Nuclear Engineering

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Table of Contents

Chapter-1

Nuclear Engineering

Nuclear engineering is the branch of engineering concerned with the application of the breakdown of atomic nuclei and/or other sub-atomic physics, based on the principles of nuclear physics. It includes, but is not limited to, the interaction and maintenance of nuclear fission systems and components— specifically, nuclear reactors, nuclear power plants, and/or nuclear weapons. The field also includes the study of nuclear fusion, medical and other applications of (generally ionizing) radiation, nuclear safety, heat/thermodynamics transport, nuclear fuel and/or other related (e.g., waste disposal) technology, nuclear proliferation, and the effect of radioactive waste or radioactivity in the environment.

Professional areas

Nuclear fission

Nuclear fission is the disintegration of a susceptible (fissile) atom's nucleus into two different, smaller elements and other particles including neutrons. Approximately 2.4 neutrons are released per fission, which may cause additional fissions if enough fissionable material is present.

The common types of nuclear fission include thermal fission, which is fission caused by the absorption of a relatively slow thermal neutron with kinetic energy approximately 0.025 eV. Fast fission is fission caused by the absorption of a more energetic neutron, with kinetic energy on the order of MeV. Also, in especially heavy nuclei, spontaneous fission may occur. Nuclei that are fissionable by neutrons typically carry at least a very small chance of spontaneous fission occurring.

Generally, thermal fission is used in commercial reactors, though Fast Breeder Reactors have been developed to harness fast fission.

The United States gets about 20% of its electricity from nuclear power. Nuclear engineers in this field generally work, directly or indirectly, in the nuclear power industry or for national laboratories. Current research in the industry is directed at producing

economical, proliferation-resistant reactor designs with passive safety features. Although government labs research the same areas as industry, they also study a myriad of other issues such as nuclear fuels and nuclear fuel cycles, advanced reactor designs, and nuclear weapon design and maintenance. A principal pipeline for trained personnel for US reactor facilities is the Navy Nuclear Power Program.

Nuclear Powerplant



B-61 thermonuclear weapon

Nuclear fusion and plasma physics

Research areas in nuclear fusion and plasma physics include high-temperature, plasma dynamics, and radiation-resistant materials. Internationally, research is currently directed at building a prototype tokamak called ITER. The research at ITER will primarily focus on instabilities and diverter design refinement. Researchers in the USA are also building an inertial confinement experiment called the National Ignition Facility or NIF. NIF will be used to refine neutron transport calculations for the US stockpile stewardship initiative.

NIF (National Ignition Facility) target chamber

Nuclear medicine and medical physics

An important field is medical physics, and its subfields nuclear medicine, radiation therapy, health physics, and diagnostic imaging. From x-ray machines to MRI to PET, among many others, medical physics provides most of modern medicine's diagnostic capability along with providing many treatment options.



X-Ray Image of a male skull



Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan of a head



PET taken with an ECAT Exact HR+ PET Scanner

Nuclear materials and nuclear fuels

Nuclear materials research focuses on two main subject areas, nuclear fuels and irradiation-induced modification of materials. Improvement of nuclear fuels is crucial for obtaining increased efficiency from nuclear reactors. Irradiation effects studies have many purposes, from studying structural changes to reactor components to studying nano-modification of metals using ion-beams or particle accelerators.

Uranium ore, the principal raw material of nuclear fuel

Nuclear fuel pellets

A Focused ion beam

Radiation measurements and dosimetry

Nuclear engineers and radiological scientists are interested in the development of more advanced ionizing radiation measurement and detection systems, and using these to improve imaging technologies. This includes detector design, fabrication and analysis, measurements of fundamental atomic and nuclear parameters, and radiation imaging systems, among other things.

A modern Geiger counter

A neutron detector

Scintillation detector next to Uraninite

Chapter-2

Neutron Moderator

Currently operating thermal nuclear reactors (nuclear reactors with moderator)

Moderator	Reactors	Design	Country
graphite	30	AGR, Magnox, RBMK	United Kingdom, Russia
heavy water	42	CANDU	Canada, India, South Korea, others
light water	359	PWR, BWR	27 countries

In nuclear engineering, a **neutron moderator** is a medium that reduces the speed of fast neutrons, thereby turning them into thermal neutrons capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction involving uranium-235.

Commonly used moderators include regular (light) water (roughly 75% of the world's reactors), solid graphite (20% of reactors) and heavy water (5% of reactors). Beryllium has also been used in some experimental types, and hydrocarbons have been suggested as another possibility.

Moderation

Neutrons are normally bound into an atomic nucleus, and do not exist free for long in nature. The unbound neutron has a half-life of just under 15 minutes. The release of neutrons from the nucleus requires exceeding the binding energy of the neutron, which is typically 7-9 MeV for most isotopes. Neutron sources generate free neutrons by a variety of nuclear reactions, including nuclear fission and nuclear fusion. Whatever the source of neutrons, they are released with energies of several MeV.

Since the kinetic energy, E, can be related to temperature via:

$$E = \frac{1}{2}mv^2 = \frac{3}{2}k_B T$$

the characteristic neutron temperature of a several-MeV neutron is several tens of millions of degrees Celsius.

Moderation is the process of the reduction of the initial high kinetic energy of the free neutron. Since energy is conserved, this reduction of the neutron kinetic energy takes place by transfer of energy to a material known as a moderator. It is also known as *neutron slowing down*, since along with the reduction of energy comes a reduction in speed.

The probability of scattering of a neutron from a nucleus is given by the scattering cross section. The first couple of collisions with the moderator may be of sufficiently high energy to excite the nucleus of the moderator. Such a collision is inelastic, since some of the kinetic energy is transformed to potential energy by exciting some of the internal degrees of freedom of the nucleus to form an excited state. As the energy of the neutron is lowered, the collisions become predominantly elastic, i.e., the total kinetic energy and momentum of the system (that of the neutron and the nucleus) is conserved.

Given the mathematics of elastic collisions, as neutrons are very light compared to most nuclei, the most efficient way of removing kinetic energy from the neutron is by choosing a moderating nucleus that has near identical mass.



Elastic collision of equal masses

A collision of a neutron, which has mass of 1, with a ^{1}H nucleus (a proton) could result in the neutron losing virtually all of its energy in a single head-on collision. More generally, it is necessary to take into account both glancing and head-on collisions. The *mean logarithmic reduction of neutron energy per collision*, ξ, depends only on the atomic mass, A, of the nucleus and is given by:

$$\xi = \ln \frac{E_0}{E} = 1 + \frac{(A-1)^2}{2A} \ln\left(\frac{A-1}{A+1}\right).$$

This can be reasonably approximated to the very simple form $\xi \simeq \frac{2}{A+1}$. From this one can deduce n, the expected number of collisions of the neutron with nuclei of a given type that is required to reduce the kinetic energy of a neutron from E_0 to E: $n = \frac{1}{\xi}(\ln E_0 - \ln E)$.



In a system at thermal equilibrium, neutrons (red) are elastically scattered by a hypothetical moderator of free hydrogen nuclei (blue), undergoing thermally activated motion. Kinetic energy is transferred between particles. As the neutrons have essentially the same mass as protons and there is no absorption, the velocity distributions of both particles types would be well-described by a single Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution.

Choice of moderator materials

Some nuclei have larger absorption cross sections than others, which removes free neutrons from the flux. Therefore, a further criterion for an efficient moderator is one for which this parameter is small. The *moderating efficiency* gives the ratio of the macroscopic cross sections of scattering, Σ_s, weighted by ξ divided by that of absorption, Σ_a: i.e., $\frac{\xi \Sigma_s}{\Sigma_a}$. For a compound moderator composed of more than one element, such as light or heavy water, it is necessary to take into account the moderating and absorbing effect of both the hydrogen isotope and oxygen atom to calculate ξ. To bring a neutron from the fission energy of E_0 2 MeV to an E of 1 eV takes an expected n of 16 and 29 collisions for H_2O and D_2O, respectively. Therefore, neutrons are more rapidly moderated by light water, as H has a far higher Σ_s. However, it also has a far higher Σ_a, so that the moderating efficiency is nearly 80 times higher for heavy water than for light water.

The ideal moderator is of low mass, high scattering cross section, and low absorption cross section.

Distribution of neutron velocities once moderated

After sufficient impacts, the speed of the neutron will be comparable to the speed of the nuclei given by thermal motion; this neutron is then called a thermal neutron, and the process may also be termed *thermalization*. Once at equilibrium at a given temperature

the distribution of speeds (energies) expected of rigid spheres scattering elastically is given by the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution. This is only slightly modified in a real moderator due to the speed (energy) dependence of the absorption cross-section of most materials, so that low-speed neutrons are preferentially absorbed, so that the true neutron velocity distribution in the core would be slightly hotter than predicted.

Reactor moderators

In a thermal nuclear reactor, the nucleus of a heavy fuel element such as uranium absorbs a slow-moving free neutron, becomes unstable, and then splits ("fissions") into two smaller atoms ("fission products"). The fission process for ^{235}U nuclei yields two fission products: two to three fast-moving free neutrons, plus an amount of energy primarily manifested in the kinetic energy of the recoiling fission products. The free neutrons are emitted with a kinetic energy of ~2 MeV each. Because more free neutrons are released from a uranium fission event than thermal neutrons are required to initiate the event, the reaction can become self sustaining — a chain reaction — under controlled conditions, thus liberating a tremendous amount of energy.



Fission cross section, measured in barns (a unit equal to 10^{-28} m^2), is a function of the energy of the neutron colliding with a ^{235}U nucleus. Fission probability decreases as

neutron energy (and speed) increases. This explains why most reactors fueled with ^{235}U need a moderator to sustain a chain reaction and why removing a moderator can shut down a reactor.

The probability of further fission events is determined by the fission cross section, which is dependent upon the speed (energy) of the incident neutrons. For thermal reactors, high-energy neutrons in the MeV-range are much less likely to cause further fission. (Note: It is not *impossible* for fast neutrons to cause fission, just much less likely.) The newly-released fast neutrons, moving at roughly 10% of the speed of light, must be slowed down or "moderated," typically to speeds of a few kilometres per second, if they are to be likely to cause further fission in neighbouring ^{235}U nuclei and hence continue the chain reaction. This speed happens to be equivalent to temperatures in the few hundred celsius range.

In all moderated reactors, some neutrons of all energy levels will produce fission, including fast neutrons. Some reactors are more fully *thermalised* than others; for example, in a CANDU reactor nearly all fission reactions are produced by thermal neutrons, while in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) a considerable portion of the fissions are produced by higher-energy neutrons. In the proposed water-cooled supercritical water reactor (SCWR), the proportion of fast fissions may exceed 50%, making it technically a fast neutron reactor.

A fast reactor uses no moderator, but relies on fission produced by unmoderated fast neutrons to sustain the chain reaction. In some fast reactor designs, up to 20% of fissions can come from direct fast neutron fission of uranium-238, an isotope which is not fissile at all with thermal neutrons.

Moderators are also used in non-reactor neutron sources, such as plutonium-beryllium and spallation sources.

Form and location

The form and location of the moderator can greatly influence the cost and safety of a reactor. Classically, moderators were precision-machined blocks of high purity graphite with embedded ducting to carry away heat. They were in the hottest part of the reactor, and therefore subject to corrosion and ablation. In some materials, including graphite, the impact of the neutrons with the moderator can cause the moderator to accumulate dangerous amounts of Wigner energy. At Windscale, this problem led to the infamous Windscale fire.

Some pebble-bed reactors' moderators are not only simple, but also inexpensive: the nuclear fuel is embedded in spheres of reactor-grade pyrolytic carbon, roughly of the size of tennis balls. The spaces between the balls serve as ducting. The reactor is operated above the Wigner annealing temperature so that the graphite does not accumulate dangerous amounts of Wigner energy.

In CANDU and PWR reactors, the moderator is liquid water (heavy water for CANDU, light water for PWR). In the event of a loss-of-coolant accident in a PWR, the moderator is also lost and the reaction will stop. This negative void coefficient is an important safety feature of these reactors. In CANDU the moderator is located in a separate heavy-water circuit, surrounding the pressurized heavy-water coolant channels. This design gives CANDU reactors a positive void coefficient, although the slower neutron kinetics of heavy-water moderated systems compensates for this, leading to comparable safety with PWRs."

Moderator impurities

Good moderators are also free of neutron-absorbing impurities such as boron. In commercial nuclear power plants the moderator typically contains dissolved boron. The boron concentration of the reactor coolant can be changed by the operators by adding boric acid or by diluting with water to manipulate reactor power. The German World War II nuclear program suffered a substantial setback when its inexpensive graphite moderators failed to work. At that time, most graphites were deposited on boron electrodes, and the German commercial graphite contained too much boron. Since the war-time German program never discovered this problem, they were forced to use far more expensive heavy water moderators. In the U.S., Leo Szilard, a former chemical engineer, discovered the problem.

Non-graphite moderators

Some moderators are quite expensive, for example beryllium, and reactor-grade heavy water. Reactor-grade heavy water must be 99.75% pure to enable reactions with unenriched uranium. This is difficult to prepare because heavy water and regular water form the same chemical bonds in almost the same ways, at only slightly different speeds.

The much cheaper light water moderator (essentially very pure regular water) absorbs too many neutrons to be used with unenriched natural uranium, and therefore uranium enrichment or nuclear reprocessing becomes necessary to operate such reactors, increasing overall costs. Both enrichment and reprocessing are expensive and technologically challenging processes, and additionally both enrichment and several types of reprocessing can be used to create weapons-usable material, causing proliferation concerns. Reprocessing schemes that are more resistant to proliferation are currently under development.

The CANDU reactor's moderator doubles as a safety feature. A large tank of low-temperature, low-pressure heavy water moderates the neutrons and also acts as a heat sink in extreme loss-of-coolant accident conditions. It is separated from the fuel rods that actually generate the heat. Heavy water is very effective at slowing down (moderating) neutrons, giving CANDU reactors their important and defining characteristic of high "neutron economy."

Nuclear weapon design

Early speculation about nuclear weapons assumed that an "atom bomb" would be a large amount of fissile material, moderated by a neutron moderator, similar in structure to a nuclear reactor or "pile." Only the Manhattan project embraced the idea of a chain reaction of fast neutrons in pure metallic uranium or plutonium. Other moderated designs were also considered by the Americans; proposals included using uranium hydride as the fissile material. In 1943 Robert Oppenheimer and Niels Bohr considered the possibility of using a "pile" as a weapon. The motivation was that with a graphite moderator it would be possible to achieve the chain reaction without the use of any isotope separation. In August 1945, when information of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was relayed to the scientists of the German nuclear program, interned at Farm Hall in England, chief scientist Werner Heisenberg hypothesized that the device must have been "something like a nuclear reactor, with the neutrons slowed by many collisions with a moderator."

After the success of the Manhattan project, all major nuclear weapons programs have relied on fast neutrons in their weapons designs. The notable exception is the *Ruth* and *Ray* test explosions of Operation Upshot-Knothole. The aim of the University of California Radiation Laboratory design was to produce an explosion powerful enough to ignite a thermonuclear weapon with the minimal amount of fissile material. The core consisted of uranium hydride, with hydrogen, or in the case of *Ray*, deuterium acting as the neutron moderator. The predicted yield was 1.5 to 3 kt for *Ruth* and 0.5-1 kt for *Ray*. The tests produced yields of 200 tons of TNT each; both tests were considered to be fizzles.

The main benefit of using a moderator in a nuclear explosive is that the amount of fissile material needed to reach criticality may be greatly reduced. Slowing of fast neutrons will increase the cross section for neutron absorption, reducing the critical mass. A side effect is however that as the chain reaction progresses, the moderator will be heated, thus losing its ability to cool the neutrons.

Another effect of moderation is that the time between subsequent neutron generations is increased, slowing down the reaction. This makes the containment of the explosion a problem; the inertia that is used to confine implosion type bombs will not be able to confine the reaction. The end result may be a fizzle instead of a bang.

The explosive power of a fully moderated explosion is thus limited, at worst it may be equal to a chemical explosive of similar mass. Again quoting Heisenberg: *"One can never make an explosive with slow neutrons, not even with the heavy water machine, as then the neutrons only go with thermal speed, with the result that the reaction is so slow that the thing explodes sooner, before the reaction is complete."*

While a nuclear bomb working on thermal neutrons may be impractical, modern weapons designs may still benefit from some level of moderation. A beryllium tamper used as a neutron reflector will also act as a moderator.

Materials used

- Hydrogen, as in ordinary "light water." Because protium also has a significant cross section for neutron capture only limited moderation is possible without losing too many neutrons. The less-moderated neutrons are relatively more likely to be captured by uranium-238 and less likely to fission uranium-235, so light water reactors require enriched uranium to operate.
    - There are also proposals to use the compound formed by the chemical reaction of metallic uranium and hydrogen (uranium hydride--UH_3) as a combination fuel and moderator in a new type of reactor.
    - Hydrogen is also used in the form of cryogenic liquid methane and sometimes liquid hydrogen as a cold neutron source in some research reactors: yielding a Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution for the neutrons whose maximum is shifted to much lower energies.
    - Hydrogen combined with carbon as in Paraffin was used in some early German experiments.
- Deuterium, in the form of heavy water, in heavy water reactors, e.g. CANDU. Reactors moderated with heavy water can use unenriched natural uranium.
- Carbon, in the form of reactor-grade graphite or pyrolytic carbon, used in e.g. RBMK and pebble-bed reactors, or in compounds, e.g. carbon dioxide . Lower-temperature reactors are susceptible to buildup of Wigner energy in the material. Like deuterium-moderated reactors, some of these reactors can use unenriched natural uranium.
    - Graphite is also deliberately allowed to be heated to around 2000 K or higher in some research reactors to produce a hot neutron source: giving a Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution whose maximum is spread out to generate higher energy neutrons.
- Beryllium, in the form of metal. Beryllium is expensive and toxic, so its use is limited.
- Lithium-7, in the form of a lithium fluoride salt, typically in conjunction with beryllium fluoride salt (FLiBe). This is the most common type of moderator in a Molten Salt Reactor.

Other light-nuclei materials are unsuitable for various reasons. Helium is a gas and it requires special design to achieve sufficient density; lithium-6 and boron-10 absorb neutrons.

Chapter-3

Nuclear Criticality Safety and Atomic Battery

Nuclear criticality safety

Nuclear criticality safety is a field of nuclear engineering dedicated to the prevention of an inadvertent, self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. Additionally, nuclear criticality safety is concerned with mitigating the consequences of a nuclear criticality accident. A nuclear criticality accident occurs from operations that involve fissile material and results in a tremendous and potentially lethal release of radiation. Nuclear criticality safety practitioners attempt to minimize the probability of a nuclear criticality accident by analyzing normal and abnormal fissile material operations and providing controls on the processing of fissile materials. A common practice is to apply a double contingency analysis to the operation in which two or more independent, concurrent and unlikely changes in process conditions must occur before a nuclear criticality accident can occur. For example, the first change in conditions may be complete or partial flooding and the second change a rearrangement of the fissile material. Controls (requirements) on process parameters (e.g., fissile material mass, equipment) result from this analysis. These controls, either passive (physical), active (mechanical), or administrative (human), are implemented by inherently safe or fault-tolerant plant designs, or, if such designs are not practicable, by administrative controls such as operating procedures, job instructions and other means to minimize the potential for significant process changes that could lead to a nuclear criticality accident.

Principles

Seven factors influence a criticality system.

Geometry or shape of the fissile material: If neutrons escape (leak from) the fissile system they are not available to interact with the fissile material to cause a fission event. Therefore the shape of the fissile material affects the probability of occurrence of fission events. A large surface area such as a thin slab has lots of leakage and is safer than the same amount of fissile material in a small, compact shape such as a cube or a sphere.

Interaction of units: Neutrons leaking from one unit can enter another. Two units, which by themselves are sub-critical, could interact with each other to form a critical system. The distance separating the units and any material between them influences the effect.

Reflection: When neutrons collide with other atomic particles (primarily nuclei) and are not absorbed, they change direction. If the change in direction is large enough, the neutron may travel back into the system, increasing the likelihood of interaction (fission). This is called 'reflection'. Good reflectors include hydrogen, beryllium, carbon, lead, uranium, water, polyethylene, concrete, Tungsten carbide and steel.

Moderation: Neutrons resulting from fission are typically fast (high energy). These fast neutrons do not cause fission as readily as slower (less energetic) ones. Neutrons are slowed down (moderated) by collision with atomic nuclei. The most effective moderating nuclei are hydrogen, deuterium, beryllium and carbon. Hence hydrogenous materials including oil, polyethylene, water, wood, paraffin, and the human body are good moderators. Note that moderation comes from collisions; therefore most moderators are also good reflectors.

Absorption: Absorption removes neutrons from the system. Large amounts of absorbers are used to control or reduce the probability of a criticality. Good absorbers are boron, cadmium, gadolinium, silver, and indium.

Enrichment: The probability of a neutron reacting with a fissile nucleus is influenced by the relative numbers of fissile and non-fissile nuclei in a system. The process of increasing the relative number of fissile nuclei in a system is called enrichment. Typically, low enrichment means less likelihood of a criticality and high enrichment means a greater likelihood.

Mass: The probability of fission increases as the total number of fissile nuclei increases. The relationship is not linear. There is a threshold below which a criticality will not occur. This threshold is called the critical mass.

Calculations and analyses

To determine whether a system containing fissile material is safe, calculations are performed using computer programmes. The analyst describes the geometry of the system and the materials, usually with conservative or pessimistic assumptions. The density and size of any neutron absorbers is minimised while the amount of fissile material is maximised. As some moderators are also absorbers, the analyst must be careful when modelling these to be pessimistic. Computer programmes allow analysts to describe a three dimensional system with boundary conditions. These boundary conditions can represent real boundaries such as concrete walls or the surface of a pond, or can be used to represent an artificial infinite system using a periodic boundary condition. These are useful when representing a large system consisting of many repeated units.

Computer codes used for criticality safety analyses include MONK (UK), KENO (USA), MCNP (USA) and CRISTAL (France).

Burnup credit

Traditional criticality analyses assume that the fissile material is in its most reactive condition, which is usually at maximum enrichment, with no irradiation. For spent nuclear fuel storage and transport, burnup credit may be used to allow fuel to be more closely packed, reducing space and allowing more fuel to be handled safely. In order to implement burnup credit, fuel is modeled as irradiated using pessimistic conditions which produce an isotopic composition representative of all irradiated fuel. Fuel irradiation produces actinides consisting of both neutron absorbers and fissionable isotopes as well as fission products which absorb neutrons.

In fuel storage pools using burnup credit, separate regions are designed for storage of fresh and irradiating fuel. In order to store fuel in the irradiating fuel store it must satisfy a loading curve which is dependent on initial enrichment and irradiation.

Atomic battery

The terms **atomic battery**, **nuclear battery**, **tritium battery** and **radioisotope generator** are used to describe a device which uses the emissions from a radioactive isotope to generate electricity. Like nuclear reactors they generate electricity from atomic energy, but differ in that they do not use a chain reaction. Compared to other batteries they are very costly, but have extremely long life and high energy density, and so they are mainly used as power sources for equipment that must operate unattended for long periods of time, such as spacecraft and automated scientific stations in remote parts of the world.

Nuclear battery technology began in 1913, when Henry Moseley first demonstrated the beta cell. The field received considerable in depth research attention for applications requiring long-life power sources for space needs during the 50s and 60s. Over the years many types and methods have been developed. The scientific principles are well known, but modern nano-scale technology and new wide bandgap semiconductors have created new devices and interesting material properties not previously available.

Batteries using the energy of radioisotope decay to provide long-lived power (10–20 years) are being developed internationally. Conversion techniques can be grouped into two types: thermal and non-thermal. The thermal converters (whose output power is a function of a temperature differential) include thermoelectric and thermionic generators. The non-thermal converters (whose output power is not a function of a temperature difference) extract a fraction of the incident energy as it is being degraded into heat rather than using thermal energy to run electrons in a cycle. Atomic batteries usually have an efficiency of 0.1–5%. High efficiency betavoltaics have 6–8%.

Thermal converters

Thermionic converter

A thermionic converter consists of a hot electrode which thermionically emits electrons over a space charge barrier to a cooler electrode, producing a useful power output. Caesium vapor is used to optimize the electrode work functions and provide an ion supply (by surface contact ionization) to neutralize the electron space charge.

Radioisotope thermoelectric generator

A thermoelectric converter connects pairs of thermocouples in series. Each thermocouple is formed by the junction of two dissimilar materials. One of each pair is heated and the other cooled. Metal thermocouples have low thermal-to-electrical efficiency. However, the carrier density and charge can be adjusted in semiconductor materials such as bismuth telluride and silicon germanium to achieve much higher conversion efficiencies.

Thermophotovoltaic cells

Thermophotovoltaic cells work by the same principles as a photovoltaic cell, except that they convert infrared light (rather than visible light) emitted by a hot surface, into electricity. Thermophotovoltaic cells have an efficiency slightly higher than thermoelectric couples and can be overlaid on thermoelectric couples, potentially doubling efficiency. The University of Houston TPV Radioisotope Power Conversion Technology development effort is aiming at combining thermophotovoltaic cell concurrently with thermocouples to provide a 3 to 4-fold improvement in system efficiency over current thermoelectric radioisotope generators.

Alkali-metal thermal to electric converter

The alkali-metal thermal to electric converter (AMTEC) is an electrochemical system which is based on the electrolyte used in the sodium-sulfur battery, sodium beta-alumina. The device is a sodium concentration cell which uses a ceramic, polycrystalline β-alumina solid electrolyte (BASE), as a separator between a high pressure region containing sodium vapor at 900 - 1300 K and a low pressure region containing a condenser for liquid sodium at 400 - 700 K. Efficiency of AMTEC cells has reached 16% in the laboratory and is predicted to approach 20%.

Non-thermal converters

Non-thermal converters extract a fraction of the nuclear energy as it is being degraded into heat. Their outputs are not functions of temperature differences as are thermoelectric and thermionic converters. Non-thermal generators can be grouped into three classes.

Direct charging generators

In the first type, the primary generators consists of a capacitor which is charged by the current of charged particles from a radioactive layer deposited on one of the electrodes. Spacing can be either vacuum or dielectric. Negatively charged beta particles or positively charged alpha particles, positrons or fission fragments may be utilized.

Although this form of nuclear-electric generator dates back to 1913, few applications have been found in the past for the extremely low currents and inconveniently high voltages provided by direct charging generators. Oscillator/transformer systems are employed to reduce the voltages, then rectifiers are used to transform the AC power back to Direct Current.

English physicist H.G.J. Moseley constructed the first of these. Moseley's apparatus consisted of a glass globe silvered on the inside with a radium emitter mounted on the tip of a wire at the center. The charged particles from the radium created a flow of electricity as they moved quickly from the radium to the inside surface of the sphere. As late as 1945 the Moseley model guided other efforts to build experimental batteries generating electricity from the emissions of radioactive elements.

Betavoltaics

Betavoltaics are generators of electrical current, in effect a form of battery, which use energy from a radioactive source emitting beta particles (electrons). A common source used is the hydrogen isotope, tritium. Unlike most nuclear power sources, which use nuclear radiation to generate heat, which then generates electricity (thermoelectric and thermionic sources), betavoltaics use a non-thermal conversion process.

Betavoltaics are particularly well-suited to low-power electrical applications where long life of the energy source is needed, such as implantable medical devices or military and space applications.

Optoelectric

An optolectric nuclear battery has also been proposed by researchers of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow. A beta-emitter (such as technetium-99) would stimulate an excimer mixture, and the light would power a photocell. The battery would consist of an excimer mixture of argon/xenon in a pressure vessel with an internal mirrored surface, finely-divided Tc-99, and an intermittent ultrasonic stirrer, illuminating a photocell with a bandgap tuned for the excimer. The advantage of this design is that precision electrode assemblies are not needed, and most beta particles escape the finely-divided bulk material to contribute to the battery's net power.

Reciprocating Electromechanical Atomic Batteries

Electromechanical atomic batteries use the build up of charge between two plates to pull one bendable plate towards the other, until the two plates touch, discharge, equalizing the electrostatic buildup, and spring back. The mechanical motion produced can be used to produce electricity through flexing of a piezoelectric material or through a linear generator. Milliwatts of power are produced in pulses depending on the charge rate, in some cases multiple times per second (35Hz).

Radioisotopes Used

Atomic batteries use radioisotopes that produce low energy beta particles or sometimes alpha particles of varying energies. Low energy beta particles are needed to prevent the production of high energy penetrating Bremsstrahlung radiation that would require heavy shielding. Radioisotopes such as tritium, nickel-63, promethium-147, and technetium-99 have been tested. Plutonium-238, curium-242, curium-244 and strontium-90 have been used.

Chapter-4

Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The **nuclear fuel cycle**, also called **nuclear fuel chain**, is the progression of nuclear fuel through a series of differing stages. It consists of steps in the *front end*, which are the preparation of the fuel, steps in the *service period* in which the fuel is used during reactor operation, and steps in the *back end*, which are necessary to safely manage, contain, and either reprocess or dispose of spent nuclear fuel. If spent fuel is not reprocessed, the fuel cycle is referred to as an *open fuel cycle* (or a *once-through fuel cycle*); if the spent fuel is reprocessed, it is referred to as a *closed fuel cycle*.

Basic concepts

Nuclear power relies on fissionable material that can sustain a chain reaction with neutrons. Examples of such materials include uranium and plutonium. Most nuclear reactors use a moderator to lower the kinetic energy of the neutrons and increase the probability that fission will occur. This allows reactors to use material with far lower concentration of fissile isotopes than nuclear weapons. Heavy water and graphite are the most effective moderators, because they slow the neutrons through collisions without absorbing them. Reactors using graphite or heavy water as the moderator can operate using natural uranium.

Reactors using light water (the form that occurs in nature) require fuel that is enriched in fissile isotopes, typically uranium enriched to 3-5% in the less common isotope U-235, the only fissile isotope that is found in significant quantity in nature. Two alternatives to this low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel are Mixed Oxide fuels produced by blending either plutonium or the uranium isotope U-233. These are produced from the absorption of neutrons by irradiating fertile materials in a reactor, including the common uranium isotope U-238 and thorium, respectively, and can be separated from spent uranium and thorium fuels in reprocessing plants.

Some reactors do not use moderators to slow the neutrons. Like nuclear weapons, which also use unmoderated or "fast" neutrons, these Fast-neutron reactors require much higher concentrations of fissile isotopes in order to sustain a chain reaction. They are also

capable of breeding fissile isotopes from fertile materials; a Breeder reactor is one that generates more fissile material in this way than it consumes.

During the nuclear reaction inside a reactor, the fissile isotopes in nuclear fuel are consumed, producing more and more fission products, most of which are considered radioactive waste. The buildup of fission products and consumption of fissile isotopes eventually stop the nuclear reaction, causing the fuel to become a spent nuclear fuel. When 3% enriched LEU fuel is used, the spent fuel typically consists of roughly 1% U-235, 95% U-238, 1% plutonium and 3% fission products. Spent fuel and other high-level radioactive waste is extremely hazardous, although nuclear reactors produce relatively small volumes of waste compared to other power plants because of the high energy density of nuclear fuel. Safe management of these byproducts of nuclear power, including their storage and disposal, is a difficult problem for any country using nuclear power.

Front end

1 Uranium ore - the principal raw material of nuclear fuel



2 Yellowcake - the form in which uranium is transported to a conversion plant

3 UF_6 - used in enrichment

4 Nuclear fuel - a compact, inert, insoluble solid

Exploration

A deposit of uranium, such as uraninite, discovered by geophysical techniques, is evaluated and sampled to determine the amounts of uranium materials that are extractable at specified costs from the deposit. Uranium reserves are the amounts of ore that are estimated to be recoverable at stated costs. Uranium in nature consists primarily of two isotopes, U-238 and U-235. The numbers refer to the atomic mass number for each isotope, or the number of protons and neutrons in the atomic nucleus. Naturally occurring uranium consists of approximately 99.28% U-238 and 0.71% U-235. The atomic nucleus of U-235 will nearly always fission when struck by a free neutron, and the isotope is therefore said to be a "fissile" isotope. The nucleus of a U-238 atom on the other hand, rather than undergoing fission when struck by a free neutron, will nearly always absorb the neutron and yield an atom of the isotope U-239. This isotope then undergoes natural radioactive decay to yield Pu-239, which, like U-235, is a fissile isotope. The atoms of U-238 are said to be fertile, because, through neutron irradiation in the core, some eventually yield atoms of fissile Pu-239.

Mining

Uranium ore can be extracted through conventional mining in open pit and underground methods similar to those used for mining other metals. In-situ leach mining methods also are used to mine uranium in the United States. In this technology, uranium is leached from the in-place ore through an array of regularly spaced wells and is then recovered from the leach solution at a surface plant. Uranium ores in the United States typically range from about 0.05 to 0.3% uranium oxide (U_3O_8). Some uranium deposits developed in other countries are of higher grade and are also larger than deposits mined in the United States. Uranium is also present in very low-grade amounts (50 to 200 parts per million) in some domestic phosphate-bearing deposits of marine origin. Because very large quantities of phosphate-bearing rock are mined for the production of wet-process phosphoric acid used in high analysis fertilizers and other phosphate chemicals, at some phosphate processing plants the uranium, although present in very low concentrations, can be economically recovered from the process stream.

Milling

Mined uranium ores normally are processed by grinding the ore materials to a uniform particle size and then treating the ore to extract the uranium by chemical leaching. The milling process commonly yields dry powder-form material consisting of natural uranium, "yellowcake", which is sold on the uranium market as U_3O_8.

Uranium conversion

Milled uranium oxide, U_3O_8, must be converted to uranium hexafluoride, UF_6, which is the form required by most commercial uranium enrichment facilities currently in use. A solid at room temperature, uranium hexafluoride can be changed to a gaseous form at

moderately higher temperature of 57 °C (134 °F). The uranium hexafluoride conversion product contains only natural, not enriched, uranium.

Triuranium octaoxide (U_3O_8) is also converted directly to ceramic grade uranium dioxide (UO_2) for use in reactors not requiring enriched fuel, such as CANDU. The volumes of material converted directly to UO_2 are typically quite small compared to the amounts converted to UF_6.

Enrichment



Nuclear fuel cycle begins when uranium is mined, enriched and manufactured to nuclear fuel (1) which is delivered to a nuclear power plant. After usage in the power plant the spent fuel is delivered to a reprocessing plant (if fuel is recycled) (2) or to a final

repository (if no recycling is done) (3) for geological disposition. In reprocessing 95% of spent fuel can be recycled to be returned to usage in a nuclear power plant (4).

The concentration of the fissionable isotope, U-235 (0.71% in natural uranium) is less than that required to sustain a nuclear chain reaction in light water reactor cores. Natural UF_6 thus must be enriched in the fissionable isotope for it to be used as nuclear fuel. The different levels of enrichment required for a particular nuclear fuel application are specified by the customer: light-water reactor fuel normally is enriched to 3.5% U-235, but uranium enriched to lower concentrations is also required. Enrichment is accomplished using one or more methods of isotope separation. Gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge are the commonly used uranium enrichment technologies, but new enrichment technologies are currently being developed.

The bulk (96%) of the byproduct from enrichment is depleted uranium (DU), which can be used for armor, kinetic energy penetrators, radiation shielding and ballast. Still, there are vast quantities of depleted uranium in storage. The United States Department of Energy alone has 470,000 tonnes. About 95% of depleted uranium is stored as uranium hexafluoride (UF_6).

Fabrication

For use as nuclear fuel, enriched uranium hexafluoride is converted into uranium dioxide (UO_2) powder that is then processed into pellet form. The pellets are then fired in a high temperature sintering furnace to create hard, ceramic pellets of enriched uranium. The cylindrical pellets then undergo a grinding process to achieve a uniform pellet size. The pellets are stacked, according to each nuclear reactor core's design specifications, into tubes of corrosion-resistant metal alloy. The tubes are sealed to contain the fuel pellets: these tubes are called fuel rods. The finished fuel rods are grouped in special fuel assemblies that are then used to build up the nuclear fuel core of a power reactor.

The metal used for the tubes depends on the design of the reactor. Stainless steel was used in the past, but most reactors now use zirconium. For the most common types of reactors, boiling water reactors (BWR) and pressurized water reactors (PWR), the tubes are assembled into bundles with the tubes spaced precise distances apart. These bundles are then given a unique identification number, which enables them to be tracked from manufacture through use and into disposal.

Service period

Transport of radioactive materials

Transport is an integral part of the nuclear fuel cycle. There are nuclear power reactors in operation in several countries but uranium mining is viable in only a few areas. Also, in the course of over forty years of operation by the nuclear industry, a number of specialized facilities have been developed in various locations around the world to provide fuel cycle services and there is a need to transport nuclear materials to and from

these facilities. Most transports of nuclear fuel material occur between different stages of the cycle, but occasionally a material may be transported between similar facilities. With some exceptions, nuclear fuel cycle materials are transported in solid form, the exception being uranium hexafluoride (UF_6) which is considered a gas. Most of the material used in nuclear fuel is transported several times during the cycle. Transports are frequently international, and are often over large distances. Nuclear materials are generally transported by specialized transport companies.

Since nuclear materials are radioactive, it is important to ensure that radiation exposure of both those involved in the transport of such materials and the general public along transport routes is limited. Packaging for nuclear materials includes, where appropriate, shielding to reduce potential radiation exposures. In the case of some materials, such as fresh uranium fuel assemblies, the radiation levels are negligible and no shielding is required. Other materials, such as spent fuel and high-level waste, are highly radioactive and require special handling. To limit the risk in transporting highly radioactive materials, containers known as spent nuclear fuel shipping casks are used which are designed to maintain integrity under normal transportation conditions and during hypothetical accident conditions.

In-core fuel management

A nuclear reactor core is composed of a few hundred "assemblies", arranged in a regular array of cells, each cell being formed by a fuel or control rod surrounded, in most designs, by a moderator and coolant, which is water in most reactors.

Because of the fission process that consumes the fuels, the old fuel rods must be changed periodically to fresh ones (this period is called a cycle). However, only a part of the assemblies (typically one-third) are removed since the fuel depletion is not spatially uniform. Furthermore, it is not a good policy, for efficiency reasons, to put the new assemblies exactly at the location of the removed ones. Even bundles of the same age may have different burn-up levels, which depends on their previous positions in the core. Thus the available bundles must be arranged in such a way that the yield is maximized, while safety limitations and operational constraints are satisfied. Consequently reactor operators are faced with the so-called **optimal fuel reloading problem**, which consists in optimizing the rearrangement of all the assemblies, the old and fresh ones, while still maximizing the reactivity of the reactor core so as to maximise fuel burn-up and minimise fuel-cycle costs.

This is a discrete optimization problem, and computationally infeasible by current combinatorial methods, due to the huge number of permutations and the complexity of each computation. Many numerical methods have been proposed for solving it and many commercial software packages have been written to support fuel management. This is an on-going issue in reactor operations as no definitive solution to this problem has been found and operators use a combination of computational and empirical techniques to manage this problem.

The study of used fuel

Used nuclear fuel is studied in Post irradiation examination, where used fuel is examined to know more about the processes that occur in fuel during use, and how these might alter the outcome of an accident. For example, during normal use, the fuel expands due to thermal expansion, which can cause cracking. Most nuclear fuel is uranium dioxide, which is a cubic solid with a structure similar to that of calcium fluoride. In used fuel the solid state structure of most of the solid remains the same as that of pure cubic uranium dioxide. SIMFUEL is the name given to the simulated spent fuel which is made by mixing finely ground metal oxides, grinding as a slurry, spray drying it before heating in hydrogen/argon to 1700 ^{o}C. In SIMFUEL, 4.1% of the volume of the solid was in the form of metal nanoparticles which are made of molybdenum, ruthenium, rhodium and palladium. Most of these metal particles are of the ε phase (hexagonal) of Mo-Ru-Rh-Pd alloy, while smaller amounts of the α (cubic) and σ (tetragonal) phases of these metals were found in the SIMFUEL. Also present within the SIMFUEL was a cubic perovskite phase which is a barium strontium zirconate ($Ba_xSr_{1-x}ZrO_3$).



The solid state structure of uranium dioxide, the oxygen atoms are in green and the uranium atoms in red

Uranium dioxide is very insoluble in water, but after oxidation it can be converted to uranium trioxide or another uranium(VI) compound which is much more soluble. Uranium dioxide (UO_2) can be oxidised to an oxygen rich hyperstoichiometric oxide (UO_{2+x}) which can be further oxidised to U_4O_9, U_3O_7, U_3O_8 and $UO_3.2H_2O$.

Because used fuel contains alpha emitters (plutonium and the minor actinides), the effect of adding an alpha emitter (^{238}Pu) to uranium dioxide on the leaching rate of the oxide has been investigated. For the crushed oxide, adding ^{238}Pu tended to increase the rate of leaching, but the difference in the leaching rate between 0.1 and 10% ^{238}Pu was very small.

The concentration of carbonate in the water which is in contact with the used fuel has a considerable effect on the rate of corrosion, because uranium(VI) forms soluble anionic carbonate complexes such as $[UO_2(CO_3)_2]^{2-}$ and $[UO_2(CO_3)_3]^{4-}$. When carbonate ions are absent, and the water is not strongly acidic, the hexavalent uranium compounds which form on oxidation of uranium dioxide often form insoluble hydrated uranium trioxide phases.

By ‘sputtering’, using uranium metal and an argon/oxygen gas mixture, thin films of uranium dioxide can be deposited upon gold surfaces. These gold surfaces modified with uranium dioxide have been used for both cyclic voltammetry and AC impedance experiments, and these offer an insight into the likely leaching behaviour of uranium dioxide.

Fuel cladding interactions

The study of the nuclear fuel cycle includes the study of the behaviour of nuclear materials both under normal conditions and under accident conditions. For example, there has been much work on how uranium dioxide based fuel interacts with the zirconium alloy tubing used to cover it. During use, the fuel swells due to thermal expansion and then starts to react with the surface of the zirconium alloy, forming a new layer which contains both fuel and zirconium (from the cladding). Then, on the fuel side of this mixed layer, there is a layer of fuel which has a higher caesium to uranium ratio than most of the fuel. This is because xenon isotopes are formed as fission products that diffuse out of the lattice of the fuel into voids such as the narrow gap between the fuel and the cladding. After diffusing into these voids, it decays to caesium isotopes. Because of the thermal gradient which exists in the fuel during use, the volatile fission products tend to be driven from the centre of the pellet to the rim area. Below is a graph of the temperature of uranium metal, uranium nitride and uranium dioxide as a function of distance from the centre of a 20 mm diameter pellet with a rim temperature of 200 ^{o}C. The uranium dioxide (because of its poor thermal conductivity) will overheat at the centre of the pellet, while the other more thermally conductive forms of uranium remain below their melting points.



Temperature profile for a 20 mm diameter fuel pellet with a power density of 1000 W per cubic meter. The fuels other than uranium dioxide are not compromised.

Normal and abnormal conditions

The nuclear chemistry associated with the nuclear fuel cycle can be divided into two main areas, one area is concerned with operation under the intended conditions while the other area is concerned with maloperation conditions where some alteration from the normal operating conditions has occurred or (*more rarely*) an accident is occurring.

The releases of radioactivity from normal operations are the small planned releases from uranium ore processing, enrichment, power reactors, reprocessing plants and waste stores. These can be in a different chemical/physical form to the releases which could occur under accident conditions. In addition the isotope signature of a hypothetical accident may be very different to that of a planned normal operational discharge of radioactivity to the environment.

Just because a radioisotope is released it does not mean it will enter a human and then cause harm. For instance the migration of radioactivity can be altered by the binding of the radioisotope to the surfaces of soil particles. For example caesium binds tightly to clay minerals such as illite and montmorillonite hence it remains in the upper layers of soil where it can be accessed by plants with shallow roots (such as grass). Hence grass and mushrooms can carry a considerable amount of ^{137}Cs which can be transferred to

humans through the food chain. But ^{137}Cs is not able to migrate quickly through most soils and thus is unlikely to contaminate well water. Colloids of soil minerals can migrate through soil so simple binding of a metal to the surfaces of soil particles does not fix the metal totally.

According to Jiří Hála's text book the distribution coefficient K_d is the ratio of the soil's radioactivity (Bq g^{-1}) to that of the soil water (Bq ml^{-1}). If the radioisotope is tightly bound to the minerals in the soil then less radioactivity can be absorbed by crops and grass growing on the soil.

- Cs-137 K_d = 1000
- Pu-239 K_d = 10000 to 100000
- Sr-90 K_d = 80 to 150
- I-131 K_d = 0.007 to 50

One of the best countermeasures in dairy farming against ^{137}Cs is to mix up the soil by deeply ploughing the soil. This has the effect of putting the ^{137}Cs out of reach of the shallow roots of the grass, hence the level of radioactivity in the grass will be lowered. Also after a nuclear war or serious accident the removal of top few cm of soil and its burial in a shallow trench will reduce the long term gamma dose to humans due to ^{137}Cs as the gamma photons will be attenuated by their passage through the soil.

Even after the radioactive element arrives at the roots of the plant, the metal may be rejected by the biochemistry of the plant. The details of the uptake of ^{90}Sr and ^{137}Cs into sunflowers grown under hydroponic conditions has been reported. The caesium was found in the leaf veins, in the stem and in the apical leaves. It was found that 12% of the caesium entered the plant, and 20% of the strontium. This paper also reports details of the effect of potassium, ammonium and calcium ions on the uptake of the radioisotopes.

In livestock farming an important countermeasure against ^{137}Cs is to feed animals a small amount of prussian blue. This iron potassium cyanide compound acts as a ion-exchanger. The cyanide is so tightly bonded to the iron that it is safe for a human to eat several grams of prussian blue per day. The prussian blue reduces the biological half life (different from the nuclear half life) of the caesium. The physical or nuclear half life of ^{137}Cs is about 30 years. This is a constant which can not be changed but the biological half life is not a constant. It will change according to the nature and habits of the organism for which it is expressed. Caesium in humans normally has a biological half life of between one and four months. An added advantage of the prussian blue is that the caesium which is stripped from the animal in the droppings is in a form which is not available to plants. Hence it prevents the caesium from being recycled. The form of prussian blue required for the treatment of humans or animals is a special grade. Attempts to use the pigment grade used in paints have not been successful. Note that a good source of data on the subject of caesium in Chernobyl fallout exists at (*Ukrainian Research Institute for Agricultural Radiology*).

Release of radioactivity from fuel during normal use and accidents

The IAEA assume that under normal operation the coolant of a water cooled reactor will contain some radioactivity but during a reactor accident the coolant radioactivity level may rise. The IAEA state that under a series of different conditions different amounts of the core inventory can be released from the fuel, the four conditions the IAEA consider are *normal operation*, a spike in coolant activity due to a sudden shutdown/loss of pressure (core remains covered with water), a cladding failure resulting in the release of the activity in the fuel/cladding gap (this could be due to the fuel being uncovered by the loss of water for 15–30 minutes where the cladding reached a temperature of 650-1250 ^{o}C) or a melting of the core (the fuel will have to be uncovered for at least 30 minutes, and the cladding would reach a temperature in excess of 1650 ^{o}C).

Based upon the assumption that a PWR contains 300 tons of water, and that the activity of the fuel of a 1 GWe reactor is as the IAEA predict, then the coolant activity after an accident such as the three mile island accident (where a core is uncovered and then recovered with water) can be predicted.

Releases from reprocessing under normal conditions

It is normal to allow used fuel to stand after the irradiation to allow the short-lived and radiotoxic iodine isotopes to decay away. In one experiment in the USA fresh fuel which had not been allowed to decay was reprocessed (the Green run) to investigate the effects of a large iodine release from the reprocessing of short cooled fuel. It is normal in reprocessing plants to scrub the off gases from the dissolver to prevent the emission of iodine. In addition to the emission of iodine the noble gases and tritium are released from the fuel when it is dissolved. It has been proposed that by voloxidation (heating the fuel in a furnace under oxidizing conditions) the majority of the tritium can be recovered from the fuel.

A paper was written on the radioactivity in oysters found in the Irish Sea. These were found by gamma spectroscopy to contain ^{141}Ce, ^{144}Ce, ^{103}Ru, ^{106}Ru, ^{137}Cs, ^{95}Zr and ^{95}Nb. Additionally, a zinc activation product (^{65}Zn) was found, which is thought to be due to the corrosion of magnox fuel cladding in cooling ponds. It is likely that the modern releases of all these isotopes from Windscale is smaller.

On-load reactors

Some reactor designs, such as RBMKs or CANDU reactors, can be refueled without being shut down. This is achieved through the use of many small pressure tubes to contain the fuel and coolant, as opposed to one large pressure vessel as in pressurized water reactor (PWR) or boiling water reactor (BWR) designs. Each tube can be individually isolated and refueled by an operator-controlled fueling machine, typically at a rate of up to 8 channels per day out of roughly 400 in CANDU reactors. On-load refueling allows for the problem of **optimal fuel reloading problem** to be dealt with continuously, leading to more efficient use of fuel. This increase in efficiency is partially

offset by the added complexity of having hundreds of pressure tubes and the fueling machines to service them.

Back end

Interim storage

After its operating cycle, the reactor is shut down for refueling. The fuel discharged at that time (spent fuel) is stored either at the reactor site (commonly in a spent fuel pool) or potentially in a common facility away from reactor sites. If on-site pool storage capacity is exceeded, it may be desirable to store the now cooled aged fuel in modular dry storage facilities known as Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) at the reactor site or at a facility away from the site. The spent fuel rods are usually stored in water or boric acid, which provides both cooling (the spent fuel continues to generate decay heat as a result of residual radioactive decay) and shielding to protect the environment from residual ionizing radiation, although after at least a year of cooling they may be moved to dry cask storage.

Reprocessing

The Sellafield reprocessing plant

Spent fuel discharged from reactors contains appreciable quantities of fissile (U-235 and Pu-239), fertile (U-238), and other radioactive materials, including reaction poisons, which is why the fuel had to be removed. These fissile and fertile materials can be chemically separated and recovered from the spent fuel. The recovered uranium and plutonium can, if economic and institutional conditions permit, be recycled for use as nuclear fuel. This is currently not done for civilian spent nuclear fuel in the United States.

Mixed oxide, or MOX fuel, is a blend of reprocessed uranium and plutonium and depleted uranium which behaves similarly, although not identically, to the enriched uranium feed for which most nuclear reactors were designed. MOX fuel is an alternative to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel used in the light water reactors which predominate nuclear power generation.

Currently, plants in Europe are reprocessing spent fuel from utilities in Europe and Japan. Reprocessing of spent commercial-reactor nuclear fuel is currently not permitted in the United States due to the perceived danger of nuclear proliferation. However the recently announced Global Nuclear Energy Partnership would see the U.S. form an international partnership to see spent nuclear fuel reprocessed in a way that renders the plutonium in it usable for nuclear fuel but not for nuclear weapons.

Partitioning and transmutation

As an alternative to the disposal of the PUREX raffinate in glass or Synroc, the most radiotoxic elements can be removed through advanced reprocessing. After separation the minor actinides and some long lived fission products can be converted to short-lived isotopes by either neutron or photon irradiation. This is called transmutation.

Waste disposal

A current concern in the nuclear power field is the safe disposal and isolation of either spent fuel from reactors or, if the reprocessing option is used, wastes from reprocessing plants. These materials must be isolated from the biosphere until the radioactivity contained in them has diminished to a safe level. In the U.S., under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 as amended, the Department of Energy has responsibility for the development of the waste disposal system for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Current plans call for the ultimate disposal of the wastes in solid form in a licensed deep, stable geologic structure called a deep geological repository. The Department of Energy chose Yucca Mountain as the location for the repository. However, its opening has been repeatedly delayed.

It is worth noting that some non-PLWR reactor designs, and in particular the ones using liquid thorium fuel in molten salt reactors, would produce virtually no long-lasting nuclear waste. It is also possible to burn rather than bury nuclear waste, for instance in Integral Fast Reactors or in variations of molten salt reactors.

A proposed type of nuclear reactor called a traveling wave reactor is claimed, if it were to be built, to be able to be fueled by nuclear waste, and to be able to operate for 200 years without needing any refueling.

Fuel cycles

Once-through nuclear fuel cycle



A once through (or open) fuel cycle

Not a cycle *per se*, fuel is used once and then sent to storage without further processing save additional packaging to provide for better isolation from the biosphere. This method is favored by six countries: the United States, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Spain and South Africa. Some countries, notably Sweden and Canada, have designed repositories to permit future recovery of the material should the need arise, while others plan for permanent sequestration in a geological repository like the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository in the United States.

Plutonium cycle



A fuel cycle in which plutonium is used for fuel

Several countries, including Japan, Switzerland, and previously Spain and Germany, are using or have used the reprocessing services offered by BNFL and COGEMA. Here, the fission products, minor actinides, activation products, and reprocessed uranium are separated from the reactor-grade plutonium, which can then be fabricated into MOX fuel. Because the proportion of the non-fissile even-mass isotopes of plutonium rises with each pass through the cycle, there are currently no plans to reuse plutonium from used MOX fuel for a third pass in a thermal reactor. However, if fast reactors become available, they may be able to burn these, or almost any other actinide isotopes.

Minor actinides recycling

It has been proposed that in addition to the use of plutonium, the minor actinides could be used in a critical power reactor. Tests are already being conducted in which americium is being used as a fuel.

A number of reactor designs, like the Integral Fast Reactor, have been designed for this rather different fuel cycle. In principle, it should be possible to derive energy from the fission of any actinide nucleus. With a careful reactor design, all the actinides in the fuel can be consumed, leaving only lighter elements with short half-lives. Whereas this has been done in prototype plants, no such reactor has ever been operated on a large scale, and the first plants with full actinide recovery are expected to be ready for commercial deployment in 2015 at the earliest.

However, such schemes would most likely require advanced remote reprocessing methods due to the neutron emitting compounds formed. For instance if curium is irradiated with neutrons it will form the very heavy actinides californium and fermium which undergo spontaneous fission. As a result, the neutron emission from a used fuel element which had included curium will be much higher, potentially posing a risk to workers at the back end of the cycle unless all reprocessing is done remotely. This could be seen as a disadvantage, but on the other hand it also makes the nuclear material difficult to steal or divert, making it more resistant to nuclear proliferation

It so happens that the neutron cross-section of many actinides decreases with increasing neutron energy, but the ratio of fission to simple activation (neutron capture) changes in favour of fission as the neutron energy increases. Thus with a sufficiently high neutron energy, it should be possible to destroy even curium without the generation of the transcurium metals. This could be very desirable as it would make it significantly easier to reprocess and handle the actinide fuel.

One promising alternative from this perspective is an accelerator driven subcritical reactor. Here a beam of either protons (United States and European designs) or electrons (Japanese design) is directed into a target. In the case of protons, very fast neutrons will spall off the target, while in the case of the electrons, very high energy photons will be generated. These high-energy neutrons and photons will then be able to cause the fission of the heavy actinides.

Such reactors compare very well to other neutron sources in terms of neutron energy:

- Thermal 0 to 100 eV
- Epithermal 100 eV to 100 KeV
- Fast (from nuclear fission) 100 KeV to 3 MeV
- DD fusion 2.5 MeV
- DT fusion 14 MeV
- Accelerator driven core 200 MeV (lead driven by 1.6 GeV protons)
- Muon-catalyzed fusion 7 GeV.

As an alternative, the curium-244, with a half life of 18 years, could be left to decay into plutonium-240 before being used in fuel in a fast reactor.



A pair of fuel cycles in which uranium and plutonium are kept separate from the minor actinides. The minor actinide cycle is kept within the green box.

Fuel or targets for this actinide transmutation

To date the nature of the fuel (targets) for actinide transformation has not been chosen.

If actinides are transmuted in a Subcritical reactor it is likely that the fuel will have to be able to tolerate more thermal cycles than conventional fuel. An accelerator driven sub critical reactor is unlikely to be able to maintain a constant operation period for equally long times as a critical reactor, and each time the accelerator stops then the fuel will cool down.

On the other hand, if actinides are destroyed using a fast reactor, such as an Integral Fast Reactor, then the fuel will most likely not be exposed to many more thermal cycles than in a normal power station.

Depending on the matrix the process can generate more transuranics from the matrix. This could either be viewed as good (generate more fuel) or can be viewed as bad (generation of more *radiotoxic* transuranic elements). A series of different matrices exists which can control this production of heavy actinides.

Fissile nuclei, like Uranium-235, Plutonium-239 and Uranium-233 respond well to delayed neutrons and are thus important to keep a critical reactor stable, and this limits the amount of minor actinides that can be destroyed in a critical reactor. As a consequence it is important that the chosen matrix allows the reactor to keep the ratio of fissile to non-fissile nuclei high, as this enables it to destroy the long lived actinides safely. In contrast, the power output of a sub-critical reactor is limited by the intensity of the driving particle accelerator, and thus it need not contain any uranium or plutonium at all. In such a system it may be preferable to have an inert matrix that doesn't produce additional long-lived isotopes.

Actinides in an inert matrix

The actinides will be mixed with a metal which will not form more actinides, for instance an alloy of actinides in a solid such as zirconia could be used.

Actinides in a thorium matrix

Thorium will on neutron bombardment form uranium-233. U-233 is fissile, and has a larger fission cross section than both U-235 and U-238, and thus it is likely to produce very little additional actinides through neutron capture.

Actinides in a uranium matrix

If the actinides are incorporated into a uranium-metal or uranium-oxide matrix, then the neutron capture of U-238 is likely to generate new plutonium-239. An advantage of mixing the actinides with uranium and plutonium is that the large fission cross sections of U-235 and Pu-239 for the less energetic delayed-neutrons could make the reaction stable enough to be carried out in a critical fast reactor, which is likely to be both cheaper and simpler than an accelerator driven system.

Mixed matrix

It is also possible to create a matrix made from a mix of the above mentioned materials. This is most commonly done in fast reactors where one may wish to keep the breeding ratio of new fuel high enough to keep powering the reactor, but still low enough that the generated actinides can be safely destroyed without transporting them to another site. One way to do this is to use fuel where actinides and uranium is mixed with inert zirconium, producing fuel elements with the desired properties.

Thorium cycle

In the thorium fuel cycle thorium-232 absorbs a neutron in either a fast or thermal reactor. The thorium-233 beta decays to protactinium-233 and then to uranium-233, which in turn is used as fuel. Hence, like uranium-238, thorium-232 is a fertile material.

After starting the reactor with existing U-233 or some other fissile material such as U-235 or Pu-239, a breeding cycle similar to but more efficient than that with U-238 and plutonium can be created. The Th-232 absorbs a neutron to become Th-233 which quickly decays to protactinium-233. Protactinium-233 in turn decays with a half-life of 27 days to U-233. In some molten salt reactor designs, the Pa-233 is extracted and protected from neutrons (which could transform it to Pa-234 and then to U-234), until it has decayed to U-233. This is done in order to improve the breeding ratio which is low compared to fast reactors.

Thorium is at least 4-5 times more abundant in nature than all of uranium isotopes combined; thorium is fairly evenly spread around Earth with a lot of countries having huge supplies of it; preparation of thorium fuel does not require difficult and expensive enrichment processes; the thorium fuel cycle creates mainly Uranium-233 contaminated with Uranium-232 which makes it harder to use in a normal, pre-assembled nuclear weapon which is stable over long periods of time (unfortunately drawbacks are much lower for immediate use weapons or where final assembly occurs just prior to usage time); elimination of at least the transuranic portion of the nuclear waste problem is possible in MSR and other breeder reactor designs.

One of the earliest efforts to use a thorium fuel cycle took place at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 1960s. An experimental reactor was built based on molten salt reactor technology to study the feasibility of such an approach, using thorium fluoride salt kept hot enough to be liquid, thus eliminating the need for fabricating fuel elements. This effort culminated in the Molten-Salt Reactor Experiment that used ^{232}Th as the fertile material and ^{233}U as the fissile fuel. Due to a lack of funding, the MSR program was discontinued in 1976.

Current industrial activity

Currently the only isotopes used as nuclear fuel are uranium-235 (U-235), uranium-238 (U-238) and plutonium-239, although the proposed thorium fuel cycle has advantages. Some modern reactors, with minor modifications, can use thorium. Thorium is approximately three times more abundant in the Earth's crust than uranium (and 550 times more abundant than uranium-235). However, there has been little exploration for thorium resources, and thus the proved resource is small. Thorium is more plentiful than uranium in some countries, notably India.

Heavy water reactors and graphite-moderated reactors can use natural uranium, but the vast majority of the world's reactors require enriched uranium, in which the ratio of U-

235 to U-238 is increased. In civilian reactors the enrichment is increased to as much as 5% U-235 and 95% U-238, but in naval reactors there is as much as 93% U-235.

The term *nuclear fuel* is not normally used in respect to fusion power, which fuses isotopes of hydrogen into helium to release energy.

Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System

Integrated nuclear fuel cycle information system (iNFCIS) is a set of databases related to the nuclear fuel cycle maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). iNFCIS provides information on various aspects of nuclear fuel cycles. Presently iNFCIS includes UDEPO - World distribution of uranium deposits; NFCIS - Nuclear fuel cycle information system, a database of civilian nuclear fuel cycle facilities; PIEDB - Post irradiation examination facilities database; MABD - Minor actinide property database and NFCSS - Nuclear fuel cycle simulation system, a tool for modeling material flow and actinide accumulations in the nuclear fuel cycle. iNFCIS requires free registration for on-line access.

Chapter-5

Critical Mass



As part of a re-creation of a 1945 criticality accident, a plutonium pit is surrounded by blocks of neutron-reflective tungsten carbide. The original experiment was designed to measure the radiation produced when an extra block was added. Instead, the mass went supercritical.

A **critical mass** is the smallest amount of fissile material needed for a sustained nuclear chain reaction. The critical mass of a fissionable material depends upon its nuclear properties (e.g. the nuclear fission cross-section), its density, its shape, its enrichment, its purity, its temperature and its surroundings.

Explanation of criticality

When a nuclear chain reaction in a mass of fissile material is self-sustaining, the mass is said to be in a *critical* state in which there is no increase or decrease in power, temperature or neutron population.

A numerical measure of a critical mass is dependent on the effective neutron multiplication factor k, the average number of neutrons released per fission event that go on to cause another fission event rather than being absorbed or leaving the material. When $k = 1$, the mass is critical, and the chain reaction is barely self-sustaining.

A *subcritical* mass is a mass of fissile material that does not have the ability to sustain a fission reaction. A population of neutrons introduced to a subcritical assembly will exponentially decrease. In this case, $k < 1$. A steady rate of spontaneous fissions causes a proportionally steady level of neutron activity. The constant of proportionality increases as k increases.

A *supercritical* mass is one where there is an increasing rate of fission. The material may settle into equilibrium (*i.e.* become critical again) at an elevated temperature/power level or destroy itself, by which equilibrium is reached. In the case of supercriticality, $k > 1$.

Changing the point of criticality

The point and therefore the mass where criticality occurs may be changed by modifying certain attributes such as fuel, shape, temperature, density and the installation of a neutron-reflective substance. These attributes have complex interactions and interdependencies. Here we, explains only the simplest ideal cases.

- **Varying the amount of fuel**

It is possible for a fuel assembly to be critical at near zero power. If the perfect quantity of fuel were added to a slightly subcritical mass to create an "exactly critical mass", fission would be self-sustaining for one neutron generation (fuel consumption makes the assembly subcritical).

If the perfect quantity of fuel were added to a slightly subcritical mass, to create a barely supercritical mass, the temperature of the assembly would increase to an initial maximum (for example: 1 K above the ambient temperature) and then decrease back to room temperature after a period of time, because fuel consumed during fission brings the assembly back to subcriticality once again.

- **Changing the shape**

A mass may be exactly critical without being a perfect homogeneous sphere. More closely refining the shape toward a perfect sphere will make the mass supercritical.

Conversely changing the shape to a less perfect sphere will decrease its reactivity and make it subcritical.

- **Changing the temperature**

A mass may be exactly critical at a particular temperature. Fission and absorption cross-sections increase as the relative neutron velocity decreases. As fuel temperature increases, neutrons of a given energy appear faster and thus fission/absorption is less likely. This is not unrelated to doppler broadening of the U238 resonances but is common to all fuels/absorbers/configurations. Neglecting the very important resonances, the total neutron cross section of every material exhibits an inverse relationship with relative neutron velocity. Hot fuel is always less reactive than cold fuel (over/under moderation in LWR is a different topic). Thermal expansion associated with temperature increase also contributes a negative coefficient of reactivity since fuel atoms are moving farther apart. A mass that is exactly critical at room temperature would be sub-critical in an environment anywhere above room temperature due to thermal expansion alone.

- **Varying the density of the mass**

The higher the density, the lower the critical mass. The density of a material at a constant temperature can be changed by varying the pressure or tension or by changing crystal structure. An ideal mass will become subcritical if allowed to expand or conversely the same mass will become supercritical if compressed. Changing the temperature may also change the density; however, the effect on critical mass is then complicated by temperature effects and by whether the material expands or contracts with increased temperature. Assuming the material expands with temperature (enriched Uranium 235 at room temperature for example), at an exactly critical state, it will become subcritical if warmed to lower density or become supercritical if cooled to higher density. Such a material is said to have a negative temperature coefficient of reactivity to indicate that its reactivity decreases when its temperature increases. Using such a material as fuel means fission decreases as the fuel temperature increases.

- **Use of a neutron reflector**

Surrounding a spherical critical mass with a neutron reflector further reduces the mass needed for criticality. A common material for a neutron reflector is beryllium metal. This reduces the number of neutrons which escape the fissile material, resulting in increased reactivity.

- **Use of a tamper**

In a bomb, a dense shell of material surrounding the fissile core will contain, via inertia, the expanding fissioning material. This increases the efficiency. Because a bomb relies on fast neutrons (not ones moderated by reflection with light elements, as in a reactor) the tamper in a bomb is not functioning as a neutron reflector. Also, if the tamper is (e.g. depleted) uranium, it can fission due to the high energy neutrons generated by the

primary explosion. This can greatly increase yield, especially if even more neutrons are generated by fusing hydrogen isotopes, in a so-called boosted configuration.

Critical mass of a bare sphere



Top: A sphere of fissile material is too small to allow the chain reaction to become self-sustaining as neutrons generated by fissions can too easily escape.

Middle: By increasing the mass of the sphere to a critical mass, the reaction can become self-sustaining.

Bottom: Surrounding the original sphere with a neutron reflector increases the efficiency of the reactions and also allows the reaction to become self-sustaining.

The shape with minimal critical mass and the smallest physical dimensions is a sphere. Bare-sphere critical masses at normal density of some actinides are listed in the following table.

Nuclide	Critical Mass (kg)	Diameter (cm)
protactinium-231	750±180?	45±3?
uranium-233	15	11
uranium-235	52	17
neptunium-236	7	8.7
neptunium-237	60	18
plutonium-238	9.04–10.07	9.5-9.9
plutonium-239	10	9.9
plutonium-240	40	15
plutonium-241	12	10.5
plutonium-242	75–100	19-21
americium-241	55–77	20-23
americium-242	9–14	11-13
americium-243	180–280	30-35
curium-243	7.34–10	10-11
curium-244	(13.5)–30	(12.4)–16
curium-245	9.41–12.3	11-12
curium-246	39–70.1	18-21
curium-247	6.94–7.06	9.9
californium-249	6	9
californium-251	5	8.5

The critical mass for lower-grade uranium depends strongly on the grade: with 20% U-235 it is over 400 kg; with 15% U-235, it is well over 600 kg.

The critical mass is inversely proportional to the square of the density. If the density is 1% more and the mass 2% less, then the volume is 3% less and the diameter 1% less. The probability for a neutron per cm travelled to hit a nucleus is proportional to the density. It follows that 1% greater density means that the distance travelled before leaving the system is 1% less. This is something that must be taken into consideration when attempting more precise estimates of critical masses of plutonium isotopes than the approximate values given above, because plutonium metal has a large number of different crystal phases which can have widely varying densities.

Note that not all neutrons contribute to the chain reaction. Some escape and others undergo radiative capture.

Let q denote the probability that a given neutron induces fission in a nucleus. Let us consider only prompt neutrons, and let ν denote the number of prompt neutrons generated in a nuclear fission. For example, ν ≈ 2.5 for uranium-235. Then, criticality occurs when $\nu \cdot q = 1$. The dependence of this upon geometry, mass, and density appears through the factor q.

Given a total interaction cross section σ (typically measured in barns), the mean free path of a prompt neutron is $\ell^{-1} = n\sigma$ where n is the nuclear number density. Most interactions are scattering events, so that a given neutron obeys a random walk until it either escapes from the medium or causes a fission reaction. So long as other loss mechanisms are not significant, then, the radius of a spherical critical mass is rather roughly given by the product of the mean free path ℓ and the square root of one plus the number of scattering events per fission event (call this s), since the net distance travelled in a random walk is proportional to the square root of the number of steps:

$$R_c \simeq \ell\sqrt{s} \simeq \frac{\sqrt{s}}{n\sigma}$$

Note again, however, that this is only a rough estimate.

In terms of the total mass M, the nuclear mass m, the density ρ, and a fudge factor f which takes into account geometrical and other effects, criticality corresponds to

$$1 = \frac{f\sigma}{m\sqrt{s}}\rho^{2/3}M^{1/3}$$

which clearly recovers the aforementioned result that critical mass depends inversely on the square of the density.

Alternatively, one may restate this more succinctly in terms of the areal density of mass, Σ:

$$1 = \frac{f'\sigma}{m\sqrt{s}}\Sigma$$

where the factor f has been rewritten as f' to account for the fact that the two values may differ depending upon geometrical effects and how one defines Σ. For example, for a bare solid sphere of Pu-239 criticality is at 320 kg/m^2, regardless of density, and for U-235 at 550 kg/m^2. In any case, criticality then depends upon a typical neutron "seeing" an amount of nuclei around it such that the areal density of nuclei exceeds a certain threshold.

This is applied in implosion-type nuclear weapons where a spherical mass of fissile material that is substantially less than a critical mass is made supercritical by very rapidly increasing ρ (and thus Σ as well). Indeed, sophisticated nuclear weapons programs can

make a functional device from less material than more primitive weapons programs require.

Aside from the math, there is a simple physical analog that helps explain this result. Consider diesel fumes belched from an exhaust pipe. Initially the fumes appear black, then gradually you are able to see through them without any trouble. This is not because the total scattering cross section of all the soot particles has changed, but because the soot has dispersed. If we consider a transparent cube of length L on a side, filled with soot, then the optical depth of this medium is inversely proportional to the square of L, and therefore proportional to the areal density of soot particles: we can make it easier to see through the imaginary cube just by making the cube larger.

Several uncertainties contribute to the determination of a precise value for critical masses, including (1) detailed knowledge of cross sections, (2) calculation of geometric effects. This latter problem provided significant motivation for the development of the Monte Carlo method in computational physics by Nicholas Metropolis and Stanislaw Ulam. In fact, even for a homogeneous solid sphere, the exact calculation is by no means trivial. Finally note that the calculation can also be performed by assuming a continuum approximation for the neutron transport. This reduces it to a diffusion problem. However, as the typical linear dimensions are not significantly larger than the mean free path, such an approximation is only marginally applicable.

Finally, note that for some idealized geometries, the critical mass might formally be infinite, and other parameters are used to describe criticality. For example, consider an infinite sheet of fissionable material. For any finite thickness, this corresponds to an infinite mass. However, criticality is only achieved once the thickness of this slab exceeds a critical value.

Criticality in nuclear weapon design



If two pieces of subcritical material are not brought together fast enough, nuclear predetonation (fizzle) can occur, whereby a very small explosion will blow the bulk of the material apart.

Until detonation is desired, a nuclear weapon must be kept subcritical. In the case of a uranium bomb, this can be achieved by keeping the fuel in a number of separate pieces, each below the critical size either because they are too small or unfavorably shaped. To produce detonation, the uranium is brought together rapidly. In Little Boy, this was achieved by firing a piece of uranium (a 'doughnut'), down a gun barrel onto another piece, (a 'spike'), a design referred to as a *gun-type fission weapon*.

A theoretical 100% pure Pu-239 weapon could also be constructed as a gun-type weapon, like the Manhattan Project's proposed Thin Man design. In reality, this is impractical because even "weapons grade" Pu-239 is contaminated with a small amount of Pu-240, which has a strong propensity toward spontaneous fission. Because of this, a reasonably-sized gun-type weapon would suffer nuclear reaction before the masses of plutonium would be in a position for a full-fledged explosion to occur.

Instead, the plutonium is present as a subcritical sphere (or other shape), which may or may not be hollow. Detonation is produced by exploding a shaped charge surrounding the

sphere, increasing the density (and collapsing the cavity, if present) to produce a prompt critical configuration. This is known as an *implosion type weapon*.

Chapter-6

Neutron Poison and Neutron Source

Neutron poison

A **neutron poison** (also called a 'neutron absorber' or a 'nuclear poison') is a substance with a large neutron absorption cross-section in applications, such as nuclear reactors. In such applications, absorbing neutrons is normally an undesirable effect. However neutron-absorbing materials, also called poisons, are intentionally inserted into some types of reactors in order to lower the high reactivity of their initial fresh fuel load. Some of these poisons deplete as they absorb neutrons during reactor operation, while others remain relatively constant.

The capture of neutrons by short half-life fission products is known as **reactor poisoning**; neutron capture by long-lived or stable fission products is called **reactor slagging**.

Transient fission product poisons

Some of the fission products generated during a nuclear reaction have a high neutron absorption capacity, such as xenon-135 (2,000,000 barns) and samarium-149 (74,500 σ). Because these two fission product poisons remove neutrons from the reactor, they will have an impact on the thermal utilization factor and thus the reactivity. The poisoning of a reactor core by these fission products may become so serious that the chain reaction comes to a standstill.

Xenon-135 in particular has a tremendous impact on the operation of a nuclear reactor. The inability of a reactor to be started due to the effects of xenon-135 is sometimes referred to as *xenon precluded start-up*. The period of time in which the reactor is unable to override the effects of xenon-135 is called the *xenon dead time* or *poison outage*. During periods of steady state operation, at a constant neutron flux level, the xenon-135 concentration builds up to its equilibrium value for that reactor power in about 40 to 50 hours. When the reactor power is increased, xenon-135 concentration initially decreases because the burn up is increased at the new higher power level. Because 95% of the xenon-135 production is from iodine-135 decay, which has a 6 to 7 hour half-life, the production of xenon-135 remains constant; at this point, the xenon-135 concentration

reaches a minimum. The concentration then increases to the equilibrium for the new power level in the same time, roughly 40 to 50 hours. The magnitude and the rate of change of concentration during the initial 4 to 6 hour period following the power change is dependent upon the initial power level and on the amount of change in power level; the xenon-135 concentration change is greater for a larger change in power level. When reactor power is decreased, the process is reversed.

Because samarium-149 is not radioactive and is not removed by decay, it presents problems somewhat different from those encountered with xenon-135. The equilibrium concentration and (thus the poisoning effect) builds to an equilibrium value during reactor operation in about 500 hours (about three weeks), and since samarium-149 is stable, the concentration remains essentially constant during reactor operation. Another problematic isotope that is building up is gadolinium-157, with cross-section of 200,000 σ.

Accumulating fission product poisons

There are numerous other fission products that, as a result of their concentration and thermal neutron absorption cross section, have a poisoning effect on reactor operation. Individually, they are of little consequence, but taken together they have a significant impact. These are often characterized as *lumped fission product poisons* and accumulate at an average rate of 50 barns per fission event in the reactor. The buildup of fission product poisons in the fuel eventually leads to loss of efficiency, and in some cases to instability. In practice, buildup of reactor poisons in nuclear fuel is what determines the lifetime of nuclear fuel in a reactor: long before all possible fissions have taken place, buildup of long-lived neutron-absorbing fission products damps out the chain reaction. This is the reason that nuclear reprocessing is a useful activity: solid spent nuclear fuel contains about 97% of the original fissionable material present in newly manufactured nuclear fuel. Chemical separation of the fission products restores the fuel so that it can be used again.

Other potential approaches to fission product removal include solid but porous fuel which allows escape of fission products and liquid or gaseous fuel (Molten salt reactor, Aqueous homogeneous reactor). These ease the problem of fission product accumulation in the fuel, but pose the additional problem of safely removing and storing the fission products.

Other fission products with relatively high absorption cross sections include ^{83}Kr, ^{95}Mo, ^{143}Nd, ^{147}Pm. Above this mass, even many even-mass number isotopes have large absorption cross sections, allowing one nucleus to serially absorb multiple neutrons. Fission of heavier actinides produces more of the heavier fission products in the lanthanide range, so the total neutron absorption cross section of fission products is higher.

In a fast reactor the fission product poison situation may differ significantly because neutron absorption cross sections can differ for thermal neutrons and fast neutrons. In the RBEC-M Lead-Bismuth Cooled Fast Reactor, the fission products with neutron capture

more than 5% of total fission products capture are, in order, ^{133}Cs, ^{101}Ru, ^{103}Rh, ^{99}Tc, ^{105}Pd and ^{107}Pd in the core, with ^{149}Sm replacing ^{107}Pd for 6th place in the breeding blanket.

Decay poisons

In addition to fission product poisons, other materials in the reactor decay to materials that act as neutron poisons. An example of this is the decay of tritium to helium-3. Since tritium has a half-life of 12.3 years, normally this decay does not significantly affect reactor operations because the rate of decay of tritium is so slow. However, if tritium is produced in a reactor and then allowed to remain in the reactor during a prolonged shutdown of several months, a sufficient amount of tritium may decay to helium-3 to add a significant amount of negative reactivity. Any helium-3 produced in the reactor during a shutdown period will be removed during subsequent operation by a neutron-proton reaction.

Control poisons

During operation of a reactor the amount of fuel contained in the core decreases monotonically. If the reactor is to operate for a long period of time, fuel in excess of that needed for exact criticality must be added when the reactor is fueled. The positive reactivity due to the excess fuel must be balanced with negative reactivity from neutron-absorbing material. Movable control rods containing neutron-absorbing material is one method, but control rods alone to balance the excess reactivity may be impractical for a particular core design as there may be insufficient room for the rods or their mechanisms.

Burnable poisons

To control large amounts of excess fuel reactivity without control rods, burnable poisons are loaded into the core. Burnable poisons are materials that have a high neutron absorption cross section that are converted into materials of relatively low absorption cross section as the result of neutron absorption. Due to the burn-up of the poison material, the negative reactivity of the burnable poison decreases over core life. Ideally, these poisons should decrease their negative reactivity at the same rate that the fuel's excess positive reactivity is depleted. Fixed burnable poisons are generally used in the form of compounds of boron or gadolinium that are shaped into separate lattice pins or plates, or introduced as additives to the fuel. Since they can usually be distributed more uniformly than control rods, these poisons are less disruptive to the core's power distribution. Fixed burnable poisons may also be discretely loaded in specific locations in the core in order to shape or control flux profiles to prevent excessive flux and power peaking near certain regions of the reactor. Current practice however is to use fixed non-burnable poisons in this service.

Non-burnable poison

A non-burnable poison is one that maintains a constant negative reactivity worth over the life of the core. While no neutron poison is strictly non-burnable, certain materials can be treated as non-burnable poisons under certain conditions. One example is hafnium. The removal (by absorption of neutrons) of one isotope of hafnium leads to the production of another neutron absorber, and continues through a chain of five absorbers. This absorption chain results in a long-lived burnable poison which approximates non-burnable characteristics.

Soluble poisons

Soluble poisons, also called chemical shim, produce a spatially uniform neutron absorption when dissolved in the water coolant. The most common soluble poison in commercial pressurized water reactors (PWR) is boric acid, which is often referred to as soluble boron, or simply *solbor*. The boric acid in the coolant decreases the thermal utilization factor, causing a decrease in reactivity. By varying the concentration of boric acid in the coolant, a process referred to as boration and dilution, the reactivity of the core can be easily varied. If the boron concentration is increased, the coolant/moderator absorbs more neutrons, adding negative reactivity. If the boron concentration is reduced (dilution), positive reactivity is added. The changing of boron concentration in a PWR is a slow process and is used primarily to compensate for fuel burnout or poison buildup. The variation in boron concentration allows control rod use to be minimized, which results in a flatter flux profile over the core than can be produced by rod insertion. The flatter flux profile occurs because there are no regions of depressed flux like those that would be produced in the vicinity of inserted control rods. This system is not in widespread use because the chemicals make the moderator temperature reactivity coefficient less negative.

Soluble poisons are also used in emergency shutdown systems. During SCRAM the operators can inject solutions containing neutron poisons directly into the reactor coolant. Various solutions, including sodium polyborate and gadolinium nitrate ($Gd(NO_3)_3 \cdot xH_2O$), are used.

On 16 March 2011, South Korea said they will send 1 kg sample of their Boric Acid stock to Japan. If the sample works on the reactors in Japan, South Korea will ship over 50 tons of Boric Acid to Japan. This was requested by the Japanese government in an attempt to further prevent meltdown at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant.

Neutron source

Neutron source is a general term referring to a variety of devices that emit neutrons, irrespective of the mechanism used to produce the neutrons. Depending upon variables including the energy of the neutrons emitted by the source, the rate of neutrons emitted

by the source, the size of the source, the cost of owning and maintaining the source, and government regulations related to the source, these devices find use in a diverse array of applications in areas of physics, engineering, medicine, nuclear weapons, petroleum exploration, biology, chemistry, nuclear power and other industries.

There are several kinds of neutron sources:

Small-sized devices

Radioisotopes which undergo spontaneous fission

Certain isotopes undergo spontaneous fission with emission of neutrons. The most commonly used spontaneous fission source is the radioactive isotope californium-252. Cf-252 and all other spontaneous fission neutron sources are produced by irradiating uranium or another transuranic element in a nuclear reactor, where neutrons are absorbed in the starting material and its subsequent reaction products, transmuting the starting material into the SF isotope. Cf-252 neutron sources are typically 1/4" to 1/2" in diameter and 1" to 2" in length. When purchased new a typical Cf-252 neutron sources emit between 1×10^7 to 1×10^9 neutrons per second but, with a half life of 2.6 years, this neutron output rate drops to half of this original value in 2.6 years. The price of a typical Cf-252 neutron source is from $15,000 to $20,000.

Radioisotopes which decay with alpha particles packed in a low-Z elemental matrix

Neutrons are produced when alpha particles impinge upon any of several low atomic weight isotopes including isotopes of lithium, beryllium, carbon and oxygen. This nuclear reaction can be used to construct a neutron source by intermixing a radioisotope that emits alpha particles such as radium or polonium with a low atomic weight isotope, usually in the form of a mixture of powders of the two materials. Typical emission rates for alpha reaction neutron sources range from 1×10^6 to 1×10^8 neutrons per second. As an example, a representative alpha-beryllium neutron source can be expected to produce approximately 30 neutrons for every one million alpha particles. The useful lifetime for these types of sources is highly variable, depending upon the half-life of the radioisotope that emits the alpha particles. The size and cost of these neutron sources are also comparable to spontaneous fission sources. Usual combinations of materials are plutonium-beryllium (PuBe), americium-beryllium (AmBe), or americium-lithium (AmLi). The neutron initiators of early nuclear weapons used a polonium-beryllium layers separated by nickel and gold until a neutron pulse was desired.

Radioisotopes which decay with high energy photons co-located with beryllium or deuterium

Gamma radiation with an energy exceeding the neutron binding energy of a nucleus can eject a neutron. Two examples and their decay products:

- ^{9}Be + >1.7 Mev photon → 1 neutron + 2 ^{4}He
- ^{2}H (deuterium) + >2.26 MeV photon → 1 neutron + ^{1}H

Sealed tube neutron generators

Some particle accelerator-based neutron generators exist that work by inducing nuclear fusion between beams of deuterium and/or tritium ions and metal hydride targets which also contain these isotopes.

Medium-sized devices

Plasma focus and plasma pinch devices

The plasma focus neutron source produces controlled nuclear fusion by creating a dense plasma within which ionized deuterium and/or tritium gas is heated to temperatures sufficient for creating fusion.

Light ion accelerators

Traditional particle accelerators with hydrogen (H), deuterium (D), or tritium (T) ion sources may be used to produce neutrons using targets of deuterium, tritium, lithium, beryllium, and other low-Z materials. Typically these accelerators operate with voltages in the > 1 MeV range,

High energy photoneutron/photofission systems

Neutrons (so-called photoneutrons) are produced when photons above the nuclear binding energy of a substance are incident on that substance, causing it to undergo giant dipole resonance after which it either emits a neutron (photodisintegration) or undergoes fission (photofission). The number of neutrons released by each fission event is dependent on the substance. Typically photons begin to produce neutrons on interaction with normal matter at energies of about 7 to 40 MeV, which means that megavoltage photon radiotherapy facilities may produce neutron radiation as well, and require special shielding for it. In addition, electrons of energy over about 50 MeV may induce giant dipole resonance in nuclides by a mechanism which is the inverse of internal conversion, and thus produce neutrons by a mechanism similar to that of photoneutrons.

Large-sized devices



Schematic drawing of the TRIGA reactor at the Aalto University campus refitted to be used as a stable neutron source for BNCT treatments.

Nuclear fission reactors

Nuclear fission which takes place within in a nuclear reactor produces very large quantities of neutrons and can be used for a variety of purposes including power generation and experiments. Subcritical reactors can be also used.

Nuclear fusion systems

Nuclear fusion, the combining of the heavy isotopes of hydrogen, also has the potential to produce large quantities of neutrons. Small scale fusion systems exist for research purposes at many universities and laboratories around the world. A small number of large scale nuclear fusion systems also exist including the National Ignition Facility in the USA, JET in the UK, and soon the recently started ITER experiment in France.

High energy particle accelerators

A spallation source is a high-flux source in which protons that have been accelerated to high energies hit a target material, prompting the emission of neutrons.

Neutron flux density

For most applications, a higher neutron flux is always better (since it reduces the time required to conduct the experiment, acquire the image, etc.). Amateur fusion devices, like the fusor, generate only about 300 000 neutrons per second. Commercial fusor devices can generate on the order of 10^9 neutrons per second, which corresponds to a usable flux of less than 10^5 n/(cm² s). Large neutron beamlines around the world achieve much greater flux. Reactor-based sources now produce 10^{15} n/(cm² s), and spallation sources generate greater than 10^{17} n/(cm² s).

Chapter-7

Nuclear Decommissioning

Example of decommissioning work underway.



The reactor pressure vessel being transported away from the site, which will be buried. Images courtesy of the NRC.

Nuclear decommissioning is the dismantling of a nuclear power plant and decontamination of the site to a state no longer requiring protection from radiation for the general public. The main difference from the dismantling of other power plants is the presence of radioactive material that requires special precautions.

Generally speaking, nuclear plants were designed for a life of about 30 years. Newer plants are designed for a 40 to 60-year operating life.

Decommissioning involves many administrative and technical actions. It includes all clean-up of radioactivity and progressive demolition of the plant. Once a facility is decommissioned, there should no longer be any danger of a radioactive accident or to any persons visiting it. After a facility has been completely decommissioned it is released from regulatory control, and the licensee of the plant no longer has responsibility for its nuclear safety.

Decommissioning options

The International Atomic Energy Agency has defined three options for decommissioning, the definitions of which have been internationally adopted:

- *Immediate Dismantling* (or Early Site Release/Decon in the US): This option allows for the facility to be removed from regulatory control relatively soon after shutdown or termination of regulated activities. Usually, the final dismantling or decontamination activities begin within a few months or years, depending on the facility. Following removal from regulatory control, the site is then available for re-use.
- *Safe Enclosure* (or Safestor(e) SAFSTOR): This option postpones the final removal of controls for a longer period, usually in the order of 40 to 60 years. The facility is placed into a safe storage configuration until the eventual dismantling and decontamination activities occur.
- *Entombment*: This option entails placing the facility into a condition that will allow the remaining on-site radioactive material to remain on-site without the requirement of ever removing it totally. This option usually involves reducing the size of the area where the radioactive material is located and then encasing the facility in a long-lived structure such as concrete, that will last for a period of time to ensure the remaining radioactivity is no longer of concern.

Experience

A wide range of nuclear facilities has been decommissioned so far. This includes nuclear power plants (NPPs), research reactors, isotope production plants, particle accelerators, and uranium mines. The number of decommissioned power plants is small. There are companies specialized in nuclear decommissioning; the practice of decommissioning has turned into a profitable business. Decommissionning is very expensive. The current estimate by the United Kingdom's Nuclear Decommissioning Authority is that it will cost at least £70 billion to decommission the 19 existing United Kingdom nuclear sites; this takes no account of what will happen in the future. Also, due to the radioactivity in the reactor structure, decommissioning is a slow process which takes place in stages. The plans of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority for decommissioning reactors have an average 50 year time frame. The long time frame makes reliable cost estimates extremely difficult. Excessive cost overruns are not uncommon even for projects done in a much shorter time frame.

Nuclear Decommissioning in North America

The Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, viewed from the west. All eight reactors are visible; two units have been shut down

Several nuclear reactors dismantled in America, type, power and decommissioning cost (often is mentioned only the probable cost per kilowatt of power:

Country:	Location:	Reactor type:	Operative life:	Decommissioning phase:	Dismantling costs:
Canada (Québec)	Gentilly-1	CANDU-BWR 250 MWe	180 days (between 1966 and 1973)	"Static state" since 1986	stage two: US $ 25 Million
Canada (Ontario)	Pickering NGS Units A2 and A3	CANDU-PWR 8 x 542 MWe	30 years (from 1974 to 2004)	Two units currently in "cold standby" Decommissioning in 2012?	(calculated: $ 270–430/kWe ?)[]
USA	Fort St. Vrain	HTGR (helium-graphite) 380 MWe	12 years (1977–1989)	Immediate Decon	$ 195 Million
USA	Rancho Seco	Multiunit: PWR 913 MWe	12 years (Closed after a referedum nel 1989)	SAFSTOR: 5–10 years completion 2018	($ 200–500/kWe)
USA	Three Mile Island 2	Multiunit: 913 MWe PWR	INCIDENT: core fusion (in 1979)	Post-Defuelling Phase 2 (1979)	$ 805 Million (estimated)
USA	Shippingport	(The first BWR) 60 MWe	25 years (closed in 1989)	Decon completed dismantled in 5 years (first small experimental reactor)	$ 98.4 Million
USA	Trojan	PWR 1.180 MWe	16 years (Closed in 1993 because nearby to seismic fault)	SAFSTOR: (cooling tower demolished in 2006)	
USA	Yankee Rowe	PWR 185 MWe	31 years (1960–1991)	DECON COMPLETED - Demolished (greenfield open to visitors)	$608 million with $8 million per year upkeep
USA	Maine Yankee	PWR 860 MWe	24 years (closed in 1996)	DECON COMPLETED - Demolished in 2004 (greenfield open to	$ 635 Million

				visitors)	
USA	Connecticut Yankee	PWR 590 MWe	28 years (closed in 1996)	Decon - demolished in 2007 (greenfield open to visitors)	$ 820 Million
USA	Exelon - Zion 1 & 2	PWR - Westinghouse 2 x 1040 MWe	25 years (1973–1998) (Incident in proceedings, abandoned because of the excessive cost of vaporizers substitution)	Safstor-EnergySolutions (opening of the site to visitors for 2018)	$ 900–1,100 Million (2007 dollars)

Nuclear Decommissioning in Asia

Several nuclear reactors dismantled in Asia, type, power and decommissioning cost per kilowatt of electric power (source: World Nuclear Association article).

Country:	Location:	Reactor type:	Operative Life:	Decommissioning Phase:	Dismantling Cost:
China	Beijing (CIAE)	HWWR 10 MWe (multipurpose) (Heavy Water Experimental Reactor for the production of plutonium and tritium)	49 years (1958–2007)	Safestore & Decon in 20 years (until 2027)	proposed: $ 6 Million for dismantling $ 5 Million for fuel remotion
North Korea	Yongbyon	Magnox-type (reactor for the production of nuclear weapons through PUREX treatment)	20 years (1985–2005) Deactivated after a treaty	SAFESTORE: Cooling tower dismantled	
Japan	Tokai-1	Magnox	32 years	Safestore: 10	estimanted

		(GCR) 160 MWe	(1966–1988)	years then DECON until 2018	cost: Yen 93 Billion (Euro 660 Million of 2003)
India ,	Tarapur-1,2 (Maharashtra)	2x BWR 160 MWe	40 years ? (1969–2009?)	NOT deactivated	
India	Rawatbhata Atomic Power Station-1,2 (Rajasthan)	1x PHWR 100 MWe 1x PHWR 200 MWe (similar to CANDU)	40 years ? (1970–2011?)	NOT deactivated	
Iraq	Osiraq/Tammuz-1	BWR 40 MWe Nuclear reactor with weapons-grade plutonium production capability	(Destroyed by Israeli Air Force in 1981)	Not radioactive: Never refurbished with uranium	

Nuclear decommissioning in Western Europe

Several nuclear reactors dismantled in Western Europe, type, power and decommissioning cost per kilowatt of power: European Union Website about Nuclear Decommissioning, World Nuclear Association (reactor building companies), United Kingdom.

Country:	Location:	Reactor type:	Operative Life:	Decommiss-oning phase:	Dismantling cost:
Austria (Nuclear Free Country)	Zwentendorf NPP Google Maps	PWR 723 MWe	NEVER activated , after referendum in 1978		
Belgium	Mol	PWR (BR-3)	25 years (1962–1987)	DECON COMPLETED - pilot project	

				(underwater cutting and remote operated tools)	
France	Brennilis	HWGCR 70 MWe	12 years (1967–1979)	Phase 3	Euro 480 Million (20 times the forecasted amount)
France	Bugey-1	UNGG Gas cooled, graphite moderator	1972-1994	postponed	
France	Chinon 1,2,3	Gas-graphite	(1973–1990)	postponed	
France	Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power Plant	Gas-graphite	1969-1992	postponed	
France	Superphénix at Creys-Malville	Fast breeder nuclear reactor (sodium-cooled)	11 years (1985–1996)	postponed	estimated for the future: $ 4000/kWe ?
United Kingdom	Berkeley	Magnox (2 x 138 MWe)	27 years (1962–1989)	Safestore: 30 years (internal demolition)	$ 2600/kWe
United Kingdom	Sellafield-Windscale (Note: Windscale: Britain's Biggest Nuclear Disaster)	Windscale Advanced Gas Reactor WAGR (32 MWe)	18 years (1963–1981) Fire of graphite in moderation bars inside the reactor partial meltdown of fuel	Remotion of reactor in 2009 - pilot project (cutting with remote controlled robots, UV lasers) ,	Bigger than $2600/kWe (WNI estimates) Until now E. 117 Million
West Germany	Gundremmingen-A	BWR 250 MWe	11 years	Immediate dismantling - pilot project (underwater cutting)	(~ $ 300–550/kWe)

Italy	Caorso NPP	BWR 840 MWe	3 years (1978 - Closed in 1987 after referendum in 1986)	Safstore: 30 years (demolizione interna)	$/kWe
Italy	Garigliano NPP (Caserta)	BWR 150 MWe	? years (Closed on March 1, 1982)	Safstore: 30 years (internal demolition)	$/kWe
Italy	Latina NPP (Foce Verde)	Magnox 210 MWe Gas-graphite	24 years (1962 - Closed in 1986 after referendum)	Safstore: 30 years (internal demolition)	$/kWe
Italy	Trino Vercellese NPP	PWR Westinghouse, 270 MWe	? years (Closed in 1986 after referendum)	Safstore: 30 years (internal demolition)	$/kWe
Nederlands	Dodewaard NPP	BWR Westinghouse, 58 MWe	28 years (1969–1997)	Defuelling completed - Safstore for 40 years	$/kWe
Slovenia (former-Yugoslavia)	Krsko NPP	PWR (Westinghouse) 696 MWe	40? years (1981–2021?)	Will be deactivated in 2022	
Spain	Vandellós NPP-1	UNGG 480 MWe (gas-graphite)	18 years Incident: fire in a turbogenerator (1989)	Safestore: 30 years (internal demolition)	Phases 1 and 2: Euro 93 Million
Switzerland	DIORIT	MWe Gas-graphite (experimental)	()	Safestore: ? years (internal demolition)	
Switzerland	LUCENS	8,3 MWe CO_2-heavy water (experimental)	(1962–1969) Incident: fire in 1969	Entombment for ? years Safestore & Decon: 24 years (internal demolition)	
Switzerland	SAPHIR	0,01-0,1 MWe (Light water pool)	39 years (1955–1994) (Experimental demonstrato	(In public display since inauguration open to visitors:	

			r)	"Cherenkov 's light")	

- Repository for radioactive waste Morsleben: 2.2 billion euro.

Nuclear Decommissioning in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union

Several nuclear reactors dismantled in the nations born from the former Soviet Union: (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and others) and rectors dismantled in countries formerly belonging to "Warsaw Pact" and/or to "Comecon", type, electric power and decommissioning cost per kilowatt of power: World Nuclear Association, OSTI (Russia & USA).

Country:	**Location:**	**Reactor typr:**	**Operative life:**	**Decommissioning phase:**	**Dismantling cost:**
Bulgaria	Kozloduy NPP-1,2,3,4	PWR VVER-440 (4 x 408 MWe)	Reactors 1,2 closed in 2003, reactors 3,4 closed in 2006 (Closing forced by European Union)	De-fuelling	
East Germany	Greifswald NPP-1, 2,3,4,5	VVER-440 5 x 408 MWe		Immediate dismantling (underwater cutting)	(~ $ 330/kWe)
East Germany	Rheinsberg NPP-1	VVER-210 70–80 MWe	24 years (1966–1990)	In dismantling since 1996 Safstor (underwater cutting)	(~ $ 330/kWe)
East Germany	Stendal NPP-1,2,3,4	VVER-1000 (4 x 1000 MWe)	Never activated (1st reactor 85% completed)	NOT radioactive (Cooling towers demolished with explosives)	(?) (Structure in exhibition inside an industrial park)
Russia	Mayak (Chelyabinsk-65)	PUREX plant for uranium enrichment	Several severe incidents (1946–1956)		

Russia	Seversk (Tomsk-7)	Three plutonium reactors Plant for uranium enrichment	Two fast-breeder reactors closed (of three), after disarmaments agreements with USA in 2003 .		
Slovakia	Mochovce NPP-1,2 (180 km east from Vienna)	VVER 440 2 X 440 MWe	(1998–2028?)		
Ukraine	Chernobyl NPP-4 (110 km from Kiev)	RBMK-1000 1000 MWe	? years WORST NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN ALL HISTORY: hydrogen explosion, then graphite fire (1986)	ENTOMBMENT (armed concrete "sarcophagus")	Past: ? Future: riding sarcophagus in steel

Legal aspects

The decommission of a nuclear reactor can only take place after the appropriate licence has been granted pursuant to the relevant legislation. As part of the licensing procedure various documents, reports and expert opinions have to be written and delivered to the competent authority, e.g. safety report, technical documents, environmental impact study (EIS).

In the European Union these documents are the basis for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) according to Council Directive 85/337/EEC. A precondition for granting such a licence is an opinion by the European Commission according to Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty. Article 37 obliges every Member State of the European Union to communicate certain data relating to the release of radioactive substances to the Commission. This information must reveal whether and if so what radiological impacts decommissioning – planned disposal and accidental release – will have on the environment, i.e. water, soil or airspace, of the EU Member States. On the basis of these general data, the Commission must be in a position to assess the exposure of reference groups of the population in the nearest neighbouring states.

Cost of decommissioning

In USA many utilities estimates now average $325 million per reactor all-up (1998 $).

In France, decommissioning of Brennilis Nuclear Power Plant, a fairly small 70 MW power plant, already cost 480 million euros (20x the estimate costs) and is still pending after 20 years. Despite the huge investments in securing the dismantlement, radioactive elements such as Plutonium, Cesium-137 and Cobalt-60 leaked out into the surrounding lake.

In the UK, decommissioning of Windscale Advanced Cooled Reactor (WAGR), a 32 MW power plant, cost 117 million euros.

In Germany, decommissioning of Niederaichbach nuclear power plant, a 100 MW power plant, amounted to more than 143 million euros.

Decommissioning Funds

In Europe there is considerable concern on the funds necessary to finance final decommissioning. In many countries either the funds do not appear sufficient to pay the financial decommissioning, and in other countries the (substantial) funds are being used (too) freely for activities other than decommissioning, putting the funds at risk, and distorting competition with parties who do not have nuclear decommissioning funds available.

Currently (2008) the European Commission is looking into this issue.

Similar concerns exist in the United States, where the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has located apparent decommissioning funding assurance shortfalls and requested 18 nuclear power plants to address that issue.

Chapter-8

Long-lived Fission Product and Nuclear Fusion-Fission Hybrid

Long-lived fission product

Long-lived fission products are radioactive materials with a long half-life (more than 200,000 years) produced by nuclear fission.

Evolution of radioactivity in nuclear waste

Nuclear fission produces fission products, as well as actinides from nuclear fuel nuclei that capture neutrons but fail to fission, and activation products from neutron activation of reactor or environmental materials.

Short-term

The high short-term radioactivity of spent nuclear fuel is primarily from fission products with short half-life. The radioactivity in the fission product mixture is mostly short lived isotopes such as I-131 and ^{140}Ba, after about four months ^{141}Ce, ^{95}Zr/^{95}Nb and ^{89}Sr take the largest share, while after about two or three years the largest share is taken by ^{144}Ce/^{144}Pr, ^{106}Ru/^{106}Rh and ^{147}Pm. Note that in the case of a release of radioactivity from a power reactor or used fuel, only some elements are released. As a result the isotopic signature of the radioactivity is very different from an open air nuclear detonation where all the fission products are dispersed.

Medium-lived fission products

Medium-lived fission products				
Prop:	**$t^{½}$**	**Yield**	**Q** *	**βγ**
Unit:	**a**	**%**	**KeV**	*

^{155}Eu	4.76	.0803	252	βγ
^{85}Kr	10.76	.2180	687	βγ
^{113m}Cd	14.1	.0008	316	β
^{90}Sr	28.9	4.505	2826	**β**
^{137}Cs	30.23	6.337	1176	βγ
^{121m}Sn	43.9	.00005	390	βγ
^{151}Sm	90	.5314	77	β

After several years of cooling, most radioactivity is from the fission products caesium-137 and strontium-90, which are each produced in about 6% of fissions, and have half-lives of about 30 years. Other fission products with similar half-lives have much lower fission product yields, lower decay energy, and several (^{151}Sm,^{155}Eu,^{113m}Cd) are also quickly destroyed by neutron capture while still in the reactor, so are not responsible for more than a tiny fraction of the radiation production at any time. Therefore, in the period from several years to several hundred years after use, radioactivity of spent fuel can be modeled simply as exponential decay of the ^{137}Cs and ^{90}Sr. These are sometimes known as medium-lived fission products.

Krypton-85, the 3rd most active MLFP, is a noble gas which escapes during current nuclear reprocessing; however, its inertness means that it does not concentrate in the environment, but diffuses to a uniform low concentration in the atmosphere. Spent fuel in the US and some other countries is not likely to be reprocessed until decades after use, and by that time most of the Kr-85 will have decayed.

Actinides

<table>
<tr><th colspan="5">Actinides</th><th>Half-life</th><th colspan="4">Fission products</th></tr>
<tr><td>^{244}Cm</td><td>^{241}Pu ^{f}</td><td>^{250}Cf</td><td>^{243}Cm^{f}</td><td></td><td>10–30 y</td><td>^{137}Cs</td><td>^{90}Sr</td><td>^{85}Kr</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>^{232}U ^{f}</td><td></td><td>^{238}Pu</td><td colspan="2">f is for fissile</td><td>69–90 y</td><td></td><td></td><td>^{151}Sm nc➔</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">4n</td><td>^{249}Cf ^{f}</td><td>^{242}Am^{f}</td><td colspan="2"></td><td>141–351</td><td colspan="4" rowspan="3">No fission product has half-life 10^2 to 2×10^5 years</td></tr>
<tr><td>^{241}Am</td><td></td><td>^{251}Cf ^{f}</td><td></td><td>431–898</td></tr>
<tr><td>^{240}Pu</td><td>^{229}Th</td><td>^{246}Cm</td><td>^{243}Am</td><td></td><td>5–7 ky</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">4n</td><td>^{245}Cm^{f}</td><td>^{250}Cm</td><td>^{239}Pu ^{f}</td><td></td><td>8–24 ky</td><td colspan="4" rowspan="2"></td></tr>
<tr><td>^{233}U ^{f}</td><td>^{230}Th</td><td>^{231}Pa</td><td></td><td>32–160</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">4n+1</td><td>^{234}U</td><td rowspan="2">4n+3</td><td></td><td>211–290</td><td>^{99}Tc</td><td></td><td>^{126}Sn</td><td>^{79}Se</td></tr>
<tr><td>^{248}Cm</td><td>^{242}Pu</td><td></td><td>340–373</td><td colspan="4">Long-lived fission products</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>^{237}Np</td><td rowspan="3">4n+2</td><td></td><td>1–2 my</td><td>^{93}Zr</td><td>^{135}Cs nc➔</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>^{236}U</td><td rowspan="2">4n+1</td><td>^{247}Cm^{f}</td><td>6–23 my</td><td></td><td>^{107}Pd</td><td>^{129}I</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>^{244}Pu</td><td></td><td>80 my</td><td>>7%</td><td>>5%</td><td>>1%</td><td>>.1%</td></tr>
<tr><td>^{232}Th</td><td></td><td>^{238}U</td><td>^{235}U ^{f}</td><td>0.7–12by</td><td colspan="4">fission product yield</td></tr>
</table>

After Cs-137 and Sr-90 have decayed to low levels, the bulk of radioactivity from spent fuel is from not fission products but actinides, notably plutonium-239, plutonium-240, americium-241, americium-243, curium-245, and curium-246. These can be recovered by

nuclear reprocessing (either before or after most Cs-137 and Sr-90 decay) and fissioned, offering the possibility of greatly reducing waste radioactivity in the time scale of about 10^3 to 10^5 years. Pu-239 is usable as fuel in existing thermal reactors, but some minor actinides like Am-241, as well as the non-fissile and less-fertile isotope plutonium-242, are better destroyed in fast reactors, accelerator-driven subcritical reactors, or fusion reactors.

Long-lived fission products

On scales greater than 10^5 years, fission products, chiefly ^{99}Tc, again represent a significant proportion of the remaining, though lower, radioactivity, along with longer-lived actinides like neptunium-237 and plutonium-242, if those have not been destroyed.

The most abundant long-lived fission products have total decay energy around 100-300 KeV, only part of which appears in the beta particle; the rest is lost to a neutrino that has no effect. In contrast, actinides undergo multiple alpha decays, each with decay energy around 4-5 MeV.

Only seven fission products have long half-lives, and these are much longer than 30 years, in the range of 200,000 to 16 million years. These are known as long-lived fission products (LLFP). Two or three have relatively high yields of about 6%, while the rest appear at much lower yields. (This list of seven excludes isotopes with very slow decay and halflives longer than the age of the universe, which are effectively stable and already found in nature; as well as a few nuclides like technetium-98 and samarium-146 that are "shadowed" from beta decay and can only occur as direct fission products, not as beta decay products of more neutron-rich initial fission products. The shadowed fission products have yields on the order of one millionth as much as iodine-129.)

The 7 long-lived fission products

Long-lived fission products				
Prop:	**$t^{½}$**	**Yield**	**Q ***	**βγ**
Unit:	**Ma**	**%**	**KeV**	*****
^{99}Tc	0.211	6.1385	294	β
^{126}Sn	0.230	0.1084	4050	βγ
^{79}Se	0.327	0.0447	151	β
^{93}Zr	1.53	5.4575	91	βγ
^{135}Cs	2.3	6.9110	269	β
^{107}Pd	6.5	1.2499	33	β
^{129}I	15.7	0.8410	194	βγ

The first three have comparable halflives, between 200 thousand and 300 thousand years; the last four have longer halflives, in the low millions of years.

1. Technetium-99 produces the largest amount of LLFP radioactivity. It emits beta particles of low to medium energy but no gamma rays, so has little hazard on external exposure, but only if ingested. However, technetium's chemistry allows it to form anions (pertechnate, TcO_4^-) that are relatively mobile in the environment.
2. Tin-126 has a large decay energy (due to a following short-halflife decay) and is the only LLFP that emits energetic gamma radiation, which is an external exposure hazard. However, this isotope is produced in very small quantities in fission by thermal neutrons, so the energy per unit time from ^{126}Sn is only about 5% as much as from ^{99}Tc for U-235 fission, or 20% as much for 65% U-235+35% Pu-239. Fast fission may produce higher yields. Tin is an inert metal with little mobility in the environment, helping limit health risks from its radiation.
3. Selenium-79 is produced at low yields and has weak radiation. Its decay energy per unit time should be only about 0.2% that of Tc-99.
4. Zirconium-93 is produced at a relatively high yield of about 6%, but its decay is 7.5 times slower than Tc-99, and its decay energy is only 30% as great; therefore its energy production is initially only 4% as great as Tc-99, though this fraction will increase as the Tc-99 decays. ^{93}Zr does produce gamma radiation, but of a very low energy, and zirconium is relatively inert in the environment.
5. Caesium-135's predecessor xenon-135 is produced at a high rate of over 6% of fissions, but is an extremely potent absorber of thermal neutrons (neutron poison), so that most of it is transmuted to nonradioactive xenon-136 before it can decay to caesium-135. If 90% of ^{135}Xe is destroyed, then the remaining ^{135}Cs's decay energy per unit time is initially only about 1% as great as that of the ^{99}Tc. In a fast reactor, less of the Xe-135 may be destroyed.
   ^{135}Cs is the only alkaline or electropositive LLFP; in contrast, the main medium-lived fission products and the minor actinides other than neptunium are all alkaline and tend to stay together during reprocessing; with many reprocessing techniques such as salt solution or salt volatilization, ^{135}Cs will also stay with this group, although some techniques such as high-temperature volatilization can separate it. Often the alkaline wastes are vitrified to form high level waste, which will include the ^{135}Cs.
   Fission caesium contains not only ^{135}Cs but also stable but neutron-absorbing ^{133}Cs (which wastes neutrons and forms ^{134}Cs which is radioactive with a halflife of 2 years) as well as the common fission product ^{137}Cs which does not absorb neutrons but is highly radioactive making handling more hazardous and complicated; for all these reasons, transmutation disposal of ^{135}Cs would be more difficult.
6. Palladium-107 has a very long halflife, a low yield (though the yield for plutonium fission is higher than the yield from uranium-235 fission), and very weak radiation. Its initial contribution to LLFP radiation should be only about one part in 10000 for U-235 fission, or 2000 for 65% U-235+35% Pu-239. Palladium is a noble metal and extremely inert.
7. Iodine-129 has the longest halflife, 15.7 million years. Initially it has only about 1% as intense radioactivity as Tc-99. However, radioactive iodine is a disproportionate biohazard because the thyroid gland concentrates iodine. I-129 has a halflife nearly a billion times as long as its sister isotope iodine-131 which is

a hazard from nuclear explosions, and a smaller decay energy, so is only about a billionth as radioactive per unit mass.

LLFP radioactivity compared

In total, the other six LLFPs, in thermal reactor spent fuel, initially release only a bit more than 10% as much energy per unit time as Tc-99 for U-235 fission, or 25% as much for 65% U-235+35% Pu-239. About 1000 years after fuel use, radioactivity from the medium-lived fission products Cs-137 and Sr-90 drops below the level of radioactivity from Tc-99 or LLFPs in general. (Actinides, if not removed, will be emitting more radioactivity than either at this point.) By about 1 million years, Tc-99 radioactivity will have declined below that of Zr-93, though immobility of the latter means it is probably still a lesser hazard. By about 3 million years, Zr-93 decay energy will have declined below that of I-129.

Nuclear transmutation is under consideration as a disposal method, primarily for Tc-99 and I-129 as these both represent the greatest biohazards and have the greatest neutron capture cross sections, although transmutation is still slow compared to fission of actinides in a reactor. Transmutation has also been considered for Cs-135, but is almost certainly not worthwhile for the other LLFPs.

Nuclear fusion-fission hybrid

Hybrid nuclear fusion-fission (**hybrid nuclear power**) is a proposed means of generating power by use of a combination of nuclear fusion and fission processes. The concept dates to the 1950s, and was briefly advocated by Hans Bethe during the 1970s, but largely remained unexplored until a revival of interest in 2009, due to the indefinite delays in the realization of pure fusion.

In the LIFE project at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LLNL, using technology developed at the National Ignition Facility, the goal is to use fuel pellets of deuterium and tritium surrounded by a fissionable (or fertile) blanket to produce energy sufficiently greater than the input (laser) energy for electrical power generation. The principle involved is to induce inertial confinement fusion (ICF) in the fuel pellet which acts as a highly concentrated point source of neutrons which in turn converts and fissions the outer fissionable blanket. In parallel with the ICF approach, the University of Texas at Austin is developing a system based on the tokamak fusion reactor, optimising for nuclear waste disposal versus power generation. The principles behind using either ICF or tokamak reactors as a neutron source are essentially the same.

Rationale

The fusion process alone currently does not achieve sufficient gain (power output over power input) to be viable as a power source. By using the excess neutrons from the fusion reaction to in turn cause a high-yield fission reaction (close to 100%) in the surrounding

subcritical fissionable blanket, the net yield from the hybrid fusion-fission process can provide a targeted gain of 100 to 300 times the input energy (an increase by a factor of three or four over fusion alone). Even allowing for high inefficiencies on the input side (i.e. low laser efficiency), this can still yield sufficient heat output for economical electric power generation. This can be seen as a shortcut to viable fusion power until more efficient pure fusion technologies can be developed, or as an end in itself to generate power, and also consume existing stockpiles of nuclear fissionables and waste products.

Unlike a conventional fission reactor, the fusion hybrid can consume almost all of the uranium fuel without enrichment or reprocessing. This has advantages for non-proliferation, as enrichment and reprocessing technologies are also associated with nuclear weapons production. The low fuel consumption, lack of need for enrichment, and small waste volumes also significantly reduce fuel cycle costs. However, the fusion equipment required will increase the construction cost of the reactor.

Use to dispose of nuclear waste

The surrounding blanket can be a fissile material (enriched uranium or plutonium) or a fertile material (capable of conversion to a fissionable material by neutron bombardment) such as thorium, depleted uranium or spent nuclear fuel. This offers currently the only means of active disposal (versus storage) of spent nuclear fuel without reprocessing. Fission by-products produced by the operation of commercial light water nuclear reactors LWRs are long-lived and highly radioactive, but they can be consumed using the excess neutrons in the fusion reaction along with the fissionable components in the blanket, essentially destroying them and producing a waste product which is far safer and less of a risk for nuclear proliferation. The waste would contain significantly reduced concentrations of long-lived, weapons-usable actinides per gigawatt-year of electric energy produced compared to the waste from a LWR. In addition, there would be about 20 times less waste per unit of electricity produced. This offers the potential to efficiently use the very large stockpiles of enriched fissile materials, depleted uranium, and spent nuclear fuel.

Safety

In contrast to current commercial fission reactors, hybrid reactors potentially demonstrate what is considered inherently safe behavior because they remain deeply subcritical under all conditions and decay heat removal is possible via passive mechanisms. The fission is driven by neutrons provided by fusion ignition events, and is consequently not self-sustaining. If the laser pulses are deliberately shut off or the process is disrupted by a mechanical failure, the fission damps out and stops instantly. This is in contrast to the forced damping in a conventional reactor by means of control rods which absorb neutrons to reduce the neutron flux below the critical, self-sustaining, level. The inherent danger of a conventional fission reactor is any situation leading to a positive feedback, runaway, chain reaction such as occurred during the Chernobyl disaster. In a hybrid configuration the fission and fusion reactions are decoupled, i.e. the fusion neutron output drives the

fission, while the fission output has no effect whatsoever on the fusion reaction, completely eliminating any chance of a positive feedback loop.

Fuel cycle

There are three main components to the hybrid fusion fuel cycle: deuterium, tritium, and fissionable elements. Deuterium can be derived by separation of hydrogen isotopes in sea water. Tritium may be generated in the hybrid process itself by absorption of neutrons in lithium bearing compounds. This would entail an additional lithium bearing blanket and a means of collection. The third component is externally derived fissionable materials from demilitarized supplies of fissionables, or commercial nuclear fuel and waste streams. Fusion driven fission also offers the possibility of using Thorium as a fuel, which would greatly increase the potential amount of fissionables available. The extremely energetic nature of the fast neutrons emitted during the fusion events (up to 0.17 the speed of light) can allow normally non-fissioning U-238 to undergo fission directly (without conversion first to Pu-239), enabling refined natural Uranium to be used with very low enrichment, while still maintaining a deeply subcritical regime.

Chapter-9

Prompt Neutron and Prompt Critical

Prompt neutron

In nuclear engineering, a **prompt neutron** is a neutron immediately emitted by a nuclear fission event, as opposed to a delayed neutron decay which can occur within the same context, emitted by one of the fission products anytime from a few milliseconds to a few minutes later.

Principle

Using U-235 as an example, this nucleus absorbs thermal neutrons, and the immediate mass products of a fission event are two large fission fragments, which are remnants of the formed U-236 nucleus. These fragments emit, on average, two or three free neutrons (in average 2.47), called "prompt" neutrons. A subsequent fission fragment occasionally undergoes a stage of radioactive decay that yields an additional neutron, called a "delayed" neutron. These neutron-emitting fission fragments are called delayed neutron precursor atoms.

Delayed neutrons are associated with the beta decay of the fission products. After prompt fission neutron emission the residual fragments are still neutron rich and undergo a beta decay chain. The more neutron rich the fragment, the more energetic and faster the beta decay. In some cases the available energy in the beta decay is high enough to leave the residual nucleus in such a highly excited state that neutron emission instead of gamma emission occurs.

Delayed Neutron Data for Thermal Fission in U-235

Group	Half-Life (s)	Decay Constant (s^{-1})	Energy (keV)	Yield, Neutrons per Fission	Fraction
1	55.72	0.0124	250	0.00052	0.000215
2	22.72	0.0305	560	0.00546	0.001424
3	6.22	0.111	405	0.00310	0.001274

4	2.30	0.301	450	0.00624	0.002568
5	0.614	1.14	-	0.00182	0.000748
6	0.230	3.01	-	0.00066	0.000273

Importance in nuclear fission basic research

The standard deviation of the final kinetic energy distribution as a function of mass of final fragments from low energy fission of uranium 234 and uranium 236, presents a peak around light fragment masses region and another on heavy fragment masses region. Simulation by Monte Carlo method of these experiments suggests that that those peaks are produced by prompt neutron emission . This effect of prompt neutron emission does not permit to obtain primary primary mass and kinetic distribution which is important to study fission dynamics from saddle to scission point.

Importance in nuclear reactors

If a nuclear reactor happened to be prompt critical - even very slightly - the number of neutrons would increase exponentially at a high rate, and very quickly the reactor would become uncontrollable by means of cybernetics. The control of the power rise would then be left to its intrinsic physical stability factors, like the thermal dilatation of the core, or the increased resonance absorptions of neutrons, that usually tend to decrease the reactor's reactivity when temperature rises; but the reactor would run the risk of being damaged or destroyed by heat.

However, thanks to the delayed neutrons, it is possible to leave the reactor in a subcritical state as far as only prompt neutrons are concerned: the delayed neutrons come a moment later, just in time to sustain the chain reaction when it is going to die out. In that regime, neutron production overall still grows exponentially, but on a time scale that is governed by the delayed neutron production, which is slow enough to be controlled (just as an otherwise unstable bicycle can be balanced because human reflexes are quick enough on the time scale of its instability). Thus, by widening the margins of non-operation and supercriticality and allowing more time to regulate the reactor, the delayed neutrons are essential to inherent reactor safety and even in reactors requiring active control.

Fraction definitions

The factor β is defined as:

$$\beta = \frac{\text{precursor atoms}}{\text{prompt neutrons} + \text{precursor atoms}}.$$

and it is equal to 0.0064 for U-235.

The delayed neutron fraction (DNF) is defined as:

$$DNF = \frac{\text{delayed neutrons}}{\text{prompt neutrons} + \text{delayed neutrons}}.$$

These two factors, β and *DNF*, are not the same thing in case of a rapid change in the number of neutrons in the reactor.

Another concept, is the *effective fraction of delayed neutrons*, which is the fraction of delayed neutrons weighted (over space, energy, and angle) on the adjoint neutron flux. This concept arises because delayed neutrons are emitted with an energy spectrum more thermalized relative to prompt neutrons. For low enriched uranium fuel working on a thermal neutron spectrum, the difference between the average and effective delayed neutron fractions can reach 50 pcm (1 pcm = 1e-5).

Prompt critical

In nuclear engineering, an assembly is **prompt critical** if for each nuclear fission event, one or more of the immediate or prompt neutrons released causes an additional fission event. This causes a rapid, exponential increase in the number of fission events. Prompt criticality is a special case of supercriticality.

Criticality

An assembly is critical if each fission event causes, on average, exactly one other. This causes a self-sustaining fission chain reaction. When a uranium-235 (U-235) atom undergoes nuclear fission, it typically releases 2 or 3 neutrons (with the average being about 2.4). In this situation, an assembly is critical if every released neutron has a 1/2.4 = 0.42 = 42% probability of causing another fission event before it is absorbed by a non-fissile atom or lost to the chain-reaction by other routes. This can be achieved either through enrichment which increases the fraction of fissile U-235 atoms in the uranium fuel, or by slowing down the neutrons by letting them scatter off lighter nuclei called moderators (slow neutrons are more likely to fission U-235 than fast neutrons).

The average number of neutrons that cause new fission events is called the *criticality* or effective neutron multiplication factor, denoted by the letter *k*. When *k* is equal to 1, the assembly is called critical, if *k* is less than 1 the assembly is said to be subcritical, and if *k* is greater than 1 the assembly is called supercritical.

Critical versus prompt-critical

In a supercritical assembly the number of fissions per unit time, *N*, along with the power production, increases exponentially with time. How fast it grows depends on the average time it takes, *T*, for the neutrons released in a fission event to cause another fission. The growth rate of the reaction is given by:

$$N(t) = N_0 e^{kt/T}$$

Most of the neutrons released by a fission event are the ones released in the fission itself. These are called prompt neutrons, and strike other nuclei and cause additional fissions within microseconds. However a small additional source of neutrons is the fission products. Some of the nuclei resulting from the fission are radioactive isotopes with short half-lives, and nuclear reactions among them release additional neutrons after a long delay of up to several minutes after the initial fission event. These neutrons, which on average account for only a few percent of the total neutrons released in a fission, are called delayed neutrons.

A supercritical assembly is said to be prompt-critical if it is supercritical even without the contribution of the delayed neutrons. In this case the time between successive generations of the reaction, *T*, is only limited by the lifetime of the prompt neutrons, and the increase in the reaction will be extremely rapid, causing a rapid release of energy and a potential explosion within a few milliseconds. With the exception of specially designed research experiments, prompt-critical assemblies are only used in nuclear weapons. Their inadvertent creation is the cause of many criticality accidents.

In contrast, in a supercritical assembly that is not prompt-critical, called delayed-critical, the delayed neutrons are needed to make *k* greater than one. So the time between successive generations of the reaction, *T*, is dominated by the time it takes for the delayed neutrons to be released, on the order of seconds or minutes. Therefore the reaction will increase slowly, with a time constant of seconds or minutes. This is slow enough to allow the reaction to be controlled with electromechanical control systems such as control rods, and as such all nuclear reactors are designed to operate in the delayed-criticality regime.

When differentiating between a prompt neutron versus a delayed neutron, the difference between the two has to do with the source from which the neutron has been released into the reactor. The neutrons, once released, have no difference except the energy or speed which have been imparted to them. The relative proportion of delayed neutrons to the total (delayed and prompt) neutrons causing fissions is known as the delayed neutron fraction, DNF. The DNF value will trend higher as a reactor approaches critical. It will trend very low in a supercritical reactor on the verge of prompt criticality.

As the DNF goes lower, the proportion of fast fissions in the nuclear reactor will increase. Fast fissions occur when a high-energy neutron causes fission. In contrast, a thermal (relatively low energy) neutron causes thermal fission of the target nucleus. A nuclear weapon relies heavily on fast fission (to produce a high peak power in a fraction of a second), whereas most nuclear reactors rely heavily on thermal fissions to produce controllable power levels for months or years.

Nuclear reactors

In order to start up a self-sustaining controllable fission reaction, the assembly must not be subcritical, critical, nor prompt-critical. In other words, *k* must be greater than 1

(supercritical) without crossing the prompt-critical threshold. In nuclear reactors this is possible due to delayed neutrons. Because it takes some time before these neutrons are emitted following a fission event, it is possible to control the nuclear reaction using control rods.

A steady-state (constant power) reactor is operated so that it is critical due to the delayed neutrons, but not without their contribution. During a gradual and deliberate increase in reactor power level, the reactor is delayed-supercritical. The exponential increase of reactor activity is slow enough to make it possible to control the criticality factor, *k*, by inserting or withdrawing rods of neutron absorbing material. Using careful control rod movements, it is thus possible to achieve a supercritical reactor core without reaching an unsafe prompt-critical state.

Once a reactor plant is operating at its target or design power level, prudent operation can maintain it at critical for long periods of time with only minor corrections.

Prompt critical accidents

Large-scale (production) nuclear reactors are susceptible to prompt criticality accidents when a large amount of reactivity is added to a core, such as during the movement of control rods. Alternate mechanisms include the loss of negative reactivity, such as when hot, borated coolant water is replaced with cold, pure water in the reactor core. Historically, all such accidents have been caused by control rod movements. The rapid uncontrollable increase in reactor activity in prompt critical conditions may irreparably damage the primary containment of the reactor, namely the fuel cladding. A breach in the primary containment may be further exacerbated by a failure of the secondary, tertiary, and subsequent containment, which in a typical reactor plant might include the reactor vessel, reactor plant piping, various shielding materials that surround the reactor, and finally the reactor building. Nuclear reactors are designed to make prompt criticality as unlikely as possible, while utilizing multiple layers of containment as a precaution against the release of radioactive fission products should a breach occur as a result of a reactor accident.

With the exception of research and experimental reactors, only three reactor accidents are suspected of having achieved prompt criticality, those of Chernobyl #4, the U.S. Army's SL-1, and Soviet submarine K-431. In some cases there is doubt that prompt criticality occurred, although the uncontrolled surge in power was sufficient to cause an explosion that destroyed each reactor and caused a release of radioactive fission products into the atmosphere.

At Chernobyl in 1986, an unusual test was performed while generating power that resulted in an overheated reactor core. The emergency shutdown performed by the operators precipitated the accident due to the poor design of the control rods which accelerated the nuclear power excursion. This led to the rupturing of the fuel plates and water pipes, vaporization of water, a steam explosion, and a graphite fire. Since the reactor was not designed with a containment building capable of containing this

catastrophic explosion, the accident released large amounts of radioactive material into the environment. The catastrophic fire in the graphite neutron moderator compounded the problem, sending massive amounts of radioactive debris into the atmosphere.

In the other two incidents, the reactor plants failed due to errors during a maintenance shutdown that was caused by the rapid and uncontrolled removal of at least one control rod. The SL-1 was a prototype reactor intended for use by the US Army in remote polar locations. At the SL-1 plant in 1961, the reactor was brought from shutdown to prompt critical state by manually extracting the central control rod too far. As the water in the core quickly converted to steam and expanded, the 26,000-pound (12,000 kg) reactor vessel jumped 9 feet 1 inch (2.77 m), leaving impressions in the ceiling above. All three men performing the maintenance procedure died from injuries. 1,100 curies of fission products were released as parts of the core were expelled. It took 2 years to investigate the accident and clean up the site. The excess prompt reactivity of the SL-1 core was calculated in a 1962 report:

The delayed neutron fraction of the SL-1 is 0.70%... Conclusive evidence revealed that the SL-1 excursion was caused by the partial withdrawal of the central control rod. The reactivity associated with the 20 inch withdrawal of this one rod has been estimated to be 2.4% δk/k which was sufficient to induce prompt criticality and place the reactor on a 4 millisecond period.

In the K-431 reactor accident, 10 were killed during a refueling operation. In these two catastrophes, the reactor plants went from complete shutdown to extremely high power levels in a fraction of a second, damaging the reactor plants beyond repair.

Many reactor designs succeed in making prompt criticality practically impossible. Some pressurized water reactors, for example, do not contain enough fuel of high enough enrichment to make a prompt critical assembly with the materials in the core. Such reactors can still overheat and even melt if the ability to cool them is lost (a loss-of-coolant accident), but they are unlikely to explode.

List of prompt critical excursions

A number of research reactors and tests have purposely examined the operation of a prompt critical reactor plant. CRAC, KEWB, SPERT-I, Godiva device, and BORAX experiments contributed to this research.

The following list of prompt critical power excursions is adapted from a report submitted in 2000 by a team of American and Russian nuclear scientists who studied criticality accidents, published by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the location of many of the excursions. A typical power excursion is about 1 x 10^17 fissions. The prompt critical excursions listed below occurred primarily during research and processing of nuclear fuel. SL-1 is the notable exception.

- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 11 February 1945

- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, December 1949
- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 1 February 1951
- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 18 April 1952
- Argonne National Laboratory, 2 June 1952
- Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 26 May 1954
- Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1 February 1956
- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 3 July 1956
- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 12 February 1957
- Mayak Production Association, 2 January 1958
- Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, 16 June 1958 (possible)
- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 30 December 1958
- SL-1, 3 January 1961
- Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, 25 January 1961
- Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 11 December 1962
- Sarov (Arzamas-16), 11 March 1963
- White Sands Missile Range, 28 May 1965
- Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 30 January 1968
- Chelyabinsk-70, 5 April 1968
- Aberdeen Proving Ground, 6 September 1968
- Mayak Production Association, 10 December 1968 (2 prompt critical excursions)
- Kurchatov Institute, 15 February 1971
- Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, 17 October 1978 (very nearly prompt critical)
- Sarov (Arzamas-16), 17 June 1997
- JCO Fuel Fabrication Plant, 30 September 1999

Nuclear weapons

In the design of nuclear weapons, on the other hand, achieving prompt criticality is essential. Indeed, one of the design problems to overcome in constructing a plutonium-fueled bomb is to contract the fissile materials and achieve prompt criticality before the chain reaction has a chance to force the core to expand. A good bomb design must therefore win the race to a dense, prompt critical core before a less-powerful chain reaction (known as a fizzle) disassembles the core without allowing a significant amount of fuel to fission. This generally means that nuclear bombs need special attention paid to the way the core is compressed, such as the novel implosion method hypothesized by Richard C. Tolman, Robert Serber, and other scientists at the University of California, Berkeley in 1942.

This is also the reason that highly enriched (weapons-grade) plutonium is used: lower grades (such as the plutonium produced by most nuclear power stations) make the timely assembly of a prompt critical configuration even more difficult because of the spontaneous fission of certain isotopes of plutonium, namely Pu-240. If the neutrons released by spontaneous fission over-run the creation of a prompt critical mass, then the reaction is spoiled and the bomb's yield will be rather weak.

Chapter-10

Nuclear Weapon Design



The first nuclear weapons, though large, cumbersome and inefficient, provided the basic design building blocks of all future weapons. Here the Gadget device is prepared for the first nuclear test: Trinity.

Nuclear weapon designs are physical, chemical, and engineering arrangements that cause the physics package of a nuclear weapon to detonate. There are three basic design types. In all three, the explosive energy of deployed devices has been derived primarily from nuclear fission, not fusion.

- **Pure fission weapons** were the first nuclear weapons built and have so far been the only type ever used in warfare. The active material is fissile uranium (U-235)

or plutonium (Pu-239), explosively assembled into a chain-reacting critical mass by one of two methods:

- **Gun assembly**, in which one piece of fissile uranium is fired at a fissile uranium target at the end of the weapon, similar to firing a bullet down a gun barrel, achieving critical mass when combined.
- **Implosion**, in which a fissile mass of either material (U-235, Pu-239, or a combination) is surrounded by high explosives that compress the mass, resulting in criticality.

The implosion method can use either uranium or plutonium as fuel. The gun method only uses uranium. Plutonium is considered impractical for the gun method because of early triggering due to Pu-240 contamination and due to its time constant for prompt critical fission being much shorter than that of U-235.

- **Fusion-boosted fission weapons** improve on the implosion design. The high pressure and temperature environment at the center of an exploding fission weapon compresses and heats a mixture of tritium and deuterium gas (heavy isotopes of hydrogen). The hydrogen fuses to form helium and free neutrons. The energy release from this fusion reaction is relatively negligible, but each neutron starts a new fission chain reaction, speeding up the fission and greatly reducing the amount of fissile material that would otherwise be wasted when expansion of the fissile material stops the chain reaction. Boosting can more than double the weapon's fission energy release.

- **Two-stage thermonuclear weapons** are essentially a chain of **fission-boosted fusion weapons** (not to be confused with the previously mentioned fusion-boosted fission weapons), usually with only two stages in the chain. The second stage, called the "secondary," is imploded by x-ray energy from the first stage, called the "primary." This radiation implosion is much more effective than the high-explosive implosion of the primary. Consequently, the secondary can be many times more powerful than the primary, without being bigger. The secondary can be designed to maximize fusion energy release, but in most designs fusion is employed only to drive or enhance fission, as it is in the primary. More stages could be added, but the result would be a multi-megaton weapon too powerful to serve any plausible purpose. (The United States briefly deployed a three-stage 25-megaton bomb, the B41, starting in 1961. Also in 1961, the Soviet Union tested, but did not deploy, a three-stage 50–100 megaton device, Tsar Bomba.)

Pure fission weapons historically have been the first type to be built by a nation state. Large industrial states with well-developed nuclear arsenals have two-stage thermonuclear weapons, which are the most compact, scalable, and cost effective option once the necessary industrial infrastructure is built.

Most known innovations in nuclear weapon design originated in the United States, although some were later developed independently by other states; the following descriptions feature U.S. designs.

In early news accounts, pure fission weapons were called atomic bombs or A-bombs, a misnomer since the energy comes only from the nucleus of the atom. Weapons involving fusion were called hydrogen bombs or H-bombs, also a misnomer since their destructive energy comes mostly from fission. Insiders favored the terms nuclear and thermonuclear, respectively.

The term thermonuclear refers to the high temperatures required to initiate fusion. It ignores the equally important factor of pressure, which was considered secret at the time the term became current. Many nuclear weapon terms are similarly inaccurate because of their origin in a classified environment.

Nuclear reactions

Nuclear fission splits heavier atoms to form lighter atoms. Nuclear fusion bonds together lighter atoms to form heavier atoms. Both reactions generate roughly a million times more energy than comparable chemical reactions, making nuclear bombs a million times more powerful than non-nuclear bombs, which a French patent claimed in May 1939.

In some ways, fission and fusion are opposite and complementary reactions, but the particulars are unique for each. To understand how nuclear weapons are designed, it is useful to know the important similarities and differences between fission and fusion. The following explanation uses rounded numbers and approximations.

Fission

When a free neutron hits the nucleus of a fissionable atom like uranium-235 (^{235}U), the uranium splits into two smaller atoms called fission fragments, plus more neutrons. Fission can be self-sustaining because it produces more neutrons of the speed required to cause new fissions.

The uranium atom can split any one of dozens of different ways, as long as the atomic weights add up to 236 (uranium plus the extra neutron). The following equation shows one possible split, namely into strontium-95 (^{95}Sr), xenon-139 (^{139}Xe), and two neutrons (n), plus energy:

$$^{235}\mathrm{U} + n = {}^{95}\mathrm{Sr} + {}^{139}\mathrm{Xe} + 2n + 180\ \mathrm{MeV}$$

The immediate energy release per atom is 180 million electron volts (MeV), i.e. 74 TJ/kg, of which 90% is kinetic energy (or motion) of the fission fragments, flying away from each other mutually repelled by the positive charge of their protons (38 for strontium, 54 for xenon). Thus their initial kinetic energy is 67 TJ/kg, hence their initial speed is 12,000 kilometers per second, but their high electric charge causes many inelastic collisions with nearby nuclei. The fragments remain trapped inside the bomb's uranium pit until their motion is converted into x-ray heat, a process which takes about a millionth of a second (a microsecond).

This x-ray energy produces the blast and fire which are normally the purpose of a nuclear explosion.

After the fission products slow down, they remain radioactive. Being new elements with too many neutrons, they eventually become stable by means of beta decay, converting neutrons into protons by throwing off electrons and gamma rays. Each fission product nucleus decays between one and six times, average three times, producing a variety of isotopes of different elements, some stable, some highly radioactive, and others radioactive with half-lives up to 200,000 years. In reactors, the radioactive products are the nuclear waste in spent fuel. In bombs, they become radioactive fallout, both local and global.

Meanwhile, inside the exploding bomb, the free neutrons released by fission strike nearby U-235 nuclei causing them to fission in an exponentially growing chain reaction (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, etc.). Starting from one, the number of fissions can theoretically double a hundred times in a microsecond, which could consume all uranium up to hundreds of tons by the hundredth link in the chain. In practice, bombs do not contain that much uranium, and, anyway, just a few kilograms undergo fission before the uranium blows itself apart.

Holding an exploding bomb together is the greatest challenge of fission weapon design. The heat of fission rapidly expands the uranium pit, spreading apart the target nuclei and making space for the neutrons to escape without being captured. The chain reaction stops.

Materials which can sustain a chain reaction are called fissile. The two fissile materials used in nuclear weapons are: U-235, also known as highly enriched uranium (HEU), oralloy (Oy) meaning Oak Ridge Alloy, or 25 (the last digits of the atomic number, which is 92 for uranium, and the atomic weight, here 235, respectively); and Pu-239, also known as plutonium, or 49 (from 94 and 239).

Uranium's most common isotope, U-238, is fissionable but not fissile (meaning that it cannot sustain a chain reaction by itself but can be made to fission, specifically by neutrons from a fusion reaction). Its aliases include natural or unenriched uranium, depleted uranium (DU), tubealloy (Tu), and 28. It cannot sustain a chain reaction, because its own fission neutrons are not powerful enough to cause more U-238 fission. However, the neutrons released by *fusion* will fission U-238. This U-238 fission reaction produces most of the destructive energy in a typical two-stage thermonuclear weapon.

Fusion

Fusion is unlikely to be self-sustaining because it does not produce the heat and pressure necessary for more fusion. It produces neutrons which run away with the energy. In weapons, the most important fusion reaction is called the D-T reaction. Using the heat and pressure of fission, hydrogen-2, or deuterium (^{2}D), fuses with hydrogen-3, or tritium (^{3}T), to form helium-4 (^{4}He) plus one neutron (n) and energy:

$$^{2}\mathrm{D} + {}^{3}\mathrm{T} = {}^{4}\mathrm{He} + n + 17.6\ \mathrm{MeV}$$



Notice that the total energy output, 17.6 MeV, is one tenth of that with fission, but the ingredients are only one-fiftieth as massive, so the energy output per unit mass is greater. However, in this fusion reaction 80% of the energy, or 14 MeV, is in the motion of the neutron which, having no electric charge and being almost as massive as the hydrogen nuclei that created it, can escape the scene without leaving its energy behind to help sustain the reaction – or to generate x-rays for blast and fire.

The only practical way to capture most of the fusion energy is to trap the neutrons inside a massive bottle of heavy material such as lead, uranium, or plutonium. If the 14 MeV neutron is captured by uranium (either type: 235 or 238) or plutonium, the result is fission and the release of 180 MeV of fission energy, multiplying the energy output tenfold.

Fission is thus necessary to start fusion, helps to sustain fusion, and captures and multiplies the energy released in fusion neutrons. In the case of a neutron bomb the last-mentioned does not apply since the escape of neutrons is the objective.

Tritium production

A third important nuclear reaction is the one that creates tritium, essential to the type of fusion used in weapons and, incidentally, the most expensive ingredient in any nuclear weapon. Tritium, or hydrogen-3, is made by bombarding lithium-6 (^{6}Li) with a neutron (n) to produce helium-4 (^{4}He) plus tritium (^{3}T) and energy:

$$^{6}\mathrm{Li} + n = {}^{4}\mathrm{He} + {}^{3}\mathrm{T} + 5\ \mathrm{MeV}$$

A nuclear reactor is necessary to provide the neutrons. The industrial-scale conversion of lithium-6 to tritium is very similar to the conversion of uranium-238 into plutonium-239. In both cases the feed material is placed inside a nuclear reactor and removed for processing after a period of time. In the 1950s, when reactor capacity was limited, the

production of tritium and plutonium were in direct competition. Every atom of tritium in a weapon replaced an atom of plutonium that could have been produced instead.

The fission of one plutonium atom releases ten times more total energy than the fusion of one tritium atom, and it generates fifty times more blast and fire. For this reason, tritium is included in nuclear weapon components only when it causes more fission than its production sacrifices, namely in the case of fusion-boosted fission.

However, an exploding nuclear bomb is a nuclear reactor. The above reaction can take place simultaneously throughout the secondary of a two-stage thermonuclear weapon, producing tritium in place as the device explodes.

Of the three basic types of nuclear weapon, the first, pure fission, uses the first of the three nuclear reactions above. The second, fusion-boosted fission, uses the first two. The third, two-stage thermonuclear, uses all three.

Pure fission weapons

The first task of a nuclear weapon design is to rapidly assemble a supercritical mass of fissile uranium or plutonium. A supercritical mass is one in which the percentage of fission-produced neutrons captured by another fissile nucleus is large enough that each fission event, on average, causes more than one additional fission event.

Once the critical mass is assembled, at maximum density, a burst of neutrons is supplied to start as many chain reactions as possible. Early weapons used an "urchin" inside the pit containing polonium-210 and beryllium separated by a thin barrier. Implosion of the pit crushed the urchin, mixing the two metals, thereby allowing alpha particles from the polonium to interact with beryllium to produce free neutrons. In modern weapons, the neutron generator is a high-voltage vacuum tube containing a particle accelerator which bombards a deuterium/tritium-metal hydride target with deuterium and tritium ions. The resulting small-scale fusion produces neutrons at a protected location outside the physics package, from which they penetrate the pit. This method allows better control of the timing of chain reaction initiation.

The critical mass of an uncompressed sphere of bare metal is 110 lb (50 kg) for uranium-235 and 35 lb (16 kg) for delta-phase plutonium-239. In practical applications, the amount of material required for criticallity is modified by shape, purity, density, and the proximity to neutron-reflecting material, all of which affect the escape or capture of neutrons.

To avoid a chain reaction during handling, the fissile material in the weapon must be sub-critical before detonation. It may consist of one or more components containing less than one uncompressed critical mass each. A thin hollow shell can have more than the bare-sphere critical mass, as can a cylinder, which can be arbitrarily long without ever reaching criticallity.

A *tamper* is an optional layer of dense material surrounding the fissile material. Due to its inertia it delays the expansion of the reacting material, increasing the efficiency of the weapon. Often the same layer serves both as tamper and as neutron reflector.

Gun-type assembly weapon



Diagram of a gun-type fission weapon

Little Boy, the Hiroshima bomb, used 141 lb (64 kg) of uranium with an average enrichment of around 80%, or 112 lb (51 kg) of U-235, just about the bare-metal critical mass. When assembled inside its tamper/reflector of tungsten carbide, the 141 lb (64 kg) was more than twice critical mass. Before the detonation, the uranium-235 was formed into two sub-critical pieces, one of which was later fired down a gun barrel to join the other, starting the atomic explosion. About 1% of the uranium underwent fission; the remainder, representing most of the entire wartime output of the giant factories at Oak Ridge, scattered uselessly.

The inefficiency was caused by the speed with which the uncompressed fissioning uranium expanded and became sub-critical by virtue of decreased density. Despite its inefficiency, this design, because of its shape, was adapted for use in small-diameter, cylindrical artillery shells (a gun-type warhead fired from the barrel of a much larger gun). Such warheads were deployed by the United States until 1992, accounting for a significant fraction of the U-235 in the arsenal, and were some of the first weapons dismantled to comply with treaties limiting warhead numbers. The rationale for this decision was undoubtedly a combination of the lower yield and grave safety issues associated with the gun-type design.

Implosion-type weapon



Fat Man, the Nagasaki bomb, used 13.6 lb (6.2 kg, about 12 fluid ounces or 350 ml in volume) of Pu-239, which is only 39% of bare-sphere critical mass. Surrounded by a U-238 reflector/tamper, the pit was brought close to critical mass by the neutron-reflecting properties of the U-238. During detonation, criticality was achieved by implosion. The plutonium pit was squeezed to increase its density by simultaneous detonation of the conventional explosives placed uniformly around the pit. The explosives were detonated by multiple exploding-bridgewire detonators. It is estimated that only about 20% of the plutonium underwent fission; the rest, about 11 lb (5.0 kg), was scattered.



An implosion shock wave might be of such short duration that only a fraction of the pit is compressed at any instant as the wave passes through it.



Flash X-Ray images of the converging shock waves formed during a test of the high explosive lens system.

A pusher shell made out of low density metal—such as aluminum, beryllium, or an alloy of the two metals (aluminum being easier and safer to shape and beryllium for its high-neutron-reflective capability) —may be needed. The pusher is located between the explosive lens and the tamper. It works by reflecting some of the shock wave backwards, thereby having the effect of lengthening its duration. Fat Man used an aluminum pusher.

The key to Fat Man's greater efficiency was the inward momentum of the massive U-238 tamper (which did not undergo fission). Once the chain reaction started in the plutonium, the momentum of the implosion had to be reversed before expansion could stop the fission. By holding everything together for a few hundred nanoseconds more, the efficiency was increased.

Plutonium pit

The core of an implosion weapon – the fissile material and any reflector or tamper bonded to it – is known as the *pit*. Some weapons tested during the 1950s used pits made with U-235 alone, or in composite with plutonium, but all-plutonium pits are the smallest in diameter and have been the standard since the early 1960s.

Casting and then machining plutonium is difficult not only because of its toxicity, but also because plutonium has many different metallic phases, also known as allotropes. As plutonium cools, changes in phase result in distortion and cracking. This distortion is normally overcome by alloying it with 3–3.5 molar% (0.9–1.0% by weight) gallium, forming a plutonium-gallium alloy, which causes it to take up its delta phase over a wide temperature range. When cooling from molten it then suffers only a single phase change, from epsilon to delta, instead of the four changes it would otherwise pass through. Other trivalent metals would also work, but gallium has a small neutron absorption cross section and helps protect the plutonium against corrosion. A drawback is that gallium

compounds themselves are corrosive and so if the plutonium is recovered from dismantled weapons for conversion to plutonium dioxide for power reactors, there is the difficulty of removing the gallium.

Because plutonium is chemically reactive it is common to plate the completed pit with a thin layer of inert metal, which also reduces the toxic hazard. The gadget used galvanic silver plating; afterwards, nickel deposited from nickel tetracarbonyl vapors was used, but gold is now preferred.

Levitated-pit implosion

The first improvement on the Fat Man design was to put an air space between the tamper and the pit to create a hammer-on-nail impact. The pit, supported on a hollow cone inside the tamper cavity, was said to be levitated. The three tests of Operation Sandstone, in 1948, used Fat Man designs with levitated pits. The largest yield was 49 kilotons, more than twice the yield of the unlevitated Fat Man.

It was immediately clear that implosion was the best design for a fission weapon. Its only drawback seemed to be its diameter. Fat Man was 5 feet (1.5 m) wide vs 2 feet (60 cm) for Little Boy.

Eleven years later, implosion designs had advanced sufficiently that the 5-foot (1.5 m)-diameter sphere of Fat Man had been reduced to a 1-foot (0.30 m)-diameter cylinder 2 feet (0.61 m) long, the Swan device.

The Pu-239 pit of Fat Man was only 3.6 inches (9 cm) in diameter, the size of a softball. The bulk of Fat Man's girth was the implosion mechanism, namely concentric layers of U-238, aluminum, and high explosives. The key to reducing that girth was the two-point implosion design.

Two-point linear implosion



A very inefficient implosion design is one that simply reshapes an ovoid into a sphere, with minimal compression. In linear implosion, an untamped, solid, elongated mass of Pu-239, larger than critical mass in a sphere, is embedded inside a cylinder of high explosive with a detonator at each end.

Detonation makes the pit critical by driving the ends inward, creating a spherical shape. The shock may also change plutonium from delta to alpha phase, increasing its density by 23%, but without the inward momentum of a true implosion. The lack of compression makes it inefficient, but the simplicity and small diameter make it suitable for use in artillery shells and atomic demolition munitions – ADMs – also known as backpack or suitcase nukes.

All such low-yield battlefield weapons, whether gun-type U-235 designs or linear implosion Pu-239 designs, pay a high price in fissile material in order to achieve diameters between six and ten inches (254 mm).

Two-point hollow-pit implosion

A more efficient two-point implosion system uses two high explosive lenses and a hollow pit.

A hollow plutonium pit was the original plan for the 1945 Fat Man bomb, but there was not enough time to develop and test the implosion system for it. A simpler solid-pit design was considered more reliable, given the time restraint, but it required a heavy U-238 tamper, a thick aluminum pusher, and three tons of high explosives.

After the war, interest in the hollow pit design was revived. Its obvious advantage is that a hollow shell of plutonium, shock-deformed and driven inward toward its empty center,

would carry momentum into its violent assembly as a solid sphere. It would be self-tamping, requiring a smaller U-238 tamper, no aluminum pusher and less high explosive.

The Fat Man bomb had two concentric, spherical shells of high explosives, each about 10 inches (25 cm) thick. The inner shell drove the implosion. The outer shell consisted of a soccer-ball pattern of 32 high explosive lenses, each of which converted the convex wave from its detonator into a concave wave matching the contour of the outer surface of the inner shell. If these 32 lenses could be replaced with only two, the high explosive sphere could become an ellipsoid (prolate spheroid) with a much smaller diameter.

A good illustration of these two features is a 1956 drawing from the Swedish nuclear weapon program (which was terminated before it produced a test explosion). The drawing shows the essential elements of the two-point hollow-pit design.



Principkonstruktion av uranbomb

There are similar drawings in the open literature that come from the post-war German nuclear bomb program, which was also terminated, and from the French program, which produced an arsenal.

The mechanism of the high explosive lens (diagram item #6) is not shown in the Swedish drawing, but a standard lens made of fast and slow high explosives, as in Fat Man, would be much longer than the shape depicted. For a single high explosive lens to generate a concave wave that envelops an entire hemisphere, it must either be very long or the part of the wave on a direct line from the detonator to the pit must be slowed dramatically.

A slow high explosive is too fast, but the flying plate of an "air lens" is not. A metal plate, shock-deformed, and pushed across an empty space can be designed to move slowly enough. A two-point implosion system using air lens technology can have a length no more than twice its diameter, as in the Swedish diagram above.

Fusion-boosted fission weapons

The next step in miniaturization was to speed up the fissioning of the pit to reduce the minimum inertial confinement time. The hollow pit provided an ideal location to introduce fusion for the boosting of fission. A 50-50 mixture of tritium and deuterium gas, pumped into the pit during arming, will fuse into helium and release free neutrons soon after fission begins. The neutrons will start a large number of new chain reactions while the pit is still critical or nearly critical.

Once the hollow pit is perfected, there is little reason not to boost.

The concept of fusion-boosted fission was first tested on May 25, 1951, in the Item shot of Operation Greenhouse, Eniwetok, yield 45.5 kilotons.

Boosting reduces diameter in three ways, all the result of faster fission:

- Since the compressed pit does not need to be held together as long, the massive U-238 tamper can be replaced by a light-weight beryllium shell (to reflect escaping neutrons back into the pit). The diameter is reduced.
- The mass of the pit can be reduced by half, without reducing yield. Diameter is reduced again.
- Since the mass of the metal being imploded (tamper plus pit) is reduced, a smaller charge of high explosive is needed, reducing diameter even further.

Since boosting is required to attain full design yield, any reduction in boosting reduces yield. Boosted weapons are thus variable-yield weapons. Yield can be reduced any time before detonation, simply by putting less than the full amount of tritium into the pit during the arming procedure.



The first device whose dimensions suggest employment of all these features (two-point, hollow-pit, fusion-boosted implosion) was the Swan device, tested June 22, 1956, as the Inca shot of Operation Redwing, at Eniwetok. Its yield was 15 kilotons, about the same as

Little Boy, the Hiroshima bomb. It weighed 105 lb (47.6 kg) and was cylindrical in shape, 11.6 inches (29.5 cm) in diameter and 22.9 inches (58 cm) long. The above schematic illustrates what were probably its essential features.

Eleven days later, July 3, 1956, the Swan was test-fired again at Eniwetok, as the Mohawk shot of Redwing. This time it served as the primary, or first stage, of a two-stage thermonuclear device, a role it played in a dozen such tests during the 1950s. Swan was the first off-the-shelf, multi-use primary, and the prototype for all that followed.





After the success of Swan, 11 or 12 inches (300 mm) seemed to become the standard diameter of boosted single-stage devices tested during the 1950s. Length was usually twice the diameter, but one such device, which became the W54 warhead, was closer to a sphere, only 15 inches (380 mm) long. It was tested two dozen times in the 1957–62 period before being deployed. No other design had such a long string of test failures. Since the longer devices tended to work correctly on the first try, there must have been some difficulty in flattening the two high explosive lenses enough to achieve the desired length-to-width ratio.

One of the applications of the W54 was the Davy Crockett XM-388 recoilless rifle projectile, shown here in comparison to its Fat Man predecessor, dimensions in inches.

Another benefit of boosting, in addition to making weapons smaller, lighter, and with less fissile material for a given yield, is that it renders weapons immune to radiation interference (RI). It was discovered in the mid-1950s that plutonium pits would be particularly susceptible to partial predetonation if exposed to the intense radiation of a nearby nuclear explosion (electronics might also be damaged, but this was a separate issue). RI was a particular problem before effective early warning radar systems because a first strike attack might make retaliatory weapons useless. Boosting reduces the amount of plutonium needed in a weapon to below the quantity which would be vulnerable to this effect.

Two-stage thermonuclear weapons

Pure fission or fusion-boosted fission weapons can be made to yield hundreds of kilotons, at great expense in fissile material and tritium, but by far the most efficient way to increase nuclear weapon yield beyond ten or so kilotons is to tack on a second independent stage, called a secondary.

Ivy Mike, the first two-stage thermonuclear detonation, 10.4 megatons, November 1, 1952.

In the 1940s, bomb designers at Los Alamos thought the secondary would be a canister of deuterium in liquified or hydride form. The fusion reaction would be D-D, harder to achieve than D-T, but more affordable. A fission bomb at one end would shock-compress and heat the near end, and fusion would propagate through the canister to the far end. Mathematical simulations showed it wouldn't work, even with large amounts of prohibitively expensive tritium added in.

The entire fusion fuel canister would need to be enveloped by fission energy, to both compress and heat it, as with the booster charge in a boosted primary. The design breakthrough came in January 1951, when Edward Teller and Stanisław Ulam invented

radiation implosion—for nearly three decades known publicly only as the Teller-Ulam H-bomb secret.

The concept of radiation implosion was first tested on May 9, 1951, in the George shot of Operation Greenhouse, Eniwetok, yield 225 kilotons. The first full test was on November 1, 1952, the Mike shot of Operation Ivy, Eniwetok, yield 10.4 megatons.

In radiation implosion, the burst of X-ray energy coming from an exploding primary is captured and contained within an opaque-walled radiation channel which surrounds the nuclear energy components of the secondary. The radiation quickly turns the plastic foam that had been filling the channel into a plasma which is mostly transparent to X-rays, and the radiation is absorbed in the outermost layers of the pusher/tamper surrounding the secondary, which ablates and applies a massive force (much like an inside out rocket engine) causing the fusion fuel capsule to implode much like the pit of the primary. As the secondary implodes a fissile "spark plug" at its center ignites and provides heat which enables the fusion fuel to ignite as well. The fission and fusion chain reactions exchange neutrons with each other and boost the efficiency of both reactions. The greater implosive force, enhanced efficiency of the fissile "spark plug" due to boosting via fusion neutrons, and the fusion explosion itself provides significantly greater explosive yield from the secondary despite often not being much larger than the primary.



A Warhead before firing; primary at top, secondary at bottom. Both components are fusion-boosted fission bombs. **B** High-explosive fires in primary, compressing plutonium core into supercriticality and beginning a fission reaction. **C** Fission in primary emits X-rays which channel along the inside of the casing, irradiating the polystyrene foam channel filler. **D** Secondary compressed by X-ray induced ablation, and Plutonium sparkplug inside the secondary begins to fission, supplying heat. **E** Compressed and heated, lithium-6 deuteride fuel begins fusion reaction, neutron flux causes tamper to fission. A fireball is starting to form...

For example, for the Redwing Mohawk test on July 3, 1956, a secondary called the Flute was attached to the Swan primary. The Flute was 15 inches (38 cm) in diameter and

23.4 inches (59 cm) long, about the size of the Swan. But it weighed ten times as much and yielded 24 times as much energy (355 kilotons, vs 15 kilotons).

Equally important, the active ingredients in the Flute probably cost no more than those in the Swan. Most of the fission came from cheap U-238, and the tritium was manufactured in place during the explosion. Only the spark plug at the axis of the secondary needed to be fissile.

A spherical secondary can achieve higher implosion densities than a cylindrical secondary, because spherical implosion pushes in from all directions toward the same spot. However, in warheads yielding more than one megaton, the diameter of a spherical secondary would be too large for most applications. A cylindrical secondary is necessary in such cases. The small, cone-shaped re-entry vehicles in multiple-warhead ballistic missiles after 1970 tended to have warheads with spherical secondaries, and yields of a few hundred kilotons.

As with boosting, the advantages of the two-stage thermonuclear design are so great that there is little incentive not to use it, once a nation has mastered the technology.

In engineering terms, radiation implosion allows for the exploitation of several known features of nuclear bomb materials which heretofore had eluded practical application. For example:

- The best way to store deuterium in a reasonably dense state is to chemically bond it with lithium, as lithium deuteride. But the lithium-6 isotope is also the raw material for tritium production, and an exploding bomb is a nuclear reactor. Radiation implosion will hold everything together long enough to permit the complete conversion of lithium-6 into tritium, while the bomb explodes. So the bonding agent for deuterium permits use of the D-T fusion reaction without any pre-manufactured tritium being stored in the secondary. The tritium production constraint disappears.
- For the secondary to be imploded by the hot, radiation-induced plasma surrounding it, it must remain cool for the first microsecond, i.e., it must be encased in a massive radiation (heat) shield. The shield's massiveness allows it to double as a tamper, adding momentum and duration to the implosion. No material is better suited for both of these jobs than ordinary, cheap uranium-238, which also happens to undergo fission when struck by the neutrons produced by D-T fusion. This casing, called the pusher, thus has three jobs: to keep the secondary cool, to hold it, inertially, in a highly compressed state, and, finally, to serve as the chief energy source for the entire bomb. The consumable pusher makes the bomb more a uranium fission bomb than a hydrogen fusion bomb. It is noteworthy that insiders never used the term hydrogen bomb.
- Finally, the heat for fusion ignition comes not from the primary but from a second fission bomb called the spark plug, embedded in the heart of the secondary. The implosion of the secondary implodes this spark plug, detonating it and igniting fusion in the material around it, but the spark plug then continues to fission in the

neutron-rich environment until it is fully consumed, adding significantly to the yield.

The initial impetus behind the two-stage weapon was President Truman's 1950 promise to build a 10-megaton hydrogen superbomb as the U.S. response to the 1949 test of the first Soviet fission bomb. But the resulting invention turned out to be the cheapest and most compact way to build small nuclear bombs as well as large ones, erasing any meaningful distinction between A-bombs and H-bombs, and between boosters and supers. All the best techniques for fission and fusion explosions are incorporated into one all-encompassing, fully-scalable design principle. Even six-inch (152 mm) diameter nuclear artillery shells can be two-stage thermonuclears.

In the ensuing fifty years, nobody has come up with a better way to build a nuclear bomb. It is the design of choice for the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France, the five thermonuclear powers. The other nuclear-armed nations, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, probably have single-stage weapons, possibly boosted.

Interstage

In a two-stage thermonuclear weapon the energy from the primary impacts the secondary. An essential energy transfer modulator called the interstage, between the primary and the secondary, protects the secondary's fusion fuel from heating too quickly, which could cause it to explode in a conventional (and small) heat explosion before the fission and fusion reactions get a chance to start.

There is very little information in the open literature about the mechanism of the interstage. Its first mention in a U.S. government document formally released to the public appears to be a caption in a recent graphic promoting the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program. If built, this new design would replace "toxic, brittle material" and "expensive 'special' material" in the interstage. This statement suggests the interstage may contain beryllium to moderate the flux of neutrons from the primary, and perhaps something to absorb and re-radiate the x-rays in a particular manner. There is also some speculation that this interstage material, which may be code-named FOGBANK might be an aerogel, possibly doped with beryllium and/or other substances.

The interstage and the secondary are encased together inside a stainless steel membrane to form the canned subassembly (CSA), an arrangement which has never been depicted in any open-source drawing. The most detailed illustration of an interstage shows a British thermonuclear weapon with a cluster of items between its primary and a cylindrical secondary. They are labeled "end-cap and neutron focus lens," "reflector/neutron gun carriage," and "reflector wrap." The origin of the drawing, posted on the internet by Greenpeace, is uncertain, and there is no accompanying explanation.

Specific designs

While every nuclear weapon design falls into one of the above categories, specific designs have occasionally become the subject of news accounts and public discussion, often with incorrect descriptions about how they work and what they do. Examples:

Hydrogen bombs

All modern nuclear weapons make some use of D-T fusion. Even pure fission weapons include neutron generators which are high-voltage vacuum tubes containing trace amounts of tritium and deuterium.

However, in the public perception, hydrogen bombs, or H-bombs, are multi-megaton devices a thousand times more powerful than Hiroshima's Little Boy. Such high-yield bombs are actually two-stage thermonuclears, scaled up to the desired yield, with uranium fission, as usual, providing most of their energy.

The idea of the hydrogen bomb first came to public attention in 1949, when prominent scientists openly recommended against building nuclear bombs more powerful than the standard pure-fission model, on both moral and practical grounds. Their assumption was that critical mass considerations would limit the potential size of fission explosions, but that a fusion explosion could be as large as its supply of fuel, which has no critical mass limit. In 1949, the Soviets exploded their first fission bomb, and in 1950 President Truman ended the H-bomb debate by ordering the Los Alamos designers to build one.

In 1952, the 10.4-megaton Ivy Mike explosion was announced as the first hydrogen bomb test, reinforcing the idea that hydrogen bombs are a thousand times more powerful than fission bombs.

In 1954, J. Robert Oppenheimer was labeled a hydrogen bomb opponent. The public did not know there were two kinds of hydrogen bomb (neither of which is accurately described as a hydrogen bomb). On May 23, when his security clearance was revoked, item three of the four public findings against him was "his conduct in the hydrogen bomb program." In 1949, Oppenheimer had supported single-stage fusion-boosted fission bombs, to maximize the explosive power of the arsenal given the trade-off between plutonium and tritium production. He opposed two-stage thermonuclear bombs until 1951, when radiation implosion, which he called "technically sweet", first made them practical. The complexity of his position was not revealed to the public until 1976, nine years after his death.

When ballistic missiles replaced bombers in the 1960s, most multi-megaton bombs were replaced by missile warheads (also two-stage thermonuclears) scaled down to one megaton or less.

Alarm Clock/Sloika

The first effort to exploit the symbiotic relationship between fission and fusion was a 1940s design that mixed fission and fusion fuel in alternating thin layers. As a single-stage device, it would have been a cumbersome application of boosted fission. It first became practical when incorporated into the secondary of a two-stage thermonuclear weapon.

The U.S. name, Alarm Clock, was a nonsense code name. The Russian name for the same design was more descriptive: Sloika (Russian: Слойка), a layered pastry cake. A single-stage Soviet Sloika was tested on August 12, 1953. No single-stage U.S. version was tested, but the Union shot of Operation Castle, April 26, 1954, was a two-stage thermonuclear code-named Alarm Clock. Its yield, at Bikini, was 6.9 megatons.

Because the Soviet Sloika test used dry lithium-6 deuteride eight months before the first U.S. test to use it (Castle Bravo, March 1, 1954), it was sometimes claimed that the USSR won the H-bomb race. (The 1952 U.S. Ivy Mike test used cryogenically-cooled liquid deuterium as the fusion fuel in the secondary, and employed the D-D fusion reaction.) However, the first Soviet test to use a radiation-imploded secondary, the essential feature of a true H-bomb, was on November 23, 1955, three years after Ivy Mike.

Clean bombs

Bassoon, the prototype for a 3.5-megaton clean bomb or a 25-megaton dirty bomb. Dirty version shown here, before its 1956 test.

On March 1, 1954, the largest-ever U.S. nuclear test explosion, the 15-megaton Bravo shot of Operation Castle at Bikini, delivered a promptly lethal dose of fission-product fallout to more than 6,000 square miles (16,000 km^2) of Pacific Ocean surface. Radiation injuries to Marshall Islanders and Japanese fishermen made that fact public and revealed the role of fission in hydrogen bombs.

In response to the public alarm over fallout, an effort was made to design a clean multi-megaton weapon, relying almost entirely on fusion. Since the energy produced by fission is essentially free, using the vital tamper as a source of extra energy, the clean bomb

needed to be much larger for the same yield. For the only time, a third stage, called the tertiary, was added, using the secondary as its primary. The device was called Bassoon. It was tested as the Zuni shot of Operation Redwing, at Bikini on May 28, 1956. With all the uranium in Bassoon replaced with a substitute material such as lead, its yield was 3.5 megatons, 85% fusion and only 15% fission. The public records for devices that produced the highest proportion of their yield via fusion-only reactions are the 97% Tsar bomba, the Hardtack Poplar test at 95.2%, and the Redwing Navajo test at 95% fusion.

On July 19, AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss said the clean bomb test "produced much of importance ... from a humanitarian aspect." However, two days later the dirty version of Bassoon, with the uranium parts restored, was tested as the Tewa shot of Redwing. Its 5-megaton yield, 87% fission, was deliberately suppressed to keep fallout within a smaller area. This dirty version was later deployed as the three-stage, 25-megaton Mark-41 bomb, which was carried by U.S. Air Force bombers, but never tested at full yield.

As such, high-yield clean bombs were a public relations exercise. The actual deployed weapons were the dirty version, which maximized yield for the same size device.

Cobalt bombs

A fictional doomsday bomb, made popular by Nevil Shute's 1957 novel, and subsequent 1959 movie, *On the Beach*, the cobalt bomb was a hydrogen bomb with a jacket of cobalt metal. The neutron-activated cobalt would supposedly have maximized the environmental damage from radioactive fallout. These bombs were popularized in the 1964 film *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*. The element added to the bombs is referred to in the film as 'cobalt-thorium G'

Such "salted" weapons were requested by the U.S. Air Force and seriously investigated, possibly built and tested, but not deployed. In the 1964 edition of the DOD/AEC book *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,* a new section titled Radiological Warfare clarified the issue. Fission products are as deadly as neutron-activated cobalt. The standard high-fission thermonuclear weapon is automatically a weapon of radiological warfare, as dirty as a cobalt bomb.

Initially, gamma radiation from the fission products of an equivalent size fission-fusion-fission bomb are much more intense than Co-60: 15,000 times more intense at 1 hour; 35 times more intense at 1 week; 5 times more intense at 1 month; and about equal at 6 months. Thereafter fission drops off rapidly so that Co-60 fallout is 8 times more intense than fission at 1 year and 150 times more intense at 5 years. The very long-lived isotopes produced by fission would overtake the ^{60}Co again after about 75 years.

Fission-fusion-fission bombs

In 1954, to explain the surprising amount of fission-product fallout produced by hydrogen bombs, Ralph Lapp coined the term fission-fusion-fission to describe a process inside what he called a three-stage thermonuclear weapon. His process explanation was

correct, but his choice of terms caused confusion in the open literature. The stages of a nuclear weapon are not fission, fusion, and fission. They are the primary, the secondary, and, in one exceptionally powerful weapon, the tertiary. Each of these stages employs fission, fusion, and fission.

Neutron bombs

A neutron bomb, technically referred to as an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW), is a type of tactical nuclear weapon designed specifically to release a large portion of its energy as energetic neutron radiation. This contrasts with standard thermonuclear weapons, which are designed to capture this intense neutron radiation to increase its overall explosive yield. In terms of yield, ERWs typically produce about one-tenth that of a fission-type atomic weapon. Even with their significantly lower explosive power, ERWs are still capable of much greater destruction than any conventional bomb. Meanwhile, relative to other nuclear weapons, damage is more focused on biological material than on material infrastructure (though extreme blast and heat effects are not eliminated).

Officially known as enhanced radiation weapons, ERWs, they are more accurately described as suppressed yield weapons. When the yield of a nuclear weapon is less than one kiloton, its lethal radius from blast, 700 m (2300 ft), is less than that from its neutron radiation. However, the blast is more than potent enough to destroy most structures, which are less resistant to blast effects than even unprotected human beings. Blast pressures of upwards of 20 PSI are survivable, whereas most buildings will collapse with a pressure of only 5 PSI.

Commonly misconceived as a weapon designed to kill populations and leave infrastructure intact, these bombs (as mentioned above) are still very capable of leveling buildings over a large radius. The intent of their design was to kill tank crews - tanks giving excellent protection against blast and heat, surviving (relatively) very close to a detonation. And with the Soviets' vast tank battalions during the Cold War, this was the perfect weapon to counter them. The neutron radiation could instantly incapacitate a tank crew out to roughly the same distance that the heat and blast would incapacitate an unprotected human (depending on design). The tank chassis would also be rendered highly radioactive (temporarily) preventing its re-use by a fresh crew.

Neutron weapons were also intended for use in other applications, however. For example, they are effective in anti-nuclear defenses - the neutron flux being capable of neutralising an incoming warhead at a greater range than heat or blast. Nuclear warheads are very resistant to physical damage, but are very difficult to harden against extreme neutron flux.

Energy distribution of weapon

	Standard	**Enhanced**
Blast	50%	40%

Thermal energy	35%	25%
Instant radiation	5%	30%
Residual radiation	10%	5%

ERWs were two-stage thermonuclears with all non-essential uranium removed to minimize fission yield. Fusion provided the neutrons. Developed in the 1950s, they were first deployed in the 1970s, by U.S. forces in Europe. The last ones were retired in the 1990s.

A neutron bomb is only feasible if the yield is sufficiently high that efficient fusion stage ignition is possible, and if the yield is low enough that the case thickness will not absorb too many neutrons. This means that neutron bombs have a yield range of 1–10 kilotons, with fission proportion varying from 50% at 1-kiloton to 25% at 10-kilotons (all of which comes from the primary stage). The neutron output per kiloton is then 10–15 times greater than for a pure fission implosion weapon or for a strategic warhead like a W87 or W88.

Oralloy thermonuclear warheads

In 1999, nuclear weapon design was in the news again, for the first time in decades. In January, the U.S. House of Representatives released the Cox Report (Christopher Cox R-CA) which alleged that China had somehow acquired classified information about the U.S. W88 warhead. Nine months later, Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwanese immigrant working at Los Alamos, was publicly accused of spying, arrested, and served nine months in pre-trial detention, before the case against him was dismissed. It is not clear that there was, in fact, any espionage.

In the course of eighteen months of news coverage, the W88 warhead was described in unusual detail. *The New York Times* printed a schematic diagram on its front page. The most detailed drawing appeared in *A Convenient Spy*, the 2001 book on the Wen Ho Lee case by Dan Stober and Ian Hoffman, adapted and shown here with permission.



Designed for use on Trident II (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the W88 entered service in 1990 and was the last warhead designed for the U.S. arsenal. It has been described as the most advanced, although open literature accounts do not indicate any major design features that were not available to U.S. designers in 1958.

The above diagram shows all the standard features of ballistic missile warheads since the 1960s, with two exceptions that give it a higher yield for its size.

- The outer layer of the secondary, called the "pusher", which serves three functions: heat shield, tamper, and fission fuel, is made of U-235 instead of U-238, hence the name Oralloy (U-235) Thermonuclear. Being fissile, rather than merely fissionable, allows the pusher to fission faster and more completely, increasing yield. This feature is available only to nations with a great wealth of fissile uranium. The United States is estimated to have 500 tons.

- The secondary is located in the wide end of the re-entry cone, where it can be larger, and thus more powerful. The usual arrangement is to put the heavier, denser secondary in the narrow end for greater aerodynamic stability during re-

entry from outer space, and to allow more room for a bulky primary in the wider part of the cone. (The W87 warhead drawing in the previous section shows the usual arrangement.) Because of this new geometry, the W88 primary uses compact conventional high explosives (CHE) to save space, rather than the more usual, and bulky but safer, insensitive high explosives (IHE). The re-entry cone probably has ballast in the nose for aerodynamic stability.

The alternating layers of fission and fusion material in the secondary are an application of the Alarm Clock/Sloika principle.

Reliable replacement warhead

The United States has not produced any nuclear warheads since 1989, when the Rocky Flats pit production plant, near Boulder, Colorado, was shut down for environmental reasons. With the end of the Cold War two years later, the production line was idled except for inspection and maintenance functions.

The National Nuclear Security Administration, the latest successor for nuclear weapons to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Energy, has proposed building a new pit facility and starting the production line for a new warhead called the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Two advertised safety improvements of the RRW would be a return to the use of "insensitive high explosives which are far less susceptible to accidental detonation", and the elimination of "certain hazardous materials, such as beryllium, that are harmful to people and the environment." Since the new warhead must not require any nuclear testing, it could not use a new design with untested concepts.

Weapon design laboratories

All the nuclear weapon design innovations discussed here originated from the following three labs in the manner described. Other nuclear weapon design labs in other countries duplicated those design innovations independently, reverse-engineered them from fallout analysis, or acquired them by espionage.

Berkeley

The first systematic exploration of nuclear weapon design concepts took place in mid-1942 at the University of California, Berkeley. Important early discoveries had been made at the adjacent Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, such as the 1940 cyclotron-made production and isolation of plutonium. A Berkeley professor, J. Robert Oppenheimer, had just been hired to run the nation's secret bomb design effort. His first act was to convene the 1942 summer conference.

By the time he moved his operation to the new secret town of Los Alamos, New Mexico, in the spring of 1943, the accumulated wisdom on nuclear weapon design consisted of five lectures by Berkeley professor Robert Serber, transcribed and distributed as the Los Alamos Primer. The Primer addressed fission energy, neutron production and capture,

nuclear chain reactions, critical mass, tampers, predetonation, and three methods of assembling a bomb: gun assembly, implosion, and "autocatalytic methods," the one approach that turned out to be a dead end.

Los Alamos

At Los Alamos, it was found in April 1944 by Emilio G. Segrè that the proposed Thin Man Gun assembly type bomb would not work for plutonium because of predetonation problems caused by Pu-240 impurities. So Fat Man, the implosion-type bomb, was given high priority as the only option for plutonium. The Berkeley discussions had generated theoretical estimates of critical mass, but nothing precise. The main wartime job at Los Alamos was the experimental determination of critical mass, which had to wait until sufficient amounts of fissile material arrived from the production plants: uranium from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and plutonium from the Hanford site in Washington.

In 1945, using the results of critical mass experiments, Los Alamos technicians fabricated and assembled components for four bombs: the Trinity Gadget, Little Boy, Fat Man, and an unused spare Fat Man. After the war, those who could, including Oppenheimer, returned to university teaching positions. Those who remained worked on levitated and hollow pits and conducted weapon effects tests such as Crossroads Able and Baker at Bikini Atoll in 1946.

All of the essential ideas for incorporating fusion into nuclear weapons originated at Los Alamos between 1946 and 1952. After the Teller-Ulam radiation implosion breakthrough of 1951, the technical implications and possibilities were fully explored, but ideas not directly relevant to making the largest possible bombs for long-range Air Force bombers were shelved.

Because of Oppenheimer's initial position in the H-bomb debate, in opposition to large thermonuclear weapons, and the assumption that he still had influence over Los Alamos despite his departure, political allies of Edward Teller decided he needed his own laboratory in order to pursue H-bombs. By the time it was opened in 1952, in Livermore, California, Los Alamos had finished the job Livermore was designed to do.

Livermore

With its original mission no longer available, the Livermore lab tried radical new designs, that failed. Its first three nuclear tests were fizzles: in 1953, two single-stage fission devices with uranium hydride pits, and in 1954, a two-stage thermonuclear device in which the secondary heated up prematurely, too fast for radiation implosion to work properly.

Shifting gears, Livermore settled for taking ideas Los Alamos had shelved and developing them for the Army and Navy. This led Livermore to specialize in small-diameter tactical weapons, particularly ones using two-point implosion systems, such as the Swan. Small-diameter tactical weapons became primaries for small-diameter

secondaries. Around 1960, when the superpower arms race became a ballistic missile race, Livermore warheads were more useful than the large, heavy Los Alamos warheads. Los Alamos warheads were used on the first intermediate-range ballistic missiles, IRBMs, but smaller Livermore warheads were used on the first intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs, as well as on the first multiple warhead systems on such missiles.

In 1957 and 1958 both labs built and tested as many designs as possible, in anticipation that a planned 1958 test ban might become permanent. By the time testing resumed in 1961 the two labs had become duplicates of each other, and design jobs were assigned more on workload considerations than lab specialty. Some designs were horse-traded. For example, the W38 warhead for the Titan I missile started out as a Livermore project, was given to Los Alamos when it became the Atlas missile warhead, and in 1959 was given back to Livermore, in trade for the W54 Davy Crockett warhead, which went from Livermore to Los Alamos.

The period of real innovation was ending by then, anyway. Warhead designs after 1960 took on the character of model changes, with every new missile getting a new warhead for marketing reasons. The chief substantive change involved packing more fissile uranium into the secondary, as it became available with continued uranium enrichment and the dismantlement of the large high-yield bombs.

Explosive testing

Nuclear weapons are in large part designed by trial and error. The trial often involves test explosion of a prototype.

In a nuclear explosion, a large number of discrete events, with various probabilities, aggregate into short-lived, chaotic energy flows inside the device casing. Complex mathematical models are required to approximate the processes, and in the 1950s there were no computers powerful enough to run them properly. Even today's computers and simulation software are not adequate.

It was easy enough to design reliable weapons for the stockpile. If the prototype worked, it could be weaponized and mass produced.

It was much more difficult to understand how it worked or why it failed. Designers gathered as much data as possible during the explosion, before the device destroyed itself, and used the data to calibrate their models, often by inserting fudge factors into equations to make the simulations match experimental results. They also analyzed the weapon debris in fallout to see how much of a potential nuclear reaction had taken place.

Light pipes

An important tool for test analysis was the diagnostic light pipe. A probe inside a test device could transmit information by heating a plate of metal to incandescence, an event that could be recorded at the far end of a long, very straight pipe.

The picture below shows the Shrimp device, detonated on March 1, 1954 at Bikini, as the Castle Bravo test. Its 15-megaton explosion was the largest ever by the United States. The silhouette of a man is shown for scale. The device is supported from below, at the ends. The pipes going into the shot cab ceiling, which appear to be supports, are diagnostic light pipes. The eight pipes at the right end (1) sent information about the detonation of the primary. Two in the middle (2) marked the time when x-radiation from the primary reached the radiation channel around the secondary. The last two pipes (3) noted the time radiation reached the far end of the radiation channel, the difference between (2) and (3) being the radiation transit time for the channel.



From the shot cab, the pipes turned horizontal and traveled 7500 ft (2.3 km), along a causeway built on the Bikini reef, to a remote-controlled data collection bunker on Namu Island.

While x-rays would normally travel at the speed of light through a low density material like the plastic foam channel filler between (2) and (3), the intensity of radiation from the exploding primary created a relatively opaque radiation front in the channel filler which acted like a slow-moving logjam to retard the passage of radiant energy. While the secondary is being compressed via radiation induced ablation, neutrons from the primary

catch up with the x-rays, penetrate into the secondary and start breeding tritium with the third reaction noted in the first section above. This Li-6 + n reaction is exothermic, producing 5 MeV per event. The spark plug is not yet compressed and thus is not critical, so there won't be significant fission or fusion. But if enough neutrons arrive before implosion of the secondary is complete, the crucial temperature difference will be degraded. This is the reported cause of failure for Livermore's first thermonuclear design, the Morgenstern device, tested as Castle Koon, April 7, 1954.

These timing issues are measured by light-pipe data. The mathematical simulations which they calibrate are called radiation flow hydrodynamics codes, or channel codes. They are used to predict the effect of future design modifications.

It is not clear from the public record how successful the Shrimp light pipes were. The data bunker was far enough back to remain outside the mile-wide crater, but the 15-megaton blast, two and a half times greater than expected, breached the bunker by blowing its 20-ton door off the hinges and across the inside of the bunker. (The nearest people were twenty miles (32 km) farther away, in a bunker that survived intact.)

Fallout analysis

The most interesting data from Castle Bravo came from radio-chemical analysis of weapon debris in fallout. Because of a shortage of enriched lithium-6, 60% of the lithium in the Shrimp secondary was ordinary lithium-7, which doesn't breed tritium as easily as lithium-6 does. But it does breed lithium-6 as the product of an (n, 2n) reaction (one neutron in, two neutrons out), a known fact, but with unknown probability. The probability turned out to be high.

Fallout analysis revealed to designers that, with the (n, 2n) reaction, the Shrimp secondary effectively had two and half times as much lithium-6 as expected. The tritium, the fusion yield, the neutrons, and the fission yield were all increased accordingly.

As noted above, Bravo's fallout analysis also told the outside world, for the first time, that thermonuclear bombs are more fission devices than fusion devices. A Japanese fishing boat, the *Lucky Dragon*, sailed home with enough fallout on its decks to allow scientists in Japan and elsewhere to determine, and announce, that most of the fallout had come from the fission of U-238 by fusion-produced 14 MeV neutrons.

Underground testing

Subsidence Craters at Yucca Flat, Nevada Test Site.

The global alarm over radioactive fallout, which began with the Castle Bravo event, eventually drove nuclear testing underground. The last U.S. above-ground test took place at Johnston Island on November 4, 1962. During the next three decades, until September 23, 1992, the United States conducted an average of 2.4 underground nuclear explosions per month, all but a few at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) northwest of Las Vegas.

The Yucca Flat section of the NTS is covered with subsidence craters resulting from the collapse of terrain over radioactive underground caverns created by nuclear explosions.

After the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which limited underground explosions to 150 kilotons or less, warheads like the half-megaton W88 had to be tested at less than full yield. Since the primary must be detonated at full yield in order to generate data about the implosion of the secondary, the reduction in yield had to come from the secondary. Replacing much of the lithium-6 deuteride fusion fuel with lithium-7 hydride limited the tritium available for fusion, and thus the overall yield, without changing the dynamics of the implosion. The functioning of the device could be

evaluated using light pipes, other sensing devices, and analysis of trapped weapon debris. The full yield of the stockpiled weapon could be calculated by extrapolation.

Production facilities

When two-stage weapons became standard in the early 1950s, weapon design determined the layout of the new, widely dispersed U.S. production facilities, and vice versa.

Because primaries tend to be bulky, especially in diameter, plutonium is the fissile material of choice for pits, with beryllium reflectors. It has a smaller critical mass than uranium. The Rocky Flats plant near Boulder, Colorado, was built in 1952 for pit production and consequently became the plutonium and beryllium fabrication facility.

The Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where mass spectrometers called Calutrons had enriched uranium for the Manhattan Project, was redesigned to make secondaries. Fissile U-235 makes the best spark plugs because its critical mass is larger, especially in the cylindrical shape of early thermonuclear secondaries. Early experiments used the two fissile materials in combination, as composite Pu-Oy pits and spark plugs, but for mass production, it was easier to let the factories specialize: plutonium pits in primaries, uranium spark plugs and pushers in secondaries.

Y-12 made lithium-6 deuteride fusion fuel and U-238 parts, the other two ingredients of secondaries.

The Savannah River plant in Aiken, South Carolina, also built in 1952, operated nuclear reactors which converted U-238 into Pu-239 for pits, and converted lithium-6 (produced at Y-12) into tritium for booster gas. Since its reactors were moderated with heavy water, deuterium oxide, it also made deuterium for booster gas and for Y-12 to use in making lithium-6 deuteride.

Warhead design safety

Because even low-yield nuclear warheads have astounding destructive power, weapon designers have always recognised the need to incorporate mechanisms and associated procedures intended to prevent accidental detonation.



A diagram of the *Green Grass* warhead's steel ball safety device, shown left, filled (safe) and right, empty (live). The steel balls were emptied into a hopper underneath the aircraft before flight, and could be re-inserted using a funnel by rotating the bomb on its trolley and raising the hopper.

Gun-type weapons

It is inherently dangerous to have a weapon containing a quantity and shape of fissile material which can form a critical mass through a relatively simple accident. Because of this danger, the propellant in Little Boy (four bags of cordite) was inserted into the bomb in flight, shortly after takeoff on August 6, 1945. This was the first time a gun-type nuclear weapon had ever been fully assembled.

If the weapon falls into water, the moderating effect of the water can also cause a criticality accident, even without the weapon being physically damaged. Similarly, a fire caused by an aircraft crashing could easily ignite the propellant, with catastrophic results. Gun-type weapons have always been inherently unsafe.

In-flight pit insertion

Neither of these effects is likely with implosion weapons since there is normally insufficient fissile material to form a critical mass without the correct detonation of the lenses. However, the earliest implosion weapons had pits so close to criticality that accidental detonation with some nuclear yield was a concern.

On August 9, 1945, Fat Man was loaded onto its airplane fully assembled, but later, when levitated pits made a space between the pit and the tamper, it was feasible to use in-flight pit insertion. The bomber would take off with no fissile material in the bomb. Some older implosion-type weapons, such as the US Mark 4 and Mark 5, used this system.

In-flight pit insertion will not work with a hollow pit in contact with its tamper.

Steel ball safety method

As shown in the diagram above, one method used to decrease the likelihood of accidental detonation employed metal balls. The balls were emptied into the pit: this prevented detonation by increasing the density of the hollow pit, thereby preventing symmetrical implosion in the event of an accident. This design was used in the Green Grass weapon, also known as the Interim Megaton Weapon, which was used in the Violet Club and Yellow Sun Mk.1 bombs.



Chain safety method

Alternatively, the pit can be "safed" by having its normally-hollow core filled with an inert material such as a fine metal chain, possibly made of cadmium to absorb neutrons. While the chain is in the center of the pit, the pit can not be compressed into an appropriate shape to fission; when the weapon is to be armed, the chain is removed. Similarly, although a serious fire could detonate the explosives, destroying the pit and spreading plutonium to contaminate the surroundings as has happened in several weapons accidents, it could not cause a nuclear explosion.

Wire safety method

The US *W47* warhead used in *Polaris A1* and *Polaris A2* had a safety device consisting of a boron-coated wire inserted into the hollow pit at manufacture. The warhead was armed by withdrawing the wire onto a spool driven by an electric motor. Once withdrawn the wire could not be re-inserted.

One-point safety

While the firing of one detonator out of many will not cause a hollow pit to go critical, especially a low-mass hollow pit that requires boosting, the introduction of two-point implosion systems made that possibility a real concern.

In a two-point system, if one detonator fires, one entire hemisphere of the pit will implode as designed. The high-explosive charge surrounding the other hemisphere will explode progressively, from the equator toward the opposite pole. Ideally, this will pinch the equator and squeeze the second hemisphere away from the first, like toothpaste in a tube. By the time the explosion envelops it, its implosion will be separated both in time and space from the implosion of the first hemisphere. The resulting dumbbell shape, with each end reaching maximum density at a different time, may not become critical.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to tell on the drawing board how this will play out. Nor is it possible using a dummy pit of U-238 and high-speed x-ray cameras, although such tests are helpful. For final determination, a test needs to be made with real fissile material. Consequently, starting in 1957, a year after Swan, both labs began one-point safety tests.

Out of 25 one-point safety tests conducted in 1957 and 1958, seven had zero or slight nuclear yield (success), three had high yields of 300 t to 500 t (severe failure), and the rest had unacceptable yields between those extremes.

Of particular concern was Livermore's W47 warhead for the Polaris submarine missile. The last test before the 1958 moratorium was a one-point test of the W47 primary, which had an unacceptably high nuclear yield of 400 lb (180 kg) of TNT equivalent (Hardtack II Titania). With the test moratorium in force, there was no way to refine the design and make it inherently one-point safe. Los Alamos had a suitable primary that was one-point safe, but rather than share with Los Alamos the credit for designing the first SLBM

warhead, Livermore chose to use mechanical safing on its own inherently unsafe primary. The wire safety scheme described above was the result.

It turns out that the W47 may have been safer than anticipated. The wire-safety system may have rendered most of the warheads "duds," unable to fire when detonated.

When testing resumed in 1961, and continued for three decades, there was sufficient time to make all warhead designs inherently one-point safe, without need for mechanical safing.

Strong link weak link

A strong link/weak link and exclusion zone nuclear detonation mechanism is a form of automatic safety interlock.

Permissive Action Links

In addition to the above steps to reduce the probability of a nuclear detonation arising from a single fault, locking mechanisms referred to by NATO states as Permissive Action Links are sometimes attached to the control mechanisms for nuclear warheads. Permissive Action Links act solely to prevent the unauthorised use of a nuclear weapon.

Chapter-11

Nuclear Reactor Physics

Most nuclear reactors use a chain reaction to induce a controlled rate of nuclear fission in fissile material, releasing both energy and free neutrons. A reactor consists of an assembly of nuclear fuel (a reactor core), usually surrounded by a neutron moderator such as regular water, heavy water, graphite, or zirconium hydride, and fitted with mechanisms such as control rods that control the rate of the reaction.

Nuclear reactor physics is the branch of science that deals with the study and application of chain reaction to induce controlled rate of fission for energy in reactors.

The physics of nuclear fission has several quirks that affect the design and behavior of nuclear reactors. Here we, presents a general overview of the physics of nuclear reactors and their behavior.

Criticality

In a nuclear reactor, the neutron population at any instant is a function of the rate of neutron production (due to fission processes) and the rate of neutron losses (via non-fission absorption mechanisms and leakage from the system). When a reactor's neutron population remains steady from one generation to the next (creating as many new neutrons as are lost), the fission chain reaction is self-sustaining and the reactor's condition is referred to as "critical". When the reactor's neutron production exceeds losses, characterized by increasing power level, it is considered "supercritical", and; when losses dominate, it is considered "subcritical" and exhibits decreasing power.

The "Six-factor formula" is the neutron life-cycle balance equation, which includes six separate factors, the product of which is equal to the ratio of the number of neutrons in any generation to that of the previous one; this parameter is called the effective multiplication factor (k), a.k.a. K_{eff}. $k = L_f \rho L_{th} f \eta \epsilon$, where L_f = "fast non-leakage factor"; ρ = "resonance escape probability"; L_{th} = "thermal non-leakage factor"; f = "thermal fuel utilization factor"; η = "reproduction factor"; ϵ = "fast-fission factor".

k = (Neutrons produced in one generation)/(Neutrons produced in the previous generation) When the reactor is critical, k = 1. When the reactor is subcritical, k < 1. When the reactor is supercritical, k > 1.

"Reactivity" is an expression of the departure from criticality. δk = (k - 1)/k When the reactor is critical, δk = 0. When the reactor is subcritical, δk < 0. When the reactor is supercritical, δk > 0. Reactivity is also represented by the lowercase Greek letter rho (**ρ**). Reactivity is commonly expressed in decimals or percentages or pcm (per cent mille) of Δk/k. When reactivity ρ is expressed in units of delayed neutron fraction β, the unit is called the *dollar*.

If we write 'N' for the number of free neutrons in a reactor core and 'τ' for the average lifetime of each neutron (before it either escapes from the core or is absorbed by a nucleus), then the reactor will follow differential equation (the *evolution equation*)

$$dN / dt = \alpha N / \tau$$

where α is a constant of proportionality, and dN / dt is the rate of change of the neutron count in the core. This type of differential equation describes exponential growth or exponential decay, depending on the sign of the constant α, which is just the expected number of neutrons after one average neutron lifetime has elapsed:

$$\alpha = P_{impact} P_{fission} n_{avg} - P_{absorb} - P_{escape}$$

Here, P_{impact} is the probability that a particular neutron will strike a fuel nucleus, $P_{fission}$ is the probability that the neutron, having struck the fuel, will cause that nucleus to undergo fission, P_{absorb} is the probability that it will be absorbed by something other than fuel, and P_{escape} is the probability that it will "escape" by leaving the core altogether. n_{avg} is the number of neutrons produced, on average, by a fission event -- it is between 2 and 3 for both ^{235}U and ^{239}Pu.

If α is positive, then the core is *supercritical* and the rate of neutron production will grow exponentially until some other effect stops the growth. If α is negative, then the core is "subcritical" and the number of free neutrons in the core will shrink exponentially until it reaches an equilibrium at zero (or the background level from spontaneous fission). If α is exactly zero, then the reactor is *critical* and its output does not vary in time ($dN / dt = 0$, from above).

Nuclear reactors are engineered to reduce P_{escape} and P_{absorb}. Small, compact structures reduce the probability of direct escape by minimizing the surface area of the core, and some materials (such as graphite) can reflect some neutrons back into the core, further reducing P_{escape}.

The probability of fission, $P_{fission}$, depends on the nuclear physics of the fuel, and is often expressed as a cross section. Reactors are usually controlled by adjusting P_{absorb}. Control rods made of a strongly neutron-absorbent material such as cadmium or boron can be

inserted into the core: any neutron that happens to impact the control rod is lost from the chain reaction, reducing α. P_{absorb} is also controlled by the recent history of the reactor core itself.

Starter sources

The mere fact that an assembly is supercritical does not guarantee that it contains any free neutrons at all. At least one neutron is required to "strike" a chain reaction, and if the spontaneous fission rate is sufficiently low it may take a long time (in ^{235}U reactors, as long as many minutes) before a chance neutron encounter starts a chain reaction even if the reactor is supercritical. Most nuclear reactors include a "starter" neutron source that ensures there are always a few free neutrons in the reactor core, so that a chain reaction will begin immediately when the core is made critical. A common type of startup neutron source is a mixture of an alpha particle emitter such as ^{241}Am (americium-241) with a lightweight isotope such as ^{9}Be (beryllium-9).

The primary sources described above have to be used with fresh reactor cores. For operational reactors, secondary sources are used; most often a combination of antimony with beryllium. Antimony becomes activated in the reactor and produces high-energy gamma photons, which produce photoneutrons from beryllium.

Uranium-235 undergoes a small rate of natural spontaneous fission, so there are always some neutrons being produced even in a fully shutdown reactor. When the control rods are withdrawn and criticality is approached the number increases because the absorption of neutrons is being progressively reduced, until at criticality the chain reaction becomes self-sustaining. Note that while a neutron source is provided in the reactor, this is not essential to start the chain reaction, its main purpose is to give a shutdown neutron population which is detectable by instruments and so make the approach to critical more observable. The reactor will go critical at the same control rod position whether a source is loaded or not.

Once the chain reaction is begun, the primary starter source may be removed from the core to prevent damage from the high neutron flux in the operating reactor core; the secondary sources usually remains in situ to provide a background reference level for control of criticality.

Subcritical multiplication

Even in a subcritical assembly such as a shut-down reactor core, any stray neutron that happens to be present in the core (for example from spontaneous fission of the fuel, from radioactive decay of fission products, or from a neutron source) will trigger an exponentially decaying chain reaction. Although the chain reaction is not self-sustaining, it acts as a multiplier that increases the equilibrium number of neutrons in the core. This *subcritical multiplication* effect can be used in two ways: as a probe of how close a core is to criticality, and as a way to generate fission power without the risks associated with a critical mass.

As a measurement technique, subcritical multiplication was used during the Manhattan Project in early experiments to determine the minimum critical masses of ^{235}U and of ^{239}Pu. It is still used today to calibrate the controls for nuclear reactors during startup, as many effects (discussed in the following sections) can change the required control settings to achieve criticality in a reactor. As a power-generating technique, subcritical multiplication allows generation of nuclear power for fission where a critical assembly is undesirable for safety or other reasons. A subcritical assembly together with a neutron source can serve as a steady source of heat to generate power from fission.

Including the effect of an external neutron source ("external" to the fission process, not physically external to the core), one can write a modified evolution equation:

$$dN / dt = \alpha N / \tau + R_{ext}$$

where R_{ext} is the rate at which the external source injects neutrons into the core. In equilibrium, the core is not changing and dN/dt is zero, so the equilibrium number of neutrons is given by:

$$N = \tau R_{ext} / (- \alpha)$$

If the core is subcritical, then α is negative so there is an equilibrium with a positive number of neutrons. If the core is close to criticality, then α is very small and thus the final number of neutrons can be made arbitrarily large.

Neutron moderators

To improve $P_{fission}$ and enable a chain reaction, uranium-fueled reactors must include a neutron moderator that interacts with newly produced fast neutrons from fission events to reduce their kinetic energy from several MeV to several eV, making them more likely to induce fission. This is because ^{235}U is much more likely to undergo fission when struck by one of these thermal neutrons than by a freshly-produced neutron from fission.

Neutron moderators are materials that interact weakly with the neutrons but absorb kinetic energy from them. Most moderators rely on either weakly bound hydrogen or a loose crystal structure of another light element such as carbon to transfer kinetic energy from the fast-moving neutrons.

Hydrogen moderators include water (H_2O), heavy water(D_2O), and zirconium hydride (ZrH_2), all of which work because a hydrogen nucleus has nearly the same mass as a free neutron: neutron-H_2O or neutron-ZrH_2 impacts excite rotational modes of the molecules (spinning them around). Deuterium nuclei (in heavy water) absorb kinetic energy less well than do light hydrogen nuclei, but they are much less likely to absorb the impacting neutron. Water or heavy water have the advantage of being transparent liquids, so that, in addition to shielding and moderating a reactor core, they permit direct viewing of the core in operation and can also serve as a working fluid for heat transfer.

Crystal structure moderators rely on a floppy crystal matrix to absorb phonons from neutron-crystal impacts. Graphite is the most common example of such a moderator. It was used in Chicago Pile-1, the world's first man-made critical assembly, and was commonplace in early reactor designs including the Soviet RBMK nuclear power plants, of which the Chernobyl plant was one.

Moderators and reactor design

The amount and nature of neutron moderation affects reactor controllability and hence safety. Because moderators both slow and absorb neutrons, there is an optimum amount of moderator to include in a given geometry of reactor core. Less moderation reduces the effectiveness by reducing the $P_{fission}$ term in the evolution equation, and more moderation reduces the effectiveness by increasing the P_{escape} term.

Most moderators become less effective with increasing temperature, so *under-moderated* reactors are stable against changes in temperature in the reactor core: if the core overheats, then the quality of the moderator is reduced and the reaction tends to slow down (there is a "negative temperature coefficient" in the reactivity of the core). Water is an extreme case: in extreme heat, it can boil, producing effective voids in the reactor core without destroying the physical structure of the core; this tends to shut down the reaction and reduce the possibility of a fuel meltdown. *Over-moderated* reactors are unstable against changes in temperature (there is a "positive temperature coefficient" in the reactivity of the core), and so are less inherently safe than under-moderated cores.

Some reactors use a combination of moderator materials. For example, TRIGA type research reactors use ZrH_2 moderator mixed with the ^{235}U fuel, an H_2O-filled core, and C (graphite) moderator and reflector blocks around the periphery of the core.

Delayed neutrons and controllability

Fission reactions and subsequent neutron escape happen very quickly; this is important for nuclear weapons, where the object is to make a nuclear core release as much energy as possible before it physically explodes. Most neutrons emitted by fission events are prompt: they are emitted essentially instantaneously. Once emitted, the average neutron lifetime (τ) in a typical core is on the order of a millisecond, so if the exponential factor α is as small as 0.01, then in one second the reactor power will vary by a factor of $(1+0.01)^{1000}$, or more than ten thousand. Nuclear weapons are engineered to maximize the power growth rate, with lifetimes well under a millisecond and exponential factors close to 2; but such rapid variation would render it practically impossible to control the reaction rates in a nuclear reactor.

Fortunately, the *effective* neutron lifetime is much longer than the average lifetime of a single neutron in the core. About 0.65% of the neutrons produced by ^{235}U fission, and about 0.75% of the neutrons produced by ^{239}Pu fission, are not produced immediately, but rather are emitted by radioactive decay of fission products, with an average lifetime of about 15 seconds. These delayed neutrons increase the effective average lifetime of

neutrons in the core, to nearly 0.1 seconds, so that a core with α of 0.01 would increase in one second by only a factor of $(1+0.01)^{10}$, or about 1.1 -- a 10% increase. This is a controllable rate of change.

Most nuclear reactors are hence operated in a *prompt subcritical*, *delayed critical* condition: the prompt neutrons alone are not sufficient to sustain a chain reaction, but the delayed neutrons make up the small difference required to keep the reaction going. This has effects on how reactors are controlled: when a small amount of control rod is slid into or out of the reactor core, the power level changes at first very rapidly due to *prompt subcritical multiplication* and then more gradually, following the exponential growth or decay curve of the delayed critical reaction. Further, *increases* in reactor power can be performed at any desired rate simply by pulling out a sufficient length of control rod -- but *decreases* are limited in speed, because even if the reactor is taken deeply subcritical, the delayed neutrons are produced by ordinary radioactive decay of fission products and that decay cannot be hastened.

Reactor poisons

Any element that strongly absorbs neutrons is called a reactor poison, because it tends to shut down (poison) an ongoing fission chain reaction. Some reactor poisons are deliberately inserted into fission reactor cores to control the reaction; boron or cadmium control rods are the best example. Many reactor poisons are produced by the fission process itself, and buildup of neutron-absorbing fission products affects both the fuel economics and the controllability of nuclear reactors.

Long-lived poisons and fuel reprocessing

In practice, buildup of reactor poisons in nuclear fuel is what determines the lifetime of nuclear fuel in a reactor: long before all possible fissions have taken place, buildup of long-lived neutron absorbing fission products damps out the chain reaction. This is the reason that nuclear reprocessing is a useful activity: spent nuclear fuel contains about 99% of the original fissionable material present in newly manufactured nuclear fuel. Chemical separation of the fission products restores the nuclear fuel so that it can be used again.

Nuclear reprocessing is useful economically because chemical separation is much simpler to accomplish than the difficult isotope separation required to prepare nuclear fuel from natural uranium ore, so that in principle chemical separation yields more generated energy for less effort than mining, purifying, and isotopically separating new uranium ore. In practice, both the difficulty of handling the highly radioactive fission products and other political concerns make fuel reprocessing a contentious subject. One such concern is the fact that spent uranium nuclear fuel contains significant quantities of ^{239}Pu, a prime ingredient in nuclear weapons.

Short-lived poisons and controllability

Short-lived reactor poisons in fission products strongly affect how nuclear reactors can operate. Unstable fission product nuclei transmute into many different elements (*secondary fission products*) as they undergo a decay chain to a stable isotope. The most important such element is xenon, because the isotope ^{135}Xe, a secondary fission product with a half-life of about 9 hours, is an extremely strong neutron absorber. In an operating reactor, each nucleus of ^{135}Xe is destroyed by neutron capture almost as soon as it is created, so that there is no buildup in the core. However, when a reactor shuts down, the level of ^{135}Xe builds up in the core for about 9 hours before beginning to decay. The result is that, about 6-8 hours after a reactor is shut down, it can become physically impossible to restart the chain reaction until the ^{135}Xe has had a chance to decay over the next several hours. This temporary state, which may last several days and prevent restart, is called the iodine pit or xenon-poisoning. It is one reason why nuclear power reactors are usually operated at an even power level around the clock.

^{135}Xe buildup in a reactor core makes it extremely dangerous to operate the reactor a few hours after it has been shut down. Because the ^{135}Xe absorbs neutrons strongly, starting a reactor in a high-Xe condition requires pulling the control rods out of the core much farther than normal. However, if the reactor does achieve criticality, then the neutron flux in the core becomes high and ^{135}Xe is destroyed rapidly -- this has the same effect as very rapidly removing a great length of control rod from the core, and can cause the reaction to grow too rapidly or even become prompt critical.

^{135}Xe played a large part in the Chernobyl accident: about eight hours after a scheduled maintenance shutdown, workers tried to bring the reactor to a zero power critical condition to test a control circuit. Since the core was loaded with ^{135}Xe from the previous day's power generation, it was necessary to withdraw more control rods to achieve this. As a result, the overdriven reaction grew rapidly and uncontrollably, leading to steam explosion in the core, fire in the graphite moderator, and violent destruction of the facility.

Uranium enrichment

While many fissionable isotopes exist in nature, the only usefully fissile isotope found in any quantity is ^{235}U. About 0.7% of the uranium in most ores is the 235 isotope, and about 99.3% is the inert 238 isotope. For most uses as a nuclear fuel, uranium must be *enriched* - purified so that it contains a higher percentage of ^{235}U. Because ^{238}U absorbs fast neutrons, the critical mass needed to sustain a chain reaction increases as the ^{238}U content increases, reaching infinity at 94% ^{238}U (6% ^{235}U). Concentrations lower than 6% ^{235}U cannot go fast critical, though they are usable in a nuclear reactor with a neutron moderator. A nuclear weapon primary stage using uranium uses HEU enriched to ~90% ^{235}U, though the secondary stage often uses lower enrichments. Nuclear reactors with water moderator can operate with only moderate enrichment of ~5% ^{235}U. Nuclear reactors with heavy water moderation can operate with natural uranium, eliminating altogether the need for enrichment and preventing the fuel from being useful for nuclear

weapons; the CANDU power reactors used in Canadian power plants are an example of this type.

Uranium enrichment is difficult because the chemical properties of ^{235}U and ^{238}U are identical, so physical processes such as gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge or mass spectrometry must be used for isotopic separation based on small differences in mass. Because enrichment is the main technical hurdle to production of nuclear fuel and simple nuclear weapons, enrichment technology is politically sensitive.

Oklo: a natural nuclear reactor

Modern deposits of uranium contain only up to ~0.7% ^{235}U (and ~99.3% ^{238}U), which is not enough to sustain a chain reaction moderated by ordinary water. But ^{235}U has a much shorter half-life (700 million years) than ^{238}U (4.5 billion years), so in the distant past the percentage of ^{235}U was much higher. About two billion years ago, a water-saturated uranium deposit (in what is now the Oklo mine in Gabon, West Africa) underwent a naturally occurring chain reaction that was moderated by groundwater and, presumably, controlled by the negative void coefficient as the water boiled from the heat of the reaction. Uranium from the Oklo mine is about 50% depleted compared to other locations: it is only about 0.3% to 0.7% ^{235}U; and the ore contains traces of stable daughters of long-decayed fission products.

Chapter-12

Nuclear Submarine

USS *Michigan*: An *Ohio*-class ballistic missile submarine.

A **nuclear submarine** is a submarine powered by a nuclear reactor marine propulsion). The performance advantages of nuclear submarines over "conventional" (typically diesel-electric) submarines are considerable: nuclear propulsion, being completely independent of air, frees the submarine from the need to surface frequently, as is necessary for conventional submarines; the large amount of power generated by a nuclear reactor allows nuclear submarines to operate at high speed for long durations; and the long interval between refuellings grants a range limited only by consumables such as food. Current generations of nuclear submarines never need to be refueled throughout their 25-year lifespans. Conversely, the limited power stored in electric batteries means that even

the most advanced conventional submarine can only remain submerged for a few days at slow speed, and only a few hours at top speed; recent advances in air-independent propulsion have eroded this disadvantage somewhat. The high cost of nuclear technology means that relatively few states have fielded nuclear submarines. Some of the most serious nuclear and radiation accidents in the world have involved nuclear submarine mishaps.

History

USS *Nautilus* (SSN-571), the first nuclear powered submarine.

The idea for a nuclear-powered submarine was first proposed by the Naval Research Laboratory's Ross Gunn in 1939.

The United States launched the USS *Nautilus*, the first nuclear submarine, in 1954. *Nautilus* could remain underwater for up to four months without resurfacing.

Construction of the *Nautilus* was made possible by the successful development of a nuclear propulsion plant by a group of scientists and engineers at the Naval Reactors Branch of the Atomic Energy Commission. In July 1951, the U.S. Congress authorized construction of the world's first nuclear-powered submarine, under the leadership of Captain Hyman G. Rickover, USN.

The Westinghouse Corporation was assigned to build its reactor. After the submarine was completed, President Harry S. Truman broke the traditional bottle of champagne on *Nautilus'* bow. On January 17, 1955, it began its sea trials after leaving its dock in Groton, Connecticut. The submarine was 320 feet long, and cost about $55 million.

The Soviet Union soon followed the United States in developing nuclear-powered submarines in the 1950s. Stimulated by the U.S. development of the *Nautilus*, Soviet

work on nuclear propulsion reactors began in the early 1950s at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, in Obninsk, under Anatoliy P. Alexandrov, later to become head of the Kurchatov Institute. In 1956, the first Soviet propulsion reactor designed by his team began operational testing. Meanwhile, a design team under Vladimir N. Peregudov worked on the vessel that would house the reactor.

After overcoming many obstacles, including steam generation problems, radiation leaks, and other difficulties, the first nuclear submarine based on these combined efforts entered service in the Soviet Navy in 1958.

The VMF Typhoon class submarine, is nuclear powered and the world's heaviest submarine.

At the height of the Cold War, approximately five to ten nuclear submarines were being commissioned from each of the four Soviet submarine yards (Sevmash in Severodvinsk, Admiralteyskiye Verfi in St. Petersburg, Krasnoye Sormovo in Nizhny Novgorod, and Amurskiy Zavod in Komsomolsk-on-Amur). From the late 1950s through the end of 1997, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, built a total of 245 nuclear submarines, more than all other nations combined.

Today, six countries deploy some form of nuclear-powered strategic submarines: the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, People's Republic of China, and

India. Several other countries, including Argentina and Brazil, have ongoing projects in different phases to build nuclear-powered submarines.

In the United Kingdom, all former and current nuclear submarines for the Royal Navy have been constructed in Barrow-in-Furness (at BAE Systems Submarine Solutions or its predecessor VSEL).

Technology

HMS *Astute*, an advanced nuclear powered attack submarine.

The main difference between conventional submarines and nuclear submarines is the power generation system. Nuclear submarines employ nuclear reactors for this task. They either generate electricity that powers electric motors connected to the propeller shaft or rely on the reactor heat to produce steam that drives steam turbines (cf. nuclear marine propulsion). Reactors used in submarines typically use highly enriched fuel (often greater than 20%) to enable them to deliver a large amount of power from a smaller reactor.

The nuclear reactor also supplies power to the submarine's other subsystems, such as for maintenance of air quality, fresh water production by distilling salt water from the ocean, temperature regulation, etc. All naval nuclear reactors currently in use are operated with diesel generators as a backup power system. These engines are able to provide emergency electrical power for reactor decay heat removal as well as enough electric power to supply an emergency propulsion mechanism. Submarines may carry nuclear fuel for up to 30 years of operation. The only resource that limits the time underwater is the food supply for the crew and maintenance of the vessel.

The stealth weakness of nuclear submarines is the need to cool the reactor even when the submarine is not moving; about 70% of the reactor output heat is coupled into the sea water. This leaves a "thermal wake", a plume of warm water of lower density which ascends to the sea surface and creates a "thermal scar" observable by thermal imaging systems, e.g. FLIR.

Chapter-13

Thorium Fuel Cycle

The **thorium fuel cycle** is a nuclear fuel cycle that uses the naturally abundant isotope of thorium, ^{232}Th, as the fertile material which is transmuted into the fissile artificial uranium isotope ^{233}U which is the nuclear fuel. Unlike natural uranium, natural thorium contains only trace amounts of fissile material (such as ^{231}Th), and these are insufficient to initiate a nuclear chain reaction. Thus, some fissile material or other neutron source must be supplied to initiate the fuel cycle. In a thorium-fueled reactor, ^{232}Th will absorb neutrons eventually to produce ^{233}U, which is similar to the process in uranium-fueled reactors whereby fertile ^{238}U absorbs neutrons to form fissile ^{239}Pu. Depending on the design of the reactor and fuel cycle, the ^{233}U generated is either utilized in situ or chemically separated from the used nuclear fuel and used in new nuclear fuel.

The thorium fuel cycle claims several potential advantages over a uranium fuel cycle, including greater abundance, superior physical and nuclear properties of fuel, enhanced proliferation resistance, and reduced plutonium and actinide production.

History

Concerns about the limits of worldwide uranium resources motivated initial interest in the thorium fuel cycle. It was envisioned that as uranium reserves were depleted, thorium would supplement uranium as a fertile material. However, for most countries, uranium was relatively abundant, and research in thorium fuel cycles waned. A notable exception is India's three stage nuclear power programme. Recently there has been renewed interest in thorium-based fuels for improving proliferation resistance and waste characteristics of used nuclear fuel.

Thorium fuels have been used in several power and research reactors. One of the earliest efforts to use a thorium fuel cycle took place at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 1960s. An experimental Molten Salt Reactor technology to study the feasibility of such an approach used thorium(IV) fluoride dissolved in a molten salt kept hot enough to be liquid, thus eliminating the need for fabricating fuel elements. This effort culminated in the Molten-Salt Reactor Experiment that used ^{232}Th as the fertile material and ^{233}U as the fissile fuel. Owing to a lack of funding, the MSR program was discontinued in 1976.

Professor Carlo Rubbia proposed the concept of an energy amplifier or "accelerator driven system" (ADS), a novel and safe way of producing nuclear energy exploiting present-day accelerator technologies, which is actively being studied worldwide in order to incinerate high activity waste from accelerators, and produce energy from natural thorium and depleted uranium. The energy resources potentially deriving from these fuels will be practically unlimited and comparable to those from nuclear fusion.

Nuclear reactions with thorium



In the thorium cycle, fuel is formed when 232Th captures a neutron (whether in a fast reactor or thermal reactor) to become 233Th. This normally emits an electron and an anti-neutrino (ν) by β−decay to become 233Pa. This then emits another electron and anti-neutrino by a second β−decay to become 233U, the fuel:

$$\mathrm{n} + {}^{232}_{90}\mathrm{Th} \rightarrow {}^{233}_{90}\mathrm{Th} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{233}_{91}\mathrm{Pa} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{233}_{92}\mathrm{U}$$

Fission product wastes

Nuclear fission produces radioactive fission products which can have half-lives from less than 100 years to greater than 200,000 years. According to some toxicity studies which assume that the thorium cycle can recycle actinide wastes and only emit fission product wastes, after a few hundred years the waste from a thorium reactor can be less toxic than the uranium ore that would have been used to produce low enriched uranium fuel for a light water reactor of the same power. Other studies assume some actinide losses and find that actinide wastes dominate thorium cycle waste radioactivity at some time periods in the future.

Actinide wastes

In a reactor, when a neutron hits a fissile atom (such as certain isotopes of uranium), it either splits the nucleus or is captured and transmutes the atom. In the case of ^{233}U, the transmutations tend to produce useful nuclear fuels rather than transuranic wastes. When ^{233}U absorbs a neutron, it either fissions or becomes ^{234}U. The chance of fissioning on absorption of a thermal neutron is about 92%; the capture-to-fission ratio of ^{233}U, therefore, is about 1:10 - which is better than the corresponding capture vs. fission ratios of ^{235}U (about 1:6), or ^{239}Pu (about 1:2), or ^{241}Pu (about 1:4). The result is less long-lived, hazardous transuranic waste than in a reactor using the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle.



Uranium-234, like most actinides with an even number of neutrons, is not a fissile isotope, but neutron capture produces fissile ^{235}U. If the newly created fissile isotope fails to fission on neutron capture, it will subsequently produce ^{236}U, ^{237}Np, ^{238}Pu, and eventually fissile ^{239}Pu and heavier isotopes of plutonium. The ^{237}Np can be removed and stored as waste or retained and transmuted to plutonium, where more of it fissions, with the remainder becoming ^{242}Pu then americium and curium, which in turn can be removed as waste or returned to reactors for further transmutation and fission.

However, the ^{231}Pa (with a half life of 3.27×10^4 yr) formed via (*n*,2*n*) reactions with ^{232}Th (yielding ^{231}Th that decays to ^{231}Pa), while not a transuranic waste, is a major contributor to the long term radiotoxicity of spent nuclear fuel.

Uranium-232 contamination

Uranium-232 is also formed in this process, via (*n*,2*n*) reactions between fast neutrons and ^{233}U, ^{233}Pu, and ^{232}Th:

$$\mathrm{n} + {}^{232}_{90}\mathrm{Th} \rightarrow {}^{233}_{90}\mathrm{Th} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{233}_{91}\mathrm{Pa} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{233}_{92}\mathrm{U} + \mathrm{n} \rightarrow {}^{232}_{92}\mathrm{U} + 2\mathrm{n}$$
$$\mathrm{n} + {}^{232}_{90}\mathrm{Th} \rightarrow {}^{233}_{90}\mathrm{Th} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{233}_{91}\mathrm{Pa} + \mathrm{n} \rightarrow {}^{232}_{91}\mathrm{Pa} + 2\mathrm{n} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{232}_{92}\mathrm{U}$$
$$\mathrm{n} + {}^{232}_{90}\mathrm{Th} \rightarrow {}^{231}_{90}\mathrm{Th} + 2\mathrm{n} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{231}_{91}\mathrm{Pa} + \mathrm{n} \rightarrow {}^{232}_{91}\mathrm{Pa} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{232}_{92}\mathrm{U}$$

Uranium-232 has a relatively short half-life (68.9 yr), and some decay products emit high energy gamma radiation, such as ^{224}Rn, ^{212}Bi and particularly ^{208}Tl. The full decay chain, along with half-lives and relevant gamma energies, is:



^{232}U decays to ^{228}Th where it joins decay chain of ^{232}Th

$$^{232}_{92}\mathrm{U} \xrightarrow{\alpha} {}^{228}_{90}\mathrm{Th}\ (68.9\ \mathrm{a})$$
$$^{228}_{90}\mathrm{Th} \xrightarrow{\alpha} {}^{224}_{88}\mathrm{Ra}\ (1.9\ \mathrm{a})$$
$$^{224}_{88}\mathrm{Ra} \xrightarrow{\alpha} {}^{220}_{86}\mathrm{Rn}\ (3.6\ \mathrm{d},\ 0.24\ \mathrm{MeV})$$
$$^{220}_{86}\mathrm{Rn} \xrightarrow{\alpha} {}^{216}_{84}\mathrm{Po}\ (55\ \mathrm{s},\ 0.54\ \mathrm{MeV})$$
$$^{216}_{84}\mathrm{Po} \xrightarrow{\alpha} {}^{212}_{82}\mathrm{Pb}\ (0.15\ \mathrm{s})$$

$$^{212}_{82}\mathrm{Pb} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{212}_{83}\mathrm{Bi}\ (10.64\ \mathrm{h})$$
$$^{212}_{83}\mathrm{Bi} \xrightarrow{\alpha} {}^{208}_{81}\mathrm{Tl}\ (61\ \mathrm{m},\ 0.78\ \mathrm{MeV})$$
$$^{208}_{81}\mathrm{Tl} \xrightarrow{\beta^-} {}^{208}_{82}\mathrm{Pb}\ (3\ \mathrm{m},\ 2.6\ \mathrm{MeV})$$

The hard gamma emissions damage electronics, and make the use of thorium-cycle fuels difficult in military bomb triggers. ^{232}U cannot be chemically separated from ^{233}U from used nuclear fuel; however, chemical separation of thorium from uranium will remove the decay product ^{228}Th and the radiation from the rest of the decay chain, which will gradually build up again as ^{228}Th reaccumulates. The hard gamma emissions also create a radiological hazard which requires remote handling during reprocessing. Of course, a sufficiently well-funded, determined organization could overcome these obstacles, but plutonium production is a less-risky development path for nuclear weapons.

Advantages as a nuclear fuel

Thorium offers several potential advantages:

Thorium is estimated to be about three to four times more abundant than uranium in the Earth's crust, although present knowledge of reserves is limited. Current demand for thorium has been satisfied as a by-product of rare-earth extraction from monazite sands. Also, unlike uranium, mined thorium consists of a single isotope (^{232}Th). Consequently, it is useful in thermal reactors without the need for isotope separation.

Thorium-based fuels exhibit several attractive nuclear properties relative to uranium-based fuels. The thermal neutron absorption cross section (σ_a) and resonance integral (average of neutron cross sections over intermediate neutron energies) for ^{232}Th are about three times and one third of the respective values for ^{238}U; consequently, fertile conversion of thorium is more efficient in a thermal reactor. Also, although the thermal neutron fission cross section (σ_f) of the resulting ^{233}U is comparable to ^{235}U and ^{239}Pu, it has a much lower capture cross section (σ_γ) than the latter two fissile isotopes, providing fewer non-fissile neutron absorptions and improved neutron economy. Finally, the ratio of neutrons released per neutron absorbed (η) in ^{233}U is greater than two over a wide range of energies, including the thermal spectrum; as a result, thorium-based fuels can be the basis for a thermal breeder reactor.

Thorium-based fuels also display favorable physical and chemical properties which improve reactor and repository performance. Compared to the predominant reactor fuel, uranium dioxide (UO_2), thorium dioxide (ThO_2) has a higher melting point, higher thermal conductivity, and lower coefficient of thermal expansion. Thorium dioxide also exhibits greater chemical stability and, unlike uranium dioxide, does not further oxidize.

Because the ^{233}U produced in thorium fuels is inevitably contaminated with ^{232}U, thorium-based used nuclear fuel possesses inherent proliferation resistance. ^{232}U can not be chemically separated from ^{233}U and has several decay products which emit high energy gamma radiation. These high energy photons are a radiological hazard that

necessitate the use of remote handling of separated uranium and aid in the passive detection of such materials.

The long term (on the order of roughly 10^3 to 10^6 yr) radiological hazard of conventional uranium-based used nuclear fuel is dominated by plutonium and other minor actinides, after which long-lived fission products become significant contributors again. A single neutron capture in ^{238}U is sufficient to produce transuranic elements, whereas six captures are generally necessary to do so from ^{232}Th. 98–99% of thorium-cycle fuel nuclei would fission at either ^{233}U or ^{235}U, so fewer long-lived transuranics are produced. Because of this, thorium is a potentially attractive alternative to uranium in mixed oxide (MOX) fuels to minimize the generation of transuranics and maximize the destruction of plutonium.

Disadvantages as nuclear fuel

There are several challenges to the application of thorium as a nuclear fuel, particularly for solid fuel reactors.

Unlike uranium, natural thorium contains no fissile isotopes; fissile material, generally ^{233}U, ^{235}U, or plutonium, must be supplemented to achieve criticality. This, along with the high sintering temperature necessary to make thorium-dioxide fuel, complicates the fuel fabrication process. Oak Ridge National Laboratory experimented with thorium tetrafluoride as fuel in a molten salt reactor from 1964–1969, which was far easier to both process and separate from fuel poisons (contaminants that slow or stop the chain reaction.)

If thorium is used in an open fuel cycle (i.e. utilizing ^{233}U in situ), higher burnup is necessary to achieve a favorable neutron economy. Although thorium dioxide has performed well at burnups of 170,000 MWd/t and 150,000 MWd/t at Fort St. Vrain Generating Station and AVR respectively, challenges complicate achieving this burnup in light water reactors (LWR), which compose the vast majority of existing power reactors.

Another challenge associated with a once-through thorium fuel cycle is the comparatively long interval over which ^{232}Th breeds to ^{233}U. The half-life of ^{233}Pa is about 27 days, which is an order of magnitude longer than the half-life of ^{239}Np. As a result, substantial ^{233}Pa builds into thorium-based fuels. ^{233}Pa is a significant neutron absorber, and although it eventually breeds into fissile ^{235}U, this requires two more neutron absorptions, which degrades neutron economy and increases the likelihood of transuranic production.

Alternatively, if solid thorium is used in a closed fuel cycle in which ^{233}U is recycled, remote handling is necessary for fuel fabrication because of the high radiation dose resulting from the decay products of ^{232}U. This is also true of recycled thorium because of the presence of ^{228}Th, which is part of the ^{232}U decay sequence. Further, although there is substantial worldwide experience recycling uranium fuels (e.g. PUREX), similar technology for thorium (e.g. THOREX) is still under development.

Although the presence of ^{232}U makes it a challenge, ^{233}U can be used in fission weapons, but this has been done only occasionally. The United States first tested ^{233}U as part of a bomb core in Operation Teapot in 1955. However, unlike plutonium, ^{233}U can be easily denatured by mixing it with natural or depleted uranium. Another option is to judiciously mix thorium fuels with small amounts of natural or depleted uranium during fabrication to ensure that ^{233}U concentrations at the end of cycle are acceptably low.

Though thorium-based fuels produce far less long-lived transuranics than uranium-based fuels, some long-lived actinide products constitute a long term radiological impact, especially ^{231}Pa.

Advocates for liquid core and molten salt reactors claim that these technologies negate thorium's disadvantages. Since only one liquid core reactor using thorium has been built, it is hard to validate the exact benefits. The lack of relevance to the nuclear weapon industry can be seen as a disadvantage to the development of Thorium usage in power generation, but a worldwide resurgence of nuclear power use could provide enough incentives and funding to negate this disadvantage.

Reactors

Thorium fuels have fueled several different reactor types, including light water reactors, heavy water reactors, high temperature gas reactors, sodium-cooled fast reactors, and molten salt reactors.

List of thorium-fueled reactors

Name and Country	Type	Power	Fuel	Operation period
AVR, Germany	HTGR, Experimental (Pebble bed reactor)	15 MW(e)	Th+^{235}U Driver Fuel, Coated fuel particles, Oxide & dicarbides	1967–1988
THTR-300, Germany	HTGR, Power (Pebble Type)	300 MW(e)	Th+^{235}U, Driver Fuel, Coated fuel particles, Oxide & dicarbides	1985–1989
Lingen, Germany	BWR Irradiation-testing	60 MW(e)	Test Fuel $(Th,Pu)O_2$ pellets	Terminated in 1973
Dragon, UK OECD-Euratom also Sweden, Norway & Switzerland	HTGR, Experimental (Pin-in-Block Design)	20 MWt	Th+^{235}U Driver Fuel, Coated fuel particles, Oxide & Dicarbides	1966–1973

Peach Bottom, USA	HTGR, Experimental (Prismatic Block)	40 MW(e)	Th+^{235}U Driver Fuel, Coated fuel particles, Oxide & dicarbides	1966–1972
Fort St Vrain, USA	HTGR, Power (Prismatic Block)	330 MW(e)	Th+^{235}U Driver Fuel, Coated fuel particles, Dicarbide	1976–1989
MSRE ORNL, USA	MSBR	7.5 MWt	^{233}U Molten Fluorides	1964–1969
Shippingport & Indian Point 1, USA	LWBR PWR, (Pin Assemblies)	100 MW(e), 285 MW(e)	Th+^{233}U Driver Fuel, Oxide Pellets	1977–1982, 1962–1980
SUSPOP/KSTR KEMA, Netherlands	Aqueous Homogenous Suspension (Pin Assemblies)	1 MWt	Th+HEU, Oxide Pellets	1974–1977
NRU & NRX, Canada	MTR (Pin Assemblies)		Th+^{235}U, Test Fuel	Irradiation–testing of few fuel elements
KAMINI; CIRUS; & DHRUVA, India	MTR Thermal	30 kWt; 40 MWt; 100 MWt	Al+^{233}U Driver Fuel, ‘J’ rod of Th & ThO2, ‘J’ rod of ThO_2	All three research reactors in operation
KAPS 1 &2; KGS 1 & 2; RAPS 2, 3 & 4, India	PHWR, (Pin Assemblies)	220 MW(e)	ThO_2 Pellets (For neutron flux flattening of initial core after start-up)	Continuing in all new PHWRs
FBTR, India	LMFBR, (Pin Assemblies)	40 MWt	ThO_2 blanket	In operation

(IAEA TECDOC-1450 "Thorium Fuel Cycle - Potential Benefits and Challenges", Table 1. Thorium utilization in different experimental and power reactors.)