and Zulus erupted in 1949. There is also a significant group of Chinese South Africans (approximately 100,000 individuals) and Vietnamese South Africans (approximately 50,000 individuals). In 2008, the Pretoria High Court has ruled that Chinese South Africans who arrived before 1994 are to be reclassified as Coloureds. As a result of this ruling, about 12,000–15,000 ethnically Chinese citizens who arrived before 1994, numbering 3%–5% of the total Chinese population in the country, will be able to benefit from government BEE policies.

Religion

According to the 2001 national census, Christians accounted for 79.7% of the population. This includes Zion Christian (11.1%), Pentecostal (Charismatic) (8.2%), Roman Catholic (7.1%), Methodist (6.8%), Dutch Reformed (6.7%), Anglican (3.8%); members of other Christian churches accounted for another 36% of the population. Muslims accounted for 1.5% of the population, Hindus about 1.3%, and Judaism 0.2%. 15.1% had no religious affiliation, 2.3% were other and 1.4% were unspecified.

African Indigenous Churches were the largest of the Christian groups. It was believed that many of these persons who claimed no affiliation with any organised religion adhered to traditional indigenous religions. Many peoples have syncretic religious practices combining Christian and indigenous influences.

Islam in South Africa constitute mostly of those are described as Coloureds and those who are described as Indians. They have been joined by black or white South African converts as well as others from other parts of Africa. South African Muslims claim that their faith is the fastest-growing religion of conversion in the country, with the number of black Muslims growing sixfold, from 12,000 in 1991 to 74,700 in 2004

The Hindu population was primarily established during British colonial period, but later waves of immigration from India have also contributed to it. Most Hindus are ethnically South Asian but there are many who come from mixed racial stock, and some are converts with the efforts of Hindu missionaries such as ISKCON.

Other minority religions in South Africa are Sikhism, Jainism and Bahá'í Faith.

By ethnicity

79.9% of Black residents are Christian, 17.5% have no religion, 0.2% are Muslim, 0.0% are Jewish, 0.0% are Hindu and 2.3% have other or undetermined beliefs.

86.8% of White residents are Christian, 8.8% have no religion, 0.2% are Muslim, 1.4% are Jewish, and 0.0% are Hindu. 2.7% have other or undetermined beliefs.

Languages

South Africa has eleven official languages: Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Northern Sotho, Sotho, Swazi, Tswana, Tsonga, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu. In this regard it is third only to Bolivia and India in number. While all the languages are formally equal, some languages are spoken more than others. According to the 2001 National Census, the three most spoken first home languages are Zulu (23.8%), Xhosa (17.6%) and Afrikaans (13.3%). Despite the fact that English is recognised as the language of commerce and science, it was spoken by only 8.2% of South Africans at home in 2001, an even lower percentage than in 1996 (8.6%).

The country also recognises several unofficial languages, including Fanagalo, Khoe, Lobedu, Nama, Northern Ndebele, Phuthi, San and South African Sign Language. These unofficial languages may be used in certain official uses in limited areas where it has been determined that these languages are prevalent. Nevertheless, their populations are not such that they require nationwide recognition.

Many of the "unofficial languages" of the San and Khoikhoi people contain regional dialects stretching northwards into Namibia and Botswana, and elsewhere. These people, who are a physically distinct population from other Africans, have their own cultural identity based on their hunter-gatherer societies. They have been marginalised to a great extent, and many of their languages are in danger of becoming extinct.


Many white South Africans also speak other European languages, such as Portuguese (also spoken by black Angolans and Mozambicans), German, and Greek, while some Asians and Indians in South Africa speak South Asian languages, such as Tamil, Hindi, Gujarati, Urdu and Telugu. French is still widely spoken by French South Africans especially in places like Franschoek, where many South Africans are of French origin. South African French is spoken by fewer than 10,000 individuals. Congolese French is also spoken in South Africa by migrants.

By ethnicity

0.7% of Black residents speak Afrikaans at home, 0.5% speak English, 2.0% speak Southern Ndebele, 22.3% speak Xhosa, 30.1% speak Zulu, 11.9% speak Northern Sotho, 10.0% speak Sesotho, 10.3% speak Tswana, 3.4% speak Swati, 2.9% speak Venda, and 5.6% speak Tsonga. 0.3% of the Black African population speaks a non-official language at home.

59.1% of White residents speak Afrikaans at home, 39.3% speak English, 0.0% speak IsiNdebele, 0.1% speak IsiXhosa, 0.0% speak IsiZulu, 0.0% speak Sepedi, 0.0% speak Sesotho, 0.0% speak Setswana, 0.0% speak SiSwati, 0.0% speak Tshivenda, and 0.0% speak Xitsonga. 1.1% of the White population speaks a non-official language at home.

Immigration




South Africa hosts a sizeable refugee and asylum seeker population. According to the *World Refugee Survey 2008*, published by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, this population numbered approximately 144,700 in 2007. Groups of refugees and asylum seekers numbering over 10,000 included people from Zimbabwe (48,400), The Democratic Republic of the Congo (24,800), and Somalia (12,900). These populations mainly lived in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth. Many refugees have now also started to work and live in rural areas in provinces such as Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal.

Statistics SA assumes in some of their calculations that there are less than 2 million immigrants in South Africa. Other institutions, like the police and Médecins Sans Frontières place estimate the figure at 4 million.

Largest municipalities

Rank	Municipality	Core City	Province	Pop.
1	City of Johannesburg	Johannesburg	Gauteng	3,888,180
2	City of Cape Town	Cape Town	Western Cape	3,497,097
3	eThekweni	Durban	KwaZulu-Natal	3,468,086

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	4	Ekurhuleni (East Rand)	Germiston	Gauteng	2,724,229	
	5	City of Tshwane	Pretoria	Gauteng	2,345,908	
Johannesburg	6	Nelson Mandela Bay Metro	Port Elizabeth	Eastern Cape	1,050,930	
	7	Mangaung	Bloemfontein	Free State	752,906	Pretoria
Cape Town	8	Buffalo City	East London	Eastern Cape	724,312	
	9	Emfuleni	Vanderbijlpark	Gauteng	650,867	Port Elizabeth
Durban	10	Msunduzi	Pietermaritzburg	KwaZulu-Natal	616,730	
	11	Thulamela	Thohoyandou	Limpopo	602,819	Bloemfontein
Germiston	12	Polokwane	Polokwane	Limpopo	561,772	
	13	Mbombela	Nelspruit	Mpumalanga	527,203	East London
	14	Bushbuckridge	Bushbuckridge	Mpumalanga	509,970	
	15	Makhado	Louis Trichardt	Limpopo	471,805	
	16	Rustenburg	Rustenburg	North West	449,776	
	17	King Sabata Dalindyebo	Mthatha	Eastern Cape	444,830	
	18	Emalahleni	Witbank	Mpumalanga	435,217	
	19	Matjhabeng	Welkom	Free State	405,031	
	20	City of Matlosana	Klerksdorp	North West	385,782	


Statistics South Africa (2007)

Graphs and maps




Ethnic groups, 2001-2010

Pyramide des âges, Afrique du Sud, 2005




Source: Organisation des Nations Unies (World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision)


Population pyramid, 2005



Black population



White population



Coloured population